Re: [PATCH v15 00/28] x86: Secure Launch support for Intel TXT

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Thu, Feb 12, 2026 at 12:40 PM Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Thu, 12 Feb 2026, at 20:49, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
> > On 2/9/26 09:04, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> ...
> >> Surprisingly, even when doing a secure launch, the EFI runtime services still work happily, which means (AIUI) that code that was excluded from the D-RTM TCB is still being executed at ring 0? Doesn't this defeat D-RTM entirely in the case some exploit is hidden in the EFI runtime code? Should we measure the contents of EfiRuntimeServicesCode regions too?
> >
> > Yes, in fact in the early days I specifically stated that we should
> > provide for the ability to measure the RS blocks. Particularly if you
> > are not in an environment where you can isolate the calls to RS from the
> > TCB. While the RS can pose runtime corruption risks, the larger concern
> > is integrating the D-RTM validation of the Intel System Resources
> > Defense (ISRD), aka SMI isolation/SMM Supervisor, provided by the Intel
> > System Security Report (ISSR). Within the ISSR is a list of memory
> > regions which the SMM Policy Shim (SPS) restricts a SMI handler's access
> > when running. This allows a kernel to restrict what access a SMI handler
> > are able to reach, thus allowing them to be removed from the TCB when
> > the appropriate guards are put in place.
> >
> > If you are interested in understanding these further, Satoshi Tanda has
> > probably the best technical explanation without Intel market speak.
> >
> > ISRD: https://tandasat.github.io/blog/2024/02/29/ISRD.html
> > ISSR: https://tandasat.github.io/blog/2024/03/18/ISSR.html
> >
>
> Thanks, I'll take a look at those.
>
> But would it be better to disable the runtime services by default when doing a secure launch? PREEMPT_RT already does the same.

So I have a possible way to disable EFI runtime service without losing
the ability to write EFI vars.  We come up with a simple file format
to store deferred EFI var updates and we come up with a place to put
it so that we find it early-ish in boot the next time around.  (This
could be done via integration with systemd-boot or shim some other
boot loader or it could actually be part of the kernel.)  And then,
instead of writing variables directly, we write them to the deferred
list and then update them on reboot (before TXT launch, etc).  [0]
This would be a distincly nontrivial project and would not work for
all configurations.

As a maybe less painful option, we could disable EFI runtime services
but have a root-writable thing in sysfs that (a) turns them back on
but (b) first extends a PCR to say that they're turned back on.

(Or someone could try running runtime services at CPL3...)

[0] I have thought for years that Intel and AMD should do this on
their end, too.  Keep the sensitive part of SMI flash entirely locked
after boot and, instead of using magic SMM stuff to validate that
write attempts have the appropriate permissions and signatures, queue
them up as deferred upates and validate the signatures on the next
boot before locking flash.