Re: [PATCH] x86/kfence: Fix booting on 32bit non-PAE systems

[Andrew Cooper]

On 26/01/2026 9:06 pm, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> The original patch inverted the PTE unconditionally to avoid
> L1TF-vulnerable PTEs, but Linux doesn't make this adjustment in 2-level
> paging.
>
> Adjust the logic to use the flip_protnone_guard() helper, which is a nop on
> 2-level paging but inverts the address bits in all other paging modes.
>
> This doesn't matter for the Xen aspect of the original change.  Linux no
> longer supports running 32bit PV under Xen, and Xen doesn't support running
> any 32bit PV guests without using PAE paging.
>
> Fixes: b505f1944535 ("x86/kfence: avoid writing L1TF-vulnerable PTEs")
> Reported-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@xxxxxxxxx>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAKFNMokwjw68ubYQM9WkzOuH51wLznHpEOMSqtMoV1Rn9JV_gw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@xxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Alexander Potapenko <glider@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Marco Elver <elver@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: x86@xxxxxxxxxx
> CC: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: kasan-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> CC: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h | 9 +++++----
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h
> index acf9ffa1a171..40cf6a5d781d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h
> @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static inline bool kfence_protect_page(unsigned long addr, bool protect)
>  {
>  	unsigned int level;
>  	pte_t *pte = lookup_address(addr, &level);
> -	pteval_t val;
> +	pteval_t val, new;
>  
>  	if (WARN_ON(!pte || level != PG_LEVEL_4K))
>  		return false;
> @@ -57,11 +57,12 @@ static inline bool kfence_protect_page(unsigned long addr, bool protect)
>  		return true;
>  
>  	/*
> -	 * Otherwise, invert the entire PTE.  This avoids writing out an
> -	 * L1TF-vulnerable PTE (not present, without the high address bits
> +	 * Otherwise, flip the Present bit, taking care to avoid writing an
> +	 * L1TF-vulenrable PTE (not present, without the high address bits
>  	 * set).
>  	 */
> -	set_pte(pte, __pte(~val));
> +	new = val ^ _PAGE_PRESENT;
> +	set_pte(pte, __pte(flip_protnone_guard(val, new, PTE_PFN_MASK)));
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * If the page was protected (non-present) and we're making it
>
> base-commit: fcb70a56f4d81450114034b2c61f48ce7444a0e2

And I apparently can't spell.  I'll do a v2 immediately, seeing as this
is somewhat urgent.

~Andrew