Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] perf/x86/intel: Don't write PEBS_ENABLED on host<=>guest xfers if CPU has isolation

[Mi, Dapeng]

On 4/24/2026 1:59 AM, Jim Mattson wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 23, 2026 at 8:03 AM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> When filling the list of MSRs to be loaded by KVM on VM-Enter and VM-Exit,
>> *never* insert an entry for PEBS_ENABLED if the CPU properly isolates PEBS
>> events, in which case disabling counters via PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL is sufficient
>> to prevent unwanted PEBS events in the guest (or host).  Because perf loads
>> PEBS_ENABLE with the unfiltered cpu_hw_events.pebs_enabled, i.e. with both
>> host and guest masks, there is no need to load different values for the
>> guest versus host, perf+KVM can and should simply control which counters
>> are enabled/disabled via PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL.
>>
>> Avoiding touching PEBS_ENABLED fixes a theorized bug where PEBS_ENABLED can
>> end up with "stuck" bits if a PEBS event is throttled better generating the
>> list and actually entering the guest (Intel CPUs can't arbtitrarily block
>> NMIs). And stating the obvious, leaving PEBS_ENABLED as-is avoids three MSR
>> writes on every VMX transition: one each on entry/exit, and one more
>> explicit WRMSR to zero PEBS_ENABLED before VM-Entry (KVM assumes the only
>> reason PEBS_ENABLED is in the load list is if the CPU lacks isolation and
>> thus needs a quiescent period).
>>
>> Fixes: c59a1f106f5c ("KVM: x86/pmu: Add IA32_PEBS_ENABLE MSR emulation for extended PEBS")
>> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------
>>  1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
>> index 793335c3ce78..002d809f82ef 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
>> @@ -4999,12 +4999,15 @@ static struct perf_guest_switch_msr *intel_guest_get_msrs(int *nr, void *data)
>>         struct kvm_pmu *kvm_pmu = (struct kvm_pmu *)data;
>>         u64 intel_ctrl = hybrid(cpuc->pmu, intel_ctrl);
>>         u64 pebs_mask = cpuc->pebs_enabled & x86_pmu.pebs_capable;
>> -       int global_ctrl, pebs_enable;
>> +       u64 guest_pebs_mask = pebs_mask & ~cpuc->intel_ctrl_host_mask;
>> +       int global_ctrl;
> Is it worth noting somewhere that pebs_ept is not supported on any
> CPUs with PMU version < 5, where a single event can set two
> PEBS_ENABLE bits (cf. intel_pmu_pebs_enable)?
>
>>         /*
>>          * In addition to obeying exclude_guest/exclude_host, remove bits being
>>          * used for PEBS when running a guest, because PEBS writes to virtual
>> -        * addresses (not physical addresses).
>> +        * addresses (not physical addresses).  If the guest wants to utilize
>> +        * PEBS, and PEBS can safely enabled in the guest, bits for the guest's
>> +        * PEBS-enabled counters will be OR'd back in as appropriate.
>>          */
>>         *nr = 0;
>>         global_ctrl = (*nr)++;
>> @@ -5051,24 +5054,25 @@ static struct perf_guest_switch_msr *intel_guest_get_msrs(int *nr, void *data)
>>                 };
>>         }
>>
>> -       pebs_enable = (*nr)++;
>> -       arr[pebs_enable] = (struct perf_guest_switch_msr){
>> -               .msr = MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE,
>> -               .host = cpuc->pebs_enabled & ~cpuc->intel_ctrl_guest_mask,
>> -               .guest = pebs_mask & ~cpuc->intel_ctrl_host_mask & kvm_pmu->pebs_enable,
>> -       };
>> -
>> -       if (arr[pebs_enable].host) {
>> -               /* Disable guest PEBS if host PEBS is enabled. */
>> -               arr[pebs_enable].guest = 0;
>> -       } else {
>> -               /* Disable guest PEBS thoroughly for cross-mapped PEBS counters. */
>> -               arr[pebs_enable].guest &= ~kvm_pmu->host_cross_mapped_mask;
>> -               arr[global_ctrl].guest &= ~kvm_pmu->host_cross_mapped_mask;
>> -               /* Set hw GLOBAL_CTRL bits for PEBS counter when it runs for guest */
>> -               arr[global_ctrl].guest |= arr[pebs_enable].guest;
>> -       }
>> +       /*
>> +        * Disable counters where the guest PMC is different than the host PMC
>> +        * being used on behalf of the guest, as the PEBS record includes
>> +        * PERF_GLOBAL_STATUS, i.e. the guest will see overflow status for the
>> +        * wrong counter(s).  Similarly, disallow PEBS in the guest if the host
>> +        * is using PEBS, to avoid bleeding host state into PEBS records.
>> +        */
>> +       guest_pebs_mask &= kvm_pmu->pebs_enable & ~kvm_pmu->host_cross_mapped_mask;
>> +       if (pebs_mask & ~cpuc->intel_ctrl_guest_mask)
>> +               guest_pebs_mask = 0;
> I don't understand this clause. IIUC, it says that if we don't have
> any exclude-host PEBS events, then clear PEBS_ENABLE for the guest.

I suppose it says all guest PEBS events need to be disabled if there is any
event using PEBS on host side, and it's clearing GLOBAL_CTRL instead of
PEBS_ENABLE to disable guest PEBS events. 


>
> Yes, any guest-programmed PEBS event should be exclude-host, but if
> there is an inconsistency, shouldn't we apply a mask? What if there is
> only one exclude-host PEBS event, but there are two bits set in
> guest_pebs_mask?
>
>> +       /*
>> +        * Do NOT mess with PEBS_ENABLED.  As above, disabling counters via
>> +        * PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL is sufficient, and loading a stale PEBS_ENABLED,
>> +        * e.g. on VM-Exit, can put the system in a bad state.  Simply enable
>> +        * counters in PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, as perf load PEBS_ENABLED with the
>> +        * full value, i.e. perf *also* relies on PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL.
>> +        */
>> +       arr[global_ctrl].guest |= guest_pebs_mask;
>>         return arr;
>>  }
>>
>> --
>> 2.54.0.545.g6539524ca2-goog
>>