Re: [PATCH] perf trace: Refactor augmented_raw_syscalls using bpf_loop

From: Viktor Malik

Date: Fri Jun 26 2026 - 02:05:54 EST


On 6/25/26 19:55, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 25, 2026 at 4:58 AM Viktor Malik <vmalik@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> On 6/24/26 19:19, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jun 24, 2026 at 3:27 AM Viktor Malik <vmalik@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 6/24/26 08:47, Viktor Malik wrote:
>>>>> On 6/23/26 19:10, Namhyung Kim wrote:
>>>>>> Hello,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Jun 23, 2026 at 08:27:39AM -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>>>>>>> On Tue Jun 23, 2026 at 4:25 AM PDT, Viktor Malik wrote:
>>>>>>>> The loop for processing syscall args in augment_raw_syscalls has a
>>>>>>>> history of breaking with Clang updates, see e.g. commit 013eb043f37b
>>>>>>>> ("perf trace: Fix BPF loading failure (-E2BIG)") from Clang 15 to 16.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Now, a similar thing happened between Clang 21 and 22. While the issue
>>>>>>>> is mitigated on the main line by a recent verifier update, it remains
>>>>>>>> broken on the 6.12 and 6.18 stable branches:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [linux-6.18.y]# sudo perf trace true
>>>>>>>> libbpf: prog 'sys_enter': BPF program load failed: -E2BIG
>>>>>>>> libbpf: prog 'sys_enter': -- BEGIN PROG LOAD LOG --
>>>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>>> BPF program is too large. Processed 1000001 insn
>>>>>>>> processed 1000001 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 40 total_states 37941 peak_states 232 mark_read 0
>>>>>>>> -- END PROG LOAD LOG --
>>>>>>>> libbpf: prog 'sys_enter': failed to load: -E2BIG
>>>>>>>> libbpf: failed to load object 'augmented_raw_syscalls_bpf'
>>>>>>>> libbpf: failed to load BPF skeleton 'augmented_raw_syscalls_bpf': -E2BIG
>>>>>>>> Error: failed to get syscall or beauty map fd
>>>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The reason is that the loop is quite complex and the BPF verifier often
>>>>>>>> struggles to prove that it terminates.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Fix the issue by refactoring the loop body into a callback function and
>>>>>>>> calling the bpf_loop helper. This should prevent future breakages of
>>>>>>>> this kind since the callback function has no loops. It also allows to
>>>>>>>> drop a few artificial checks to help the verifier, including the changes
>>>>>>>> introduced by 013eb043f37b.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks for working on this. I encountered this issue before and never
>>>>>> found time to take a deeper look yet.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>>>>> Fixes: a68fd6a6cdd3 ("perf trace: Collect augmented data using BPF")
>>>>>>>> Fixes: 013eb043f37b ("perf trace: Fix BPF loading failure (-E2BIG)")
>>>>>>>> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>>> .../bpf_skel/augmented_raw_syscalls.bpf.c | 157 +++++++++++-------
>>>>>>>> 1 file changed, 96 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> diff --git a/tools/perf/util/bpf_skel/augmented_raw_syscalls.bpf.c b/tools/perf/util/bpf_skel/augmented_raw_syscalls.bpf.c
>>>>>>>> index 2a6e61864ee0..6d553ed3ac23 100644
>>>>>>>> --- a/tools/perf/util/bpf_skel/augmented_raw_syscalls.bpf.c
>>>>>>>> +++ b/tools/perf/util/bpf_skel/augmented_raw_syscalls.bpf.c
>>>>>>>> @@ -429,15 +429,96 @@ static bool pid_filter__has(struct pids_filtered *pids, pid_t pid)
>>>>>>>> return bpf_map_lookup_elem(pids, &pid) != NULL;
>>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> +struct args_loop_ctx {
>>>>>>>> + struct syscall_enter_args *args;
>>>>>>>> + unsigned int *beauty_map;
>>>>>>>> + void *payload_offset;
>>>>>>>> + int value_size;
>>>>>>>> + u64 *output;
>>>>>>>> + bool *do_output;
>>>>>>>> +};
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> +static long process_arg_cb(u64 i, void *ctx)
>>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>>>> + * Determine what type of argument and how many bytes to read from user space, using the
>>>>>>>> + * value in the beauty_map. This is the relation of parameter type and its corresponding
>>>>>>>> + * value in the beauty map, and how many bytes we read eventually:
>>>>>>>> + *
>>>>>>>> + * string: 1 -> size of string
>>>>>>>> + * struct: size of struct -> size of struct
>>>>>>>> + * buffer: -1 * (index of paired len) -> value of paired len (maximum: TRACE_AUG_MAX_BUF)
>>>>>>>> + */
>>>>>>>> + struct augmented_arg *augmented_arg;
>>>>>>>> + struct args_loop_ctx *loop_ctx;
>>>>>>>> + int aug_size, size, index;
>>>>>>>> + bool augmented;
>>>>>>>> + void *arg;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + /* Bounds check for the below map access to help the verifier */
>>>>>>>> + if (i < 0 || i >= 6)
