Re: [PATCH RFC] iommu: Enable per-device SSID space for SVA
From: Robin Murphy
Date: Tue May 12 2026 - 09:56:12 EST
On 12/05/2026 1:40 pm, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
On Tue, May 12, 2026 at 09:57:14AM +0000, Joonwon Kang wrote:
There is a bit more going on though, I think that is what Joonwon is
mentioning by asking about ST64B and ST64BV. I *think* the answer is:
- ST64B uses a posted write
- ST64BV can be restricted so EL0 cannot execute it, it uses a
non-posted write (AI tells me via EnASR)
- ST64BV0 can be used by EL0, always uses a non-posted write, and always
uses ACCDATA_EL1
Which is similar to Intel.
Ah, I missed that ST64BV is currently being trapped to EL1 while ST64B is
not [1]. However, I am not sure if the trap is to disallow EL0 to use it.
Can it be instead to pass the response value of the non-posted write to
EL0 while using the EL0-given PASID as-is? If so, I believe EL0 still can
specify arbitrary PASID as it wants via ST64BV.
I think if an OS implements things this way it is would security
broken as far as ENQCMD compatible HW goes.
Yes, I think it's rather the point that the EnALS/EnASR traps to EL1 allow EL1 to sanitise the data that ST64B/ST64BV are sending, and do exactly things like substituting a valid PASID. ST64BV0 offers a way of doing so _without_ needing the overhead of trapping, but conversely that needs the EnAS0 opt-in all the way down to indicate both EL1's awareness of programming ACCDATA_EL1 appropriately and EL2/3's awareness of context-switching it.
I've not looked closely at what exactly the arm64 arch code is doing today and how well it actually fits the expected ENQCMD usage model, but I can well believe it might need a bit of tweaking.
Thanks,
Robin.
Since I guess ST64B* instructions are to serve generic purposes not only
for communication with accelerators with SIOV but also with any memory
location or device without SIOV, I am not sure if it is always okay to
make those instructions work the way Jason mentioned.
The end point has to use the posted vs non-posted write distinction
for security.
The device only processes the PASID from a non-posted write,
Regarding ST64B, are the ARM devices behind ARM SMMU v3 supposed to work
this way too? If not, EL0 can specify arbitrary PASID via ST64B with the
kernel today [1].
If you want ENQCMD compatible semantics then yes you have to do all of
these things, it is part of the security design.
Jason