[PATCH bpf 1/2] bpf: Fix stack slot index in nospec checks

[Nuoqi Gui]

check_stack_write_fixed_off() computes the byte slot for a fixed-offset
stack write as -off - 1, and records each written byte in slot_type[] with
(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE.

The Spectre v4 sanitization pre-check uses slot_type[i] instead. For a
4-byte write at fp-8 after the lower half of fp-8 has been zeroed, the
pre-check scans bytes 0..3 and sees STACK_ZERO while the actual write updates
bytes 7..4. That can leave the second half-slot write without nospec_result
even though the bytes being overwritten still require sanitization.

Use the same slot index in the sanitization pre-check that the write path uses
when updating slot_type[].

Fixes: e4f4db47794c ("bpf: Fix pointer-leak due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Nuoqi Gui <gnq25@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 2abc79dbf281c..50e80dbbc1784 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3479,7 +3479,8 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		bool sanitize = reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type);
 
 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
-			u8 type = state->stack[spi].slot_type[i];
+			u8 type = state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) %
+							      BPF_REG_SIZE];
 
 			if (type != STACK_MISC && type != STACK_ZERO) {
 				sanitize = true;

-- 
2.34.1