Re: [PATCH net v2] net/tcp-ao: don't dereference NULL current_key/rnext_key
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima
Date: Wed Sep 09 2026 - 00:47:14 EST
On Tue, Sep 8, 2026 at 9:31 PM Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Hi Xiang,
>
> Thanks for your report and the proposed fix.
> I remember I wanted to write tests for re-connect() on the same
> socket, but never found time for this, as it's not really used in BGP,
> as far as I'm aware.
>
> On Sun, 6 Sept 2026 at 04:04, Xiang Mei <xmei5@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > TCP_AO_DEL_KEY with del_async=1 is accepted in TCP_LISTEN and NULLs
> > current_key and rnext_key; tcp_ao_connect_init() clears them on a
> > reconnect. Five readers dereference them without a check.
> >
> > tcp_ao_time_wait() leaves tp->ao_info pointing at the tcp_ao_info it
> > hands the TIME_WAIT socket, and tcp_done() skips inet_csk_destroy_sock()
> > on the tcp_fin() FIN_WAIT2 path, so the full socket stays in TCP_CLOSE
> > with its fd open, sharing that object. An unprivileged
> > connect(AF_UNSPEC) + listen() then clears rnext_key while the TIME_WAIT
> > socket reads it from softirq, and tcp_v4_timewait_ack() dereferences it.
> > The segment need not be authenticated: tcp_v4_rcv()'s do_time_wait: path
> > skips tcp_inbound_hash().
> >
> > Check both fields and drop the segment when the key is gone; without one
> > no valid signature can be produced. In tcp_inbound_ao_hash() this must
> > be a drop rather than a fallthrough to the keyid lookup, which would let
> > the peer pick the verification key that rnext_key pins.
> >
> > This removes the dereferences only; the two sockets still share one
> > mutable tcp_ao_info, leaving snd_sne, lisn and sk_omem_alloc racy. The
> > first Fixes: is where the unchecked read came from, not the sharing.
> >
> > Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
> > 0xdffffc0000000010: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
> > KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000080-0x0000000000000087]
> > RIP: 0010:tcp_v4_rcv (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1055 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2333)
> > Call Trace:
> > <IRQ>
> > ip_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:207)
> > ip_local_deliver (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:262)
> > ip_rcv (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:612)
> > __netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:6264)
> > process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6728)
> > net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:8007)
> > handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:645)
> > </IRQ>
> > Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
> >
> > Fixes: decde2586b34 ("net/tcp: Add TCP-AO sign to twsk")
> > Fixes: 0a3a809089eb ("net/tcp: Verify inbound TCP-AO signed segments")
> > Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Reported-by: co+2c72469dbbec34af@xxxxxxx
> > Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/YG9s0PiBKJZcXAKld3MToa1IVRJOUoKiaA57%40bugs.sh/
> > Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@xxxxxxx>
> > ---
> > v2: drop the incomplete v1 fix; adding missing checks to avoid null-deref
> >
> > net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c | 6 ++++++
> > net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 4 ++++
> > net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 2 ++
> > 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c
> > index bb7bbc20ba3f..9c2e5c8c8fe3 100644
> > --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c
> > +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c
> > @@ -857,6 +857,8 @@ int tcp_ao_prepare_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> > return -ENOENT;
> > *traffic_key = snd_other_key(*key);
> > rnext_key = READ_ONCE(ao_info->rnext_key);
> > + if (!rnext_key)
> > + return -ENOENT;
>
> I think this is quite a big hammer to fix the re-connect() issue.
> In theory, we could even restrict connect()/listen() after TCP_CLOSE,
As there were too many rehash issues, we disallowed it.
8cc3aef0cb19 tcp: Do not allow buggy transitions between ehash and lhash2.
> but I think I have an idea how to address it "properly".
>
> I have a draft of a patch; I'll test it today and send it for review.
>
> > *keyid = rnext_key->rcvid;
> > *sne = tcp_ao_compute_sne(READ_ONCE(ao_info->snd_sne),
> > snd_basis, seq);
> > @@ -1026,6 +1028,8 @@ tcp_inbound_ao_hash(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb,
> > * matching the rcvid in the mkt.
> > */
> > key = READ_ONCE(info->rnext_key);
> > + if (!key)
> > + goto key_not_found;
> > if (key->rcvid != aoh->keyid) {
> > key = tcp_ao_established_key(sk, info, -1, aoh->keyid);
> > if (!key)
> > @@ -1045,6 +1049,8 @@ tcp_inbound_ao_hash(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb,
> > if (err)
> > return err;
> > current_key = READ_ONCE(info->current_key);
> > + if (!current_key)
> > + return SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_AOFAILURE;
> > /* Key rotation: the peer asks us to use new key (RNext) */
> > if (unlikely(aoh->rnext_keyid != current_key->sndid)) {
> > trace_tcp_ao_rnext_request(sk, skb, current_key->sndid,
> > diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
> > index 9f053eb8b46e..93e073065b1b 100644
> > --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
> > +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
> > @@ -1052,6 +1052,10 @@ static void tcp_v4_timewait_ack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> > key.traffic_key = snd_other_key(key.ao_key);
> > key.sne = READ_ONCE(ao_info->snd_sne);
> > rnext_key = READ_ONCE(ao_info->rnext_key);
> > + if (!rnext_key) {
> > + inet_twsk_put(tw);
> > + return;
> > + }
> > key.rcv_next = rnext_key->rcvid;
> > key.type = TCP_KEY_AO;
> > #else
> > diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
> > index df9c29eb5c1f..0fb75d139430 100644
> > --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
> > +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
> > @@ -1182,6 +1182,8 @@ static void tcp_v6_timewait_ack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> > key.traffic_key = snd_other_key(key.ao_key);
> > /* rcv_next switches to our rcv_next */
> > rnext_key = READ_ONCE(ao_info->rnext_key);
> > + if (!rnext_key)
> > + goto out;
> > key.rcv_next = rnext_key->rcvid;
> > key.sne = READ_ONCE(ao_info->snd_sne);
> > key.type = TCP_KEY_AO;
> > --
> > 2.43.0
> >
>
> Thanks again,
> Dmitry