Re: [PATCH v13 11/12] x509, pkcs7: Limit crypto combinations that may be used for module signing

[David Howells]

Vitaly Chikunov <vt@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> > +static const struct public_key_restriction public_key_restrictions[] = {
> > +	/* algo			encoding	hash */
> > +	{ "rsa",		"pkcs1",	"sha256" },
> > +	{ "rsa",		"pkcs1",	"sha384" },
> > +	{ "rsa",		"pkcs1",	"sha512" },
> > +	{ "rsa",		"emsa-pss",	"sha512" },
> > +	{ "ecdsa",		"x962",		"sha256" },
> > +	{ "ecdsa",		"x962",		"sha384" },
> > +	{ "ecdsa",		"x962",		"sha512" },
> > +	{ "ecrdsa",		"raw",		"sha256" },
> > +	{ "ecrdsa",		"raw",		"sha384" },
> > +	{ "ecrdsa",		"raw",		"sha512" },
> 
> Why such hash choice? Aren't it should be streebog256 and streebog512?

Maybe?  I don't have any example ecrdsa (assuming you're talking about that
specifically), nor does it seem that it was added to the choice of module
signing.  Possibly I should drop the encoding column - or just have a list of
hashes that we accept - but we might want to limit the hashes that can use
with ML-DSA more strictly (ie. only allow SHA512).

David