Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] net/smc: bound the receive length to the RMB in smc_rx_recvmsg()

[Dust Li]

On 2026-06-18 22:11:12, Bryam Vargas wrote:
>On Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:03:17 +0800, Dust Li wrote:
>> Once we validate the CDC message at the input boundary (as in the
>> previous patch), bytes_to_rcv can never exceed rmb_desc->len, so
>> this check becomes unreachable. So I don't think this patch is needed.
>
>This one I'd actually like to keep, and let me walk through why -- I don't think the
>boundary check closes it.
>
>bytes_to_rcv isn't set to a cursor count, it's a running accumulator:
>smc_cdc_msg_recv_action does atomic_add(diff_prod, &bytes_to_rcv), where
>diff_prod = smc_curs_diff(rmb_desc->len, old, new). So bounding each cursor's count at
>the boundary doesn't bound the sum of the deltas.
>
>The differing-wrap branch of smc_curs_diff returns (len - old.count) + new.count,
>which is up to 2*len-1 even when both cursors pass count <= len. With len=16, a prod
>going (0,0) -> (1,15) gives diff=31, so bytes_to_rcv is already 31 > len after one
>message; alternating wrap 0<->1 at count=15 keeps adding ~len and eventually wraps the
>atomic_t negative. I have an A/B for this -- happy to send it along.

Glad to see you A/B test, I think we can decide after we see the real
issue.

>
>So to make this truly unreachable from the boundary check, we'd need to bound
>prod - cons <= len there, not just the absolute count. The consumer-side clamp is two
>lines and race-free against the tasklet, so my preference would be to keep it as a
>backstop -- but if you'd rather fold it into a stronger boundary check instead, I'm
>open to that.

Another thing I'd worry about is if this really happens, should we also
abort the connection like what we did in patch #1 ?

Best regards,
Dust