>>>>>>>> + return 1;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + loop_ctx = (struct args_loop_ctx *)ctx;
>>>>>>>> + arg = (void *)loop_ctx->args->args[i];
>>>>>>>> + augmented = false;
>>>>>>>> + size = loop_ctx->beauty_map[i];
>>>>>>>> + aug_size = size; /* size of the augmented data read from user space */
>>>>>>>> + augmented_arg = (struct augmented_arg *)loop_ctx->payload_offset;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + if (size == 0 || arg == NULL)
>>>>>>>> + return 0; /* continue */
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + if (size == 1) { /* string */
>>>>>>>> + aug_size = bpf_probe_read_user_str(augmented_arg->value, loop_ctx->value_size, arg);
>>>>>>>> + augmented = true;
>>>>>>>> + } else if (size > 0 && size <= loop_ctx->value_size) { /* struct */
>>>>>>>> + if (!bpf_probe_read_user(augmented_arg->value, size, arg))
>>>>>>>> + augmented = true;
>>>>>>>> + } else if (size < 0 && size >= -6) { /* buffer */
>>>>>>>> + index = -(size + 1);
>>>>>>>> + barrier_var(index); // Prevent clang (noticed with v18) from removing the &= 7 trick.
>>>>>>>> + index &= 7; // Satisfy the bounds checking with the verifier in some kernels.
>>>>>>>> + aug_size = loop_ctx->args->args[index];
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + if (aug_size > TRACE_AUG_MAX_BUF)
>>>>>>>> + aug_size = TRACE_AUG_MAX_BUF;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + if (aug_size > 0) {
>>>>>>>> + if (!bpf_probe_read_user(augmented_arg->value, aug_size, arg))
>>>>>>>> + augmented = true;
>>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + /* Augmented data size is limited to sizeof(augmented_arg->unnamed union with value field) */
>>>>>>>> + if (aug_size > loop_ctx->value_size)
>>>>>>>> + aug_size = loop_ctx->value_size;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + /* write data to payload */
>>>>>>>> + if (augmented) {
>>>>>>>> + int written = offsetof(struct augmented_arg, value) + aug_size;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + if (written < 0 || written > sizeof(struct augmented_arg))
>>>>>>>> + return 1; /* break */
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + augmented_arg->size = aug_size;
>>>>>>>> + *loop_ctx->output += written;
>>>>>>>> + loop_ctx->payload_offset += written;
>>>>>>>> + *loop_ctx->do_output = true;
>>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>>>> +}
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> static int augment_sys_enter(void *ctx, struct syscall_enter_args *args)
>>>>>>>> {
>>>>>>>> - bool augmented, do_output = false;
>>>>>>>> - int zero = 0, index, value_size = sizeof(struct augmented_arg) - offsetof(struct augmented_arg, value);
>>>>>>>> + bool do_output = false;
>>>>>>>> + int zero = 0, value_size = sizeof(struct augmented_arg) - offsetof(struct augmented_arg, value);
>>>>>>>> u64 output = 0; /* has to be u64, otherwise it won't pass the verifier */
>>>>>>>> - s64 aug_size, size;
>>>>>>>> unsigned int nr, *beauty_map;
>>>>>>>> struct beauty_payload_enter *payload;
>>>>>>>> - void *arg, *payload_offset;
>>>>>>>> + void *payload_offset;
>>>>>>>> + long iters;
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> /* fall back to do predefined tail call */
>>>>>>>> if (args == NULL)
>>>>>>>> @@ -457,63 +538,17 @@ static int augment_sys_enter(void *ctx, struct syscall_enter_args *args)
>>>>>>>> /* copy the sys_enter header, which has the syscall_nr */
>>>>>>>> __builtin_memcpy(&payload->args, args, sizeof(struct syscall_enter_args));
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - /*
>>>>>>>> - * Determine what type of argument and how many bytes to read from user space, using the
>>>>>>>> - * value in the beauty_map. This is the relation of parameter type and its corresponding
>>>>>>>> - * value in the beauty map, and how many bytes we read eventually:
>>>>>>>> - *
>>>>>>>> - * string: 1 -> size of string
>>>>>>>> - * struct: size of struct -> size of struct
>>>>>>>> - * buffer: -1 * (index of paired len) -> value of paired len (maximum: TRACE_AUG_MAX_BUF)
>>>>>>>> - */
>>>>>>>> - for (int i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
>>>>>>>> - arg = (void *)args->args[i];
>>>>>>>> - augmented = false;
>>>>>>>> - size = beauty_map[i];
>>>>>>>> - aug_size = size; /* size of the augmented data read from user space */
>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>> - if (size == 0 || arg == NULL)
>>>>>>>> - continue;
>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>> - if (size == 1) { /* string */
>>>>>>>> - aug_size = bpf_probe_read_user_str(((struct augmented_arg *)payload_offset)->value, value_size, arg);
>>>>>>>> - /* minimum of 0 to pass the verifier */
>>>>>>>> - if (aug_size < 0)
>>>>>>>> - aug_size = 0;
>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>> - augmented = true;
>>>>>>>> - } else if (size > 0 && size <= value_size) { /* struct */
>>>>>>>> - if (!bpf_probe_read_user(((struct augmented_arg *)payload_offset)->value, size, arg))
