[PATCH net] sctp: fix possible out-of-bounds read in SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES

From: luoqing

Date: Tue Aug 18 2026 - 05:30:26 EST


From: Qing Luo <luoqing@xxxxxxxxxx>

While processing SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES in
sctp_process_param(), the length field is subtracted from
sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) and stored in a __u16 variable. If the
length is less than sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) (4 bytes), the unsigned
subtraction underflows, resulting in a value near 0xFFFF. The subsequent
for() loop then iterates far beyond the parameter boundaries, causing an
out-of-bounds read.

sctp_verify_param() performs no length validation for this parameter
type, so a malformed parameter with insufficient length can reach
sctp_process_param() through the INIT/INIT-ACK/COOKIE-ECHO processing
path.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Qing Luo <luoqing@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 12 +++++++++++-
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index 236e25abc7a4..ebf791969454 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -2169,12 +2169,19 @@ static enum sctp_ierror sctp_verify_param(struct net *net,
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS:
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:
case SCTP_PARAM_COOKIE_PRESERVATIVE:
- case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES:
case SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE:
case SCTP_PARAM_HEARTBEAT_INFO:
case SCTP_PARAM_UNRECOGNIZED_PARAMETERS:
case SCTP_PARAM_ECN_CAPABLE:
break;
+
+ case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES:
+ if (ntohs(param.p->length) < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) {
+ sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p,
+ chunk, err_chunk);
+ retval = SCTP_IERROR_ABORT;
+ }
+ break;
case SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND:
if (ntohs(param.p->length) != sizeof(*param.aind)) {
sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p,
@@ -2600,6 +2607,9 @@ static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
asoc->peer.ipv4_address = 1;

/* Cycle through address types; avoid divide by 0. */
+ if (ntohs(param.p->length) < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr))
+ break;
+
sat = ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
if (sat)
sat /= sizeof(__u16);
--
2.25.1