Re: [PATCH] nvmet: auth: validate dhchap id list lengths(KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds)

[Chris Leech]

On Wed, Mar 11, 2026 at 02:52:36AM +0900, yunje shin wrote:
> Thanks for the review.
> 
> Yes, I triggered the KASAN issue by injecting an invalid dhlen The
> reproduction steps are:
> 1. Connect to the NVMe/TCP target on port 4420 (ICReq + Fabrics CONNECT).
> 2. Send AUTH_SEND with a crafted NEGOTIATE payload where dhlen=200. 3.
> The kernel target code in nvmet_auth_negotiate() then iterates
> 
>     for (i = 0; i < data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.dhlen; i++) {
>         int tmp_dhgid = data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[i + 30];
> 
> With dhlen=200, this reads idlist[30..229], but idlist[] is only 60
> bytes (indices 0..59). The accesses at indices 60 and beyond read past
> the kmalloc'd slab object into adjacent slab memory, which KASAN
> catches as a slab-out-of-bounds read.

Thank you, I appreciate understanding how this was triggered.
 
> While the standard Linux NVMe host driver does use hardcoded halen=3
> and dhlen=6, the NVMe target is network-facing and must validate all
> fields from the wire. A malicious or non-standard host can send
> arbitrary values. The same applies to halen — if halen > 30, the
> first loop also reads out of bounds.

Yes, this code absolutly should validate halen and dhlen bounds.

> Regarding idlist_half — yes, idlist is currently a fixed 60-byte array
> and the DH offset is always 30. I derived it from sizeof(idlist)
> rather than hardcoding 30 so that the bounds check and the DH offset
> stay consistent with the array definition. If the struct ever changes,
> the validation adapts automatically instead of silently going stale.

The 60-byte idlist (and 30:30 split) are part of the NVMe specification.
It's the maximum amount of space while keeping to a 64-byte struct.

I'd rather see this made clearer with a define for the limit, but not
adding code that appears to calculate it at runtime.

Thanks,
- Chris