[PATCH v4] keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into trusted_tpm_options
From: Srish Srinivasan
Date: Sat Aug 29 2026 - 09:09:56 EST
The trusted_key_options struct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle,
keyauth, blobauth_len, blobauth, pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash,
policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the
accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure.
Define a trusted_tpm_options structure and move the TPM-specific fields
there. Store a pointer to trusted_tpm_options in the private member of
trusted_key_options.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
Changelog:
v4:
- Rebased onto mainline after tpm-buf memory-safe allocation changes were
merged
- Resolved the resulting merge conflicts
v3:
- Exclude the preparatory clean up patch as the problem has been addressed
in commit 9ec4175a30eb ("KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature")
v2:
- Exclude the bug-fix patch as it has already been applied to 6.19-rc7
- Rename instances of trusted_tpm_options from tpm_opts to private
- Use pr_debug and KERN_DEBUG for logging debug messages (preparatory clean
up patch)
- Address other minor comments from Jarkko
include/keys/trusted-type.h | 11 ---
include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 14 ++++
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 96 ++++++++++++++---------
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 50 ++++++------
4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
index 9f9940482da4..3db61b57cf73 100644
--- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
@@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload {
struct trusted_key_options {
uint16_t keytype;
- uint32_t keyhandle;
- unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
- uint32_t blobauth_len;
- unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
- uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
- unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
- int pcrlock;
- uint32_t hash;
- uint32_t policydigest_len;
- unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
- uint32_t policyhandle;
void *private;
};
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
index 3a0fa3bc8454..98d638d13ecb 100644
--- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
@@ -6,6 +6,20 @@
extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops;
+struct trusted_tpm_options {
+ uint32_t keyhandle;
+ unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ uint32_t blobauth_len;
+ unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
+ unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
+ int pcrlock;
+ uint32_t hash;
+ uint32_t policydigest_len;
+ unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ uint32_t policyhandle;
+};
+
int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options);
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index bf0bf7f36970..14d005e76a1c 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -48,15 +48,17 @@ enum {
#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private;
+
if (!trusted_debug)
return;
pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
- pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
- pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
- pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
+ pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", private->keyhandle);
+ pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", private->pcrlock);
+ pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", private->pcrinfo_len);
print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
+ 16, 1, private->pcrinfo, private->pcrinfo_len, 0);
}
static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
@@ -626,6 +628,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
struct trusted_key_options *o)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private;
int ret;
struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -637,9 +640,10 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
/* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */
p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable;
- ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth,
+ ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth,
p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len,
- o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len);
+ private->blobauth, private->pcrinfo,
+ private->pcrinfo_len);
if (ret < 0)
pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
@@ -652,6 +656,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
struct trusted_key_options *o)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private;
int ret;
struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -660,8 +665,8 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
tpm_buf_init(tb, TPM_BUFSIZE);
- ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
- o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
+ ret = tpm_unseal(tb, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, p->blob,
+ p->blob_len, private->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
if (ret < 0)
pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
else
@@ -697,6 +702,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
struct trusted_key_options *opt)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = opt->private;
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
char *p = c;
int token;
@@ -712,7 +718,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
if (tpm2 < 0)
return tpm2;
- opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+ private->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
if (!c)
return 0;
@@ -726,11 +732,11 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
switch (token) {
case Opt_pcrinfo:
- opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
- if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
+ private->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
+ if (private->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
- res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
- opt->pcrinfo_len);
+ res = hex2bin(private->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
+ private->pcrinfo_len);
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
break;
@@ -739,12 +745,12 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype;
- opt->keyhandle = handle;
+ private->keyhandle = handle;
break;
case Opt_keyauth:
if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
- res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from,
+ res = hex2bin(private->keyauth, args[0].from,
SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -755,21 +761,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
* hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple
* passwords (although it can take a hash as well)
*/
- opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
+ private->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
- if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
- res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
+ if (private->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
+ res = hex2bin(private->blobauth, args[0].from,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ private->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
break;
}
- if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) {
- memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
- opt->blobauth_len);
+ if (tpm2 &&
+ private->blobauth_len <=
+ sizeof(private->blobauth)) {
+ memcpy(private->blobauth, args[0].from,
+ private->blobauth_len);
break;
}
@@ -787,14 +795,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- opt->pcrlock = lock;
+ private->pcrlock = lock;
break;
case Opt_hash:
if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask))
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) {
- opt->hash = i;
+ private->hash = i;
break;
}
}
@@ -806,14 +814,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
}
break;
case Opt_policydigest:
- digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
+ digest_len = hash_digest_size[private->hash];
