Re: [PATCH 3/4] mm/secretmem: zeroize secret pages before kdump

From: David Hildenbrand (Arm)

Date: Fri Aug 21 2026 - 10:37:22 EST


On 8/11/26 17:18, Jan Sebastian Götte wrote:
> On 8/11/26 17:14, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
>> On 8/11/26 17:05, Jan Sebastian Götte wrote:
>>>
>>> I'm aware nobody is really using secretmem. I decided to build this on top of
>>> secretmem because it's an existing API that actually kind of fits the use case.
>>> While I could have added a new API just for this (marking userspace memory as
>>> wipe-on-crash), making it part of secretmem instead gives some additional
>>> defense-in-depth protection for both users who only need wiping, and for users
>>> who only want secretmem's additional protection against kernel memory read
>>> primitives so I think everyone wins here.
>>
>> What I was thinking when I looked at patch #3+#4: 50% of the users you add are
>> irrelevant in practice.
>>
>> Or are you saying that you are going to start using secretmem for your use case?
>
> I'm in fact going to start using secretmem.

Okay, thanks for clarifying!

--
Cheers,

David