[PATCH bpf-next v2] bpf: Fix stack out-of-bounds write in cgroup link update
From: Sanghyun Park
Date: Tue Aug 18 2026 - 02:15:33 EST
The cgroup link update path checks only the program type. Several cgroup
hooks share a type while using different runtime contexts or verifier
contracts. A UDP6 sock_addr program can therefore replace a UDP4 program
and write beyond the four-byte ipc.addr context into adjacent fields of
the stack-local struct ipcm_cookie. The same omission lets an LSM_MAC
program replace an LSM_CGROUP program despite the incompatible return
semantics.
Validate replacement programs against the link attach type. Use the
existing per-type rules where applicable, and compare LSM
expected_attach_type explicitly because both flavors share
BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM. Preserve legacy non-enforcing CGROUP_SKB
ingress/egress updates.
CGROUP_SKB programs do not require CAP_NET_ADMIN when loaded. That
permission is checked when the program is attached. Once the link exists,
updates are controlled through its FD, so BPF_LINK_UPDATE does not check
CAP_NET_ADMIN again. Keep this behavior and only validate the attach type
during link update.
Fixes: 0c991ebc8c69 ("bpf: Implement bpf_prog replacement for an active bpf_cgroup_link")
Signed-off-by: Sanghyun Park <sanghyun.park.cnu@xxxxxxxxx>
---
v2:
- Extend validation from cgroup sock_addr programs to all cgroup program
types, including exact LSM attach flavors.
- Preserve legacy CGROUP_SKB ingress/egress replacement compatibility.
- Keep the CGROUP_SKB CAP_NET_ADMIN check on attach, not link update.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260805052858.2390918-3-sanghyun.park.cnu@xxxxxxxxx
---
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 8d111da886553c..de7a8b46814648 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -4462,7 +4462,8 @@ attach_type_to_prog_type(enum bpf_attach_type attach_type)
}
static int bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
- enum bpf_attach_type attach_type)
+ enum bpf_attach_type attach_type,
+ bool check_cap_net_admin)
{
enum bpf_prog_type ptype;
@@ -4473,7 +4474,8 @@ static int bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP:
return attach_type == prog->expected_attach_type ? 0 : -EINVAL;
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB:
- if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (check_cap_net_admin &&
+ !bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
/* cg-skb progs can be loaded by unpriv user.
* check permissions at attach time.
*/
@@ -4596,7 +4598,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr)
if (IS_ERR(prog))
return PTR_ERR(prog);
- if (bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(prog, attr->attach_type)) {
+ if (bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(prog, attr->attach_type, true)) {
bpf_prog_put(prog);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -5797,7 +5799,8 @@ static int link_create(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr)
return PTR_ERR(prog);
ret = bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(prog,
- attr->link_create.attach_type);
+ attr->link_create.attach_type,
+ true);
if (ret)
goto out;
@@ -5922,6 +5925,7 @@ static int link_update(union bpf_attr *attr)
{
struct bpf_prog *old_prog = NULL, *new_prog;
struct bpf_link *link;
+ enum bpf_attach_type atype;
u32 flags;
int ret;
@@ -5959,6 +5963,22 @@ static int link_update(union bpf_attr *attr)
goto out_put_progs;
}
+ if (link->type == BPF_LINK_TYPE_CGROUP) {
+ atype = link->attach_type;
+ /*
+ * BPF_LSM_MAC and BPF_LSM_CGROUP share BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, so
+ * the helper's default prog-type check cannot distinguish them.
+ */
+ if (new_prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM &&
+ new_prog->expected_attach_type != atype)
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ else
+ ret = bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(new_prog, atype,
+ false);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_put_progs;
+ }
+
if (link->ops->update_prog)
ret = link->ops->update_prog(link, new_prog, old_prog);
else