Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] net/smc: bound the send length to the send buffer in smc_tx_sendmsg()
From: Dust Li
Date: Thu Jun 18 2026 - 12:14:42 EST
On 2026-06-14 03:23:32, Bryam Vargas via B4 Relay wrote:
>From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@xxxxxxxxx>
>
>On the SMC-D DMB-merge (nocopy) path, smc_cdc_msg_recv_action() advances
>conn->sndbuf_space from the peer's consumer cursor:
>
> diff_tx = smc_curs_diff(sndbuf_desc->len, &tx_curs_fin,
> &local_rx_ctrl.cons);
> atomic_add(diff_tx, &conn->sndbuf_space);
>
>The consumer cursor is wire-controlled and unvalidated, and
>smc_curs_diff()'s differing-wrap branch can return more than
>sndbuf_desc->len, so a forged cursor drives sndbuf_space past the send
>buffer (and across many CDC messages can overflow the signed counter
>negative). smc_tx_sendmsg() reads it as the available write space and
>performs a wrap-around copy whose second chunk (copylen - first_chunk,
>written at ring offset 0) is never re-bounded to sndbuf_desc->len,
>writing user data past the send buffer -- a heap out-of-bounds write of
>attacker-influenced length and content.
Hi Bryam,
I think this is the same as patch #2.
Best regards,
Dust
>
>Bound the write space to sndbuf_desc->len where it is consumed, treating
>a negative (sign-overflowed) value as out of range too, so the copy
>length can never exceed the ring. This enforces the documented
>0 <= sndbuf_space <= sndbuf_desc->len invariant at the producer,
>race-free against the CDC tasklet that advances sndbuf_space.
>
>Fixes: cc0ab806fc52 ("net/smc: adapt cursor update when sndbuf and peer DMB are merged")
>Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@xxxxxxxxx>
>---
> net/smc/smc_tx.c | 13 +++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
>
>diff --git a/net/smc/smc_tx.c b/net/smc/smc_tx.c
>index 3144b4b1fe29..5916f02060fb 100644
>--- a/net/smc/smc_tx.c
>+++ b/net/smc/smc_tx.c
>@@ -233,6 +233,19 @@ int smc_tx_sendmsg(struct smc_sock *smc, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
> /* initialize variables for 1st iteration of subsequent loop */
> /* could be just 1 byte, even after smc_tx_wait above */
> writespace = atomic_read(&conn->sndbuf_space);
>+ /* sndbuf_space is advanced from the peer's wire-controlled
>+ * consumer cursor on the SMC-D DMB-merge path; a forged cursor
>+ * can inflate it past the send buffer, or overflow the signed
>+ * accumulator to a negative value across many CDC messages
>+ * (which a plain "> len" check would miss before the size_t
>+ * cast below turns it huge). Bound it to the send buffer in
>+ * either case so the wrap-around write cannot run past
>+ * sndbuf_desc->len. This enforces the documented
>+ * 0 <= sndbuf_space <= sndbuf_desc->len invariant at the
>+ * producer, race-free against the CDC tasklet.
>+ */
>+ if (writespace < 0 || writespace > conn->sndbuf_desc->len)
>+ writespace = conn->sndbuf_desc->len;
> /* not more than what user space asked for */
> copylen = min_t(size_t, send_remaining, writespace);
> /* determine start of sndbuf */
>
>--
>2.43.0
>