[PATCH v3 7/7] s390/mm: Lazy MMU mode sanitizer

From: Alexander Gordeev

Date: Tue Jun 16 2026 - 08:46:57 EST


Detect PTE entries access in lazy MMU mode by means other
than set_pte() and ptep_get() primitives, which would be
a read hazard.

The access to kasan shadow memory from ptep_get_lockless()
mistakenly hits invalid access in case a concurrent lazy
MMU access to the same PTE is happening. To avoid that
disable instrumentation for ptep_get_lockless() altogether.

Suggested-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h | 6 ++++++
arch/s390/mm/lazy_mmu.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 2b6659d61fa5..a93e7e786457 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -1047,6 +1047,12 @@ static inline void set_pte(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte)
__set_pte(ptep, pte);
}

+#define ptep_get_lockless ptep_get_lockless
+static inline __no_sanitize_address pte_t ptep_get_lockless(pte_t *ptep)
+{
+ return READ_ONCE(*ptep);
+}
+
static inline pte_t __ptep_get(pte_t *ptep)
{
return READ_ONCE(*ptep);
diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/lazy_mmu.c b/arch/s390/mm/lazy_mmu.c
index d75b93d9b0de..ee2385897bc7 100644
--- a/arch/s390/mm/lazy_mmu.c
+++ b/arch/s390/mm/lazy_mmu.c
@@ -63,10 +63,13 @@ static int invalidate_pte_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
}

static void set_pte_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
- pte_t *ptep, pte_t *end, pte_t *cache)
+ pte_t *start, pte_t *end, pte_t *cache)
{
- int i, nr_ptes;
+ int nr_ptes, nr_total = end - start;
+ pte_t *ptep = start;
+ int i;

+ kasan_unpoison_pte(start, nr_total);
while (ptep < end) {
nr_ptes = invalidate_pte_range(mm, addr, ptep, end);

@@ -77,6 +80,7 @@ static void set_pte_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,

addr += nr_ptes * PAGE_SIZE;
}
+ kasan_poison_pte(start, nr_total);
}

static void enter_ipte_norange(void)
@@ -94,6 +98,7 @@ static void enter_ipte_range(struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, pte_t *pte)
{
struct ipte_range *range;
+ unsigned int nr_ptes;

if (!test_facility(13))
return;
@@ -105,6 +110,9 @@ static void enter_ipte_range(struct mm_struct *mm,
range->base_addr = addr;
range->base_end = end;
range->base_pte = pte;
+
+ nr_ptes = (range->base_end - range->base_addr) / PAGE_SIZE;
+ kasan_poison_pte(range->base_pte, nr_ptes);
}

static void leave_ipte_range(void)
@@ -112,6 +120,7 @@ static void leave_ipte_range(void)
pte_t *ptep, *start, *start_cache, *cache;
unsigned long start_addr, addr;
struct ipte_range *range;
+ unsigned int nr_ptes;
int start_idx;

if (!test_facility(13))
@@ -148,6 +157,9 @@ static void leave_ipte_range(void)
range->end_pte = NULL;

done:
+ nr_ptes = (range->base_end - range->base_addr) / PAGE_SIZE;
+ kasan_unpoison_pte(range->base_pte, nr_ptes);
+
range->mm = NULL;
range->base_addr = 0;
range->base_end = 0;
@@ -227,10 +239,17 @@ static void __ipte_range_set_pte(struct ipte_range *range, pte_t *ptep, pte_t pt
static pte_t __ipte_range_ptep_get(struct ipte_range *range, pte_t *ptep)
{
unsigned int idx = ptep - range->base_pte;
+ pte_t pte;

lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled();
- if (pte_val(range->cache[idx]) == PTE_POISON)
- return __ptep_get(ptep);
+ if (pte_val(range->cache[idx]) == PTE_POISON) {
+ kasan_unpoison_pte(ptep, 1);
+ pte = __ptep_get(ptep);
+ kasan_poison_pte(ptep, 1);
+
+ return pte;
+ }
+
return range->cache[idx];
}

--
2.53.0