[PATCH net-next v3 3/5] net: af_unix: useful handling of LSM denials on SCM_RIGHTS
From: Jori Koolstra
Date: Mon Jun 29 2026 - 15:45:05 EST
Right now if some LSM such as Smack denies an AF_UNIX socket peer to
receive an SCM_RIGHTS fd, the SCM_RIGHTS fd array will be cut short at
that point, and MSG_CTRUNC is set on return of recvmsg(). This is
highly problematic behaviour, because it leaves the receiver
wondering what happened. As per man page MSG_CTRUNC is supposed to
indicate that the control buffer was sized too short, but suddenly
a permission error might result in the exact same flag being set.
Moreover, the receiver has no chance to determine how many fds got
originally sent and how many were suppressed.[1]
Add a SO_RIGHTS_NOTRUNC option to UNIX sockets to enable more useful
handling of LSM denials when receiving SCM_RIGHTS messages: instead of
truncating the message at the first blocked fd, keep every fd slot
and store the LSM errno in the blocked slot.
[1]: https://github.com/uapi-group/kernel-features#useful-handling-of-lsm-denials-on-scm_rights
Signed-off-by: Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xxxxxxxxx>
---
include/net/af_unix.h | 1 +
include/net/scm.h | 15 +++++++++++----
include/uapi/asm-generic/socket.h | 3 +++
net/compat.c | 4 ++--
net/core/scm.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
net/unix/af_unix.c | 9 +++++++++
6 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
index 34f53dde65ce..bb1b3dee02e8 100644
--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ struct unix_sock {
struct scm_stat scm_stat;
int inq_len;
bool recvmsg_inq;
+ bool scm_rights_notrunc;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AF_UNIX_OOB)
struct sk_buff *oob_skb;
#endif
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index c52519669349..761cda0803fb 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ struct scm_cookie {
#endif
};
-void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
-void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
+void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, bool notrunc);
+void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, bool notrunc);
int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm);
struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
@@ -108,11 +108,18 @@ void scm_recv_unix(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags);
static inline int scm_recv_one_fd(struct file *f, int __user *ufd,
- unsigned int flags)
+ unsigned int flags, bool notrunc)
{
+ bool filtered;
+ int error;
+
if (!ufd)
return -EFAULT;
- return receive_fd(f, ufd, flags);
+
+ error = receive_fd_filtered(f, ufd, flags, &filtered);
+ if (filtered && notrunc)
+ return put_user(error, ufd);
+ return error;
}
#endif /* __LINUX_NET_SCM_H */
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/socket.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/socket.h
index 53b5a8c002b1..c5fb2ee96830 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/socket.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/socket.h
@@ -150,6 +150,9 @@
#define SO_INQ 84
#define SCM_INQ SO_INQ
+#define SO_RIGHTS_NOTRUNC 85
+#define SCM_RIGHTS_NOTRUNC SO_RIGHTS_NOTRUNC
+
#if !defined(__KERNEL__)
#if __BITS_PER_LONG == 64 || (defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__))
diff --git a/net/compat.c b/net/compat.c
index d68cf9c3aad5..6bdf4a2c9077 100644
--- a/net/compat.c
+++ b/net/compat.c
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static int scm_max_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg)
return (msg->msg_controllen - sizeof(struct compat_cmsghdr)) / sizeof(int);
}
-void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
+void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, bool notrunc)
{
struct compat_cmsghdr __user *cm =
(struct compat_cmsghdr __user *)msg->msg_control_user;
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
int err = 0, i;
for (i = 0; i < fdmax; i++) {
- err = scm_recv_one_fd(scm->fp->fp[i], cmsg_data + i, o_flags);
+ err = scm_recv_one_fd(scm->fp->fp[i], cmsg_data + i, o_flags, notrunc);
if (err < 0)
break;
}
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index a73b1eb30fd2..55bab203281a 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static int scm_max_fds(struct msghdr *msg)
return (msg->msg_controllen - sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) / sizeof(int);
}
-void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
+void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, bool notrunc)
{
struct cmsghdr __user *cm =
(__force struct cmsghdr __user *)msg->msg_control_user;
@@ -365,12 +365,12 @@ void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
return;
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) {
- scm_detach_fds_compat(msg, scm);
+ scm_detach_fds_compat(msg, scm, notrunc);
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < fdmax; i++) {
- err = scm_recv_one_fd(scm->fp->fp[i], cmsg_data + i, o_flags);
+ err = scm_recv_one_fd(scm->fp->fp[i], cmsg_data + i, o_flags, notrunc);
if (err < 0)
break;
}
@@ -542,8 +542,14 @@ void scm_recv_unix(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
if (!__scm_recv_common(sock->sk, msg, scm, flags))
return;
- if (scm->fp)
- scm_detach_fds(msg, scm);
+ if (scm->fp) {
+ struct unix_sock *u;
+ bool notrunc;
+
+ u = unix_sk(sock->sk);
+ notrunc = READ_ONCE(u->scm_rights_notrunc);
+ scm_detach_fds(msg, scm, notrunc);
+ }
if (sock->sk->sk_scm_pidfd)
scm_pidfd_recv(msg, scm);
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index f7a9d55eee8a..83274ce18e06 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -921,6 +921,7 @@ static bool unix_custom_sockopt(int optname)
{
switch (optname) {
case SO_INQ:
+ case SO_RIGHTS_NOTRUNC:
return true;
default:
return false;
@@ -956,6 +957,14 @@ static int unix_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
WRITE_ONCE(u->recvmsg_inq, val);
break;
+
+ case SO_RIGHTS_NOTRUNC:
+ if (val > 1 || val < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ WRITE_ONCE(u->scm_rights_notrunc, val);
+ break;
+
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
--
2.54.0