Re: [BUG] ksmbd: OOB read in share_config_request() when payload_sz == 0
From: Namjae Jeon
Date: Thu Aug 27 2026 - 22:36:40 EST
On Fri, Aug 28, 2026 at 7:38 AM Farhad Alemi <farhad.alemi@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Hello Namjae and Steve,
>
> While fuzzing Linux 7.1-rc5 with syzkaller, as part of research at ASU's
> SEFCOM lab, we hit the crash below. Crash reports can be found here:
>
> https://github.com/farhad-alemi/public_bug_reports/tree/main/106-ksmbd-oob-read-share_config_request/
>
> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strnlen+0x66/0x90 lib/string.c:432
> kstrndup+0x2d/0x160 mm/util.c:120
> share_config_request fs/smb/server/mgmt/share_config.c:168 [inline]
> ksmbd_share_config_get+0x5e0/0x1190
> fs/smb/server/mgmt/share_config.c:243
> smb2_tree_connect+0x2f4/0x1320 fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c:2015
>
> Our reproducer.c is available upon request.
>
> Happy to test a patch if that would help.
Can you test if the attached patch fixes this issue?
Thanks.
From d2c0970ab706b1d9e6c7960aeb17521acbc7b32c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 28 Aug 2026 08:39:57 +0900
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] ksmbd: prevent out-of-bounds reads in share config
responses
Validate IPC share configuration payload sizes before consuming
variable-length fields. Bound veto list parsing and account for
the separator byte when deriving the path length.
Fixes: a677ebd8ca2f ("ksmbd: validate payload size in ipc response")
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/smb/server/mgmt/share_config.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c | 21 ++++++++++------
2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/smb/server/mgmt/share_config.c b/fs/smb/server/mgmt/share_config.c
index b2d9580bddc6..cc9f18ede80d 100644
--- a/fs/smb/server/mgmt/share_config.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/mgmt/share_config.c
@@ -146,9 +146,9 @@ static struct ksmbd_share_config *__share_lookup(const char *name)
static int parse_veto_list(struct ksmbd_share_config *share,
char *veto_list,
- int veto_list_sz)
+ size_t veto_list_sz)
{
- int sz = 0;
+ size_t sz;
if (!veto_list_sz)
return 0;
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static int parse_veto_list(struct ksmbd_share_config *share,
while (veto_list_sz > 0) {
struct ksmbd_veto_pattern *p;
- sz = strlen(veto_list);
+ sz = strnlen(veto_list, veto_list_sz);
if (!sz)
break;
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static int parse_veto_list(struct ksmbd_share_config *share,
if (!p)
return -ENOMEM;
- p->pattern = kstrdup(veto_list, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP);
+ p->pattern = kstrndup(veto_list, sz, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP);
if (!p->pattern) {
kfree(p);
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -172,6 +172,9 @@ static int parse_veto_list(struct ksmbd_share_config *share,
list_add(&p->list, &share->veto_list);
+ if (sz == veto_list_sz)
+ break;
+
veto_list += sz + 1;
veto_list_sz -= (sz + 1);
}
@@ -224,17 +227,28 @@ static struct ksmbd_share_config *share_config_request(struct ksmbd_work *work,
}
if (!test_share_config_flag(share, KSMBD_SHARE_FLAG_PIPE)) {
- int path_len = PATH_MAX;
-
- if (resp->payload_sz)
- path_len = resp->payload_sz - resp->veto_list_sz;
+ size_t path_len;
- share->path = kstrndup(ksmbd_share_config_path(resp), path_len,
- KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP);
- if (!share->path) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
+ if (resp->payload_sz <= resp->veto_list_sz) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
} else {
- ret = 0;
+ path_len = resp->payload_sz - resp->veto_list_sz;
+ if (resp->veto_list_sz)
+ path_len--;
+
+ if (!path_len) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ } else {
+ share->path = kstrndup(
+ ksmbd_share_config_path(resp),
+ path_len, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP);
+ if (!share->path)
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ else
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (share->path) {
share->path_sz = strlen(share->path);
while (share->path_sz > 1 &&
share->path[share->path_sz - 1] == '/')
diff --git a/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c b/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c
index 4b0b572a3e1b..e550aa41ad2c 100644
--- a/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c
@@ -532,14 +532,21 @@ static int ipc_validate_msg(struct ipc_msg_table_entry *entry)
if (entry->msg_sz < sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response))
return -EINVAL;
- if (resp->payload_sz) {
- if (resp->payload_sz < resp->veto_list_sz)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (strnlen(resp->share_name, sizeof(resp->share_name)) ==
+ sizeof(resp->share_name))
+ return -EINVAL;
- if (check_add_overflow(sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response),
- resp->payload_sz, &msg_sz))
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ if (resp->veto_list_sz > resp->payload_sz)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (resp->flags != KSMBD_SHARE_FLAG_INVALID &&
+ !(resp->flags & KSMBD_SHARE_FLAG_PIPE) &&
+ resp->payload_sz <= resp->veto_list_sz)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (check_add_overflow(sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response),
+ resp->payload_sz, &msg_sz))
+ return -EINVAL;
break;
}
case KSMBD_EVENT_LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT:
--
2.34.1