>>>>>>>> - augmented = true;
>>>>>>>> - } else if ((int)size < 0 && size >= -6) { /* buffer */
>>>>>>>> - index = -(size + 1);
>>>>>>>> - barrier_var(index); // Prevent clang (noticed with v18) from removing the &= 7 trick.
>>>>>>>> - index &= 7; // Satisfy the bounds checking with the verifier in some kernels.
>>>>>>>> - aug_size = args->args[index] > TRACE_AUG_MAX_BUF ? TRACE_AUG_MAX_BUF : args->args[index];
>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>> - if (aug_size > 0) {
>>>>>>>> - if (!bpf_probe_read_user(((struct augmented_arg *)payload_offset)->value, aug_size, arg))
>>>>>>>> - augmented = true;
>>>>>>>> - }
>>>>>>>> - }
>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>> - /* Augmented data size is limited to sizeof(augmented_arg->unnamed union with value field) */
>>>>>>>> - if (aug_size > value_size)
>>>>>>>> - aug_size = value_size;
>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>> - /* write data to payload */
>>>>>>>> - if (augmented) {
>>>>>>>> - int written = offsetof(struct augmented_arg, value) + aug_size;
>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>> - if (written < 0 || written > sizeof(struct augmented_arg))
>>>>>>>> - return 1;
>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>> - ((struct augmented_arg *)payload_offset)->size = aug_size;
>>>>>>>> - output += written;
>>>>>>>> - payload_offset += written;
>>>>>>>> - do_output = true;
>>>>>>>> - }
>>>>>>>> - }
>>>>>>>> + struct args_loop_ctx loop_ctx = {
>>>>>>>> + .args = args,
>>>>>>>> + .beauty_map = beauty_map,
>>>>>>>> + .payload_offset = payload_offset,
>>>>>>>> + .value_size = value_size,
>>>>>>>> + .output = &output,
>>>>>>>> + .do_output = &do_output
>>>>>>>> + };
>>>>>>>> + iters = bpf_loop(6, process_arg_cb, &loop_ctx, 0);
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> bpf_loop() is old and generally not recommended.
>>>>>>> Please use bpf_for() then the diff will be one line change and
>>>>>>> can scale to any number of args. Not just 6.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks Alexei, I didn't know about this preference.
>>>>>
>>>>>> One thing we should take care is to support old kernels. The oldest
>>>>>> LTS kernel in the kernel.org is 5.10 and bpf_loop() was introduced in
>>>>>> 5.17 and bpf_for (bpf_iter_num) was 6.4.
>>>>>
>>>>> The problematic loop was introduced in 6.12 by a68fd6a6cdd3 ("perf
>>>>> trace: Collect augmented data using BPF") so we should be good using
>>>>> bpf_for. Or is perf from 7.2 supposed to work on 5.10 LTS kernels?
>>>>>
>>>>> I'll refactor with bpf_for and will send v2.
>>>>
>>>> Or I won't. It turns out that just swapping the for loop for bpf_for
>>>> leads to -E2BIG from the verifier again. Looking at the verifier log, it
>>>> fails to find equivalence between states at the loop head:
>>>>
>>>> [...]
>>>> 78: (85) call bpf_iter_num_next#84922 [...]
>>>> fp-56=map_value(map=beauty_payload_,ks=4,vs=24688,imm=112)
>>>> [...]
>>>> 78: (85) call bpf_iter_num_next#84922 [...]
>>>> fp-56=map_value(map=beauty_payload_,ks=4,vs=24688,imm=120)
>>>> [...]
>>>>
>>>> IMHO, the reason is that payload_offset, which points to the
>>>> beauty_payload_enter_map entry, gets updated in every iteration.
>>>>
>>>> This could be probably fixed on the perf side by reworking how augmented
>>>> args are stored but at this point, bpf_loop sounds like an easier and
>>>> more reliable approach.
>>>>
>>>> Let me know if anyone has objections, otherwise I'll send v2 of the
>>>> bpf_loop approach, with suggestions from Sashiko incorporated.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I'd still try to adapt bpf_for(), it's a much better code structure.
>>> You probably need to add a bounding checking/confirming `if ()`
>>> condition validating that offset at which you access map_value is
>>> always correct. And/or you might need barrier_var() before using i,
>>> because bpf_for() macro does bounds checking (check the macro itself),
>>> but compiler often will reorder instructions leading to verifier
>>> complaints.
>>
>> I gave it a try but wasn't successful so far. I think that the problem
>> is that while it would be possible to add an upper bound condition for
>> `payload_offset`, the verifier tracks the value of `payload_offset` too
>> precisely (as map_value(..., imm=X) with a concrete offset) and never
>> merges states with different offsets. And since there are multiple
>> branches inside the loop, each incrementing `payload_offset` by a
>> different value, the verifier seems to fork its state on each branch,
>> effectively leading to the amount of states growing exponentially and
>> hitting the jump limit.
>>
>> To me, bpf_loop sounds like a more reliable choice in this situation.
>
> correctly verified bpf_loop would basically have to follow the same
> logic, so if it works with bpf_loop, it should work with bpf_for.