if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len))
return -EINVAL;
- res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from,
+ res = hex2bin(private->policydigest, args[0].from,
digest_len);
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- opt->policydigest_len = digest_len;
+ private->policydigest_len = digest_len;
break;
case Opt_policyhandle:
if (!tpm2)
@@ -821,7 +829,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- opt->policyhandle = handle;
+ private->policyhandle = handle;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
@@ -832,6 +840,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private;
struct trusted_key_options *options;
int tpm2;
@@ -844,14 +853,22 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
/* set any non-zero defaults */
options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
- if (!tpm2)
- options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
+ private = kzalloc_obj(*private);
+ if (!private) {
+ kfree_sensitive(options);
+ options = NULL;
+ } else {
+ if (!tpm2)
+ private->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
+ options->private = private;
+ }
}
return options;
}
static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = NULL;
struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
int ret = 0;
int tpm2;
@@ -869,7 +886,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
goto out;
dump_options(options);
- if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
+ private = options->private;
+ if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -883,20 +901,23 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
goto out;
}
- if (options->pcrlock) {
- ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
+ if (private->pcrlock) {
+ ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
goto out;
}
}
out:
+ if (options)
+ kfree_sensitive(options->private);
kfree_sensitive(options);
return ret;
}
static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = NULL;
struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
int ret = 0;
int tpm2;
@@ -914,7 +935,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
goto out;
dump_options(options);
- if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
+ private = options->private;
+ if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -926,14 +948,16 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
if (ret < 0)
pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
- if (options->pcrlock) {
- ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
+ if (private->pcrlock) {
+ ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
goto out;
}
}
out:
+ if (options)
+ kfree_sensitive(options->private);
kfree_sensitive(options);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 67225dd562a9..07b831b515bb 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
u8 *src, u32 len)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE;
u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
u8 *work = scratch, *work1;
@@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid,
asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid));
- if (options->blobauth_len == 0) {
+ if (private->blobauth_len == 0) {
unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool;
/* tag 0 is emptyAuth */
w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true);
@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
goto err;
}
- work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle);
+ work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, private->keyhandle);
work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len);
work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len);
@@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
u8 **buf)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
int ret;
struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
u8 *blob;
@@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
return -ENOMEM;
*buf = blob;
- options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
+ private->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
blob += ctx.priv_len;
@@ -232,6 +234,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
struct tpm_buf *sized __free(kfree) = NULL;
@@ -240,11 +243,11 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
u32 flags;
int rc;
- hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash);
+ hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(private->hash);
if (hash < 0)
return hash;
- if (!options->keyhandle)
+ if (!private->keyhandle)
return -EINVAL;
rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
@@ -274,18 +277,18 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_init_sized(sized, TPM_BUFSIZE);
- rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL);
if (rc)
goto out;
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT,
- options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ private->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
/* sensitive */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->blobauth_len);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, private->blobauth_len);
- if (options->blobauth_len)
- tpm_buf_append(sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
+ if (private->blobauth_len)
+ tpm_buf_append(sized, private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);
tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, payload->key_len);
tpm_buf_append(sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);
@@ -298,14 +301,15 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
/* key properties */
flags = 0;
- flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
+ flags |= private->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
tpm_buf_append_u32(sized, flags);
/* policy */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->policydigest_len);
- if (options->policydigest_len)
- tpm_buf_append(sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, private->policydigest_len);
+ if (private->policydigest_len)
+ tpm_buf_append(sized, private->policydigest,
+ private->policydigest_len);
/* public parameters */
tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, TPM_ALG_NULL);
@@ -376,6 +380,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
u32 *blob_handle)
{
u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
unsigned int private_len;
unsigned int public_len;
@@ -395,7 +400,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
}
/* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
- if (!options->keyhandle)
+ if (!private->keyhandle)
return -EINVAL;
/* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
@@ -439,11 +444,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
- rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL);
if (rc)
return rc;
- tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, options->keyauth,
+ tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, private->keyauth,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
tpm_buf_append(buf, blob, blob_len);
@@ -483,6 +488,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
u32 blob_handle)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
struct tpm_header *head;
struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
u16 data_len;
@@ -507,10 +513,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (rc)
return rc;
- if (!options->policyhandle) {
+ if (!private->policyhandle) {
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
- options->blobauth,
- options->blobauth_len);
+ private->blobauth,
+ private->blobauth_len);
} else {
/*
* FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the
@@ -523,9 +529,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
* could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated
* password.
*/
- tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, options->policyhandle,
+ tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, private->policyhandle,
NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
- options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
+ private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);
if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
NULL, 0);
--
2.53.0