Re: [PATCH bpf] bpf: tcp: Fix use-after-free in bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch()
From: Jiayuan Chen
Date: Sat Jun 20 2026 - 10:07:33 EST
On 6/20/26 8:32 AM, Jose Fernandez (Anthropic) wrote:
reqsk_queue_hash_req() publishes a TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV request_sock onto
the ehash chain (via inet_ehash_insert(), which drops the bucket lock on
return) and only afterwards refcount_set()s rsk_refcnt to 3.
Lockless readers such as __inet_lookup_established() account for this by
using refcount_inc_not_zero(), but bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch() uses
plain sock_hold() while holding the bucket lock, on the assumption that
the lock guarantees sk_refcnt > 0. That assumption does not hold for
request_sock:
CPU 0 CPU 1
----- -----
tcp_conn_request()
reqsk_queue_hash_req()
inet_ehash_insert(req)
spin_lock(bucket)
__sk_nulls_add_node_rcu(req) // rsk_refcnt == 0
spin_unlock(bucket)
bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch()
spin_lock(bucket)
sock_hold(req) <-- addition on 0
spin_unlock(bucket)
refcount_set(&req->rsk_refcnt, 3) // clobbers saturated value
which surfaces as:
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate+0x48/0x90, CPU#1
Call Trace:
bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch+0x14e/0x170
bpf_iter_tcp_batch+0x53/0x200
bpf_iter_tcp_seq_next+0x27/0x70
bpf_seq_read+0x107/0x410
vfs_read+0xb9/0x380
refcount_warn_saturate() then saturates the count, the publishing CPU's
refcount_set() clobbers it, and the socket is left one reference short.
When the last legitimate owner drops its reference the reqsk is freed
while still reachable, leading to use-after-free panics in e.g.
inet_csk_accept() or inet_csk_listen_stop().
This reproduces in seconds with tcp_syncookies=0, a handful of threads
doing connect()/close() to a local listener while others read an
iter/tcp link in a tight loop.
Use refcount_inc_not_zero() and skip the socket on failure, the same way
every other ehash walker does. The listening hash is unaffected as
listeners are always inserted into lhash2 with sk_refcnt >= 1, so
bpf_iter_tcp_listening_batch() is left as-is.
If every matching socket in a bucket is mid-init, end_sk can stay at 0;
advance to the next bucket in that case rather than terminating the
whole iteration on a stale batch[0].
Fixes: 04c7820b776f ("bpf: tcp: Bpf iter batching and lock_sock")
Reviewed-by: Ben Cressey <ben@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Assisted-by: Claude:unspecified
Signed-off-by: Jose Fernandez (Anthropic) <jose.fernandez@xxxxxxxxx>
LGTM.
Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@xxxxxxxxx>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index fdc81150ff6c..92342dcc6892 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -3074,25 +3074,25 @@ static unsigned int bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch(struct seq_file *seq,
{
struct bpf_tcp_iter_state *iter = seq->private;
struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
- unsigned int expected = 1;
- struct sock *sk;
+ unsigned int expected = 0;
+ struct sock *sk = *start_sk;
- sock_hold(*start_sk);
- iter->batch[iter->end_sk++].sk = *start_sk;
-
- sk = sk_nulls_next(*start_sk);
Folding the open-coded first *start_sk into the loop is a good
cleanup — it was the one socket that bypassed the refcnt check.
The double-put on the realloc-failure path reported by ai is a separate,
pre-existing issue and can be addressed in a follow-up.