Are you sure about that? My perception is that the bpf_loop callback is
only verified once in a single pass. On the contrary, bpf_for is a
normal loop, for which the verifier needs to prove that after some
iteration, we get to the state seen in a previous iteration (to prune
the state). Which never happens here because the offset to
beauty_payload_enter_map (the payload_offset var) is tracked precisely
and causes state forks on every condition inside the loop.

> Is
> it possible to share your bpf_for-based code in some branch to try
> locally? I'm sure it can be done one way or another.

The change is super-simple, I can as well share it here. It's just the
matter of using bpf_for with two additional suggested mechanisms,
barrier_var and a bounds check for payload_offset:

diff --git a/tools/perf/util/bpf_skel/augmented_raw_syscalls.bpf.c b/tools/perf/util/bpf_skel/augmented_raw_syscalls.bpf.c
index 2a6e61864ee0..341d77a78949 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/bpf_skel/augmented_raw_syscalls.bpf.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/bpf_skel/augmented_raw_syscalls.bpf.c
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ static bool pid_filter__has(struct pids_filtered *pids, pid_t pid)
static int augment_sys_enter(void *ctx, struct syscall_enter_args *args)
{
bool augmented, do_output = false;
- int zero = 0, index, value_size = sizeof(struct augmented_arg) - offsetof(struct augmented_arg, value);
+ int zero = 0, i, index, value_size = sizeof(struct augmented_arg) - offsetof(struct augmented_arg, value);
u64 output = 0; /* has to be u64, otherwise it won't pass the verifier */
s64 aug_size, size;
unsigned int nr, *beauty_map;
@@ -466,12 +466,16 @@ static int augment_sys_enter(void *ctx, struct syscall_enter_args *args)
* struct: size of struct -> size of struct
* buffer: -1 * (index of paired len) -> value of paired len (maximum: TRACE_AUG_MAX_BUF)
*/
- for (int i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
+ bpf_for(i, 0, 6) {
+ barrier_var(i);
arg = (void *)args->args[i];
augmented = false;
size = beauty_map[i];
aug_size = size; /* size of the augmented data read from user space */

+ if (payload_offset + sizeof(struct augmented_arg) > (void *)payload + sizeof(struct beauty_payload_enter))
+ break;
+
if (size == 0 || arg == NULL)
continue;


Thanks a lot for the help!
Viktor