RE: [EXT] [PATCH] crypto: caam - Remove public key support

From: Varun Sethi

Date: Wed Sep 09 2026 - 03:34:00 EST


Hi Herbert,
Gaurav and Meenakshi were maintaining the CAAM driver but have left NXP
sometime back. Sahil Malhotra would be taking up this responsibility now.
Please allow Sahil a few weeks to fully transition into this role.

Regards
Varun
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: 04 September 2026 11:08 AM
> To: Changwei Zou <changwei.zou@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx; gaurav.jain@xxxxxxx; Horia Geanta
> <horia.geanta@xxxxxxx>; linux-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; linux-
> kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; lukas@xxxxxxxxx; Pankaj Gupta
> <pankaj.gupta@xxxxxxx>
> Subject: [EXT] [PATCH] crypto: caam - Remove public key support
>
> Caution: This is an external email. Please take care when clicking links
or opening
> attachments. When in doubt, report the message using the 'Report this
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> button
>
>
> On Fri, Aug 21, 2026 at 03:18:24PM +1000, Changwei Zou wrote:
> >
> > A new version with two patches and a cover letter is available at the
following
> link.
>
> This driver hasn't been actively maintained for years.
>
> Let's just remove it:
>
> ---8<---
> Remove the public key part of the caam driver because it has been
> unmaintained and there are serious bugs in it.
>
> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
> deleted file mode 100644
> index cb001aa1de66..000000000000
> --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,1230 +0,0 @@
> -// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0+ OR BSD-3-Clause)
> -/*
> - * caam - Freescale FSL CAAM support for Public Key Cryptography
> - *
> - * Copyright 2016 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
> - * Copyright 2018-2019, 2023 NXP
> - *
> - * There is no Shared Descriptor for PKC so that the Job Descriptor must
carry
> - * all the desired key parameters, input and output pointers.
> - */
> -#include "compat.h"
> -#include "regs.h"
> -#include "intern.h"
> -#include "jr.h"
> -#include "error.h"
> -#include "desc_constr.h"
> -#include "sg_sw_sec4.h"
> -#include "caampkc.h"
> -#include <crypto/internal/engine.h>
> -#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
> -#include <linux/err.h>
> -#include <linux/kernel.h>
> -#include <linux/slab.h>
> -#include <linux/string.h>
> -
> -#define DESC_RSA_PUB_LEN (2 * CAAM_CMD_SZ + SIZEOF_RSA_PUB_PDB)
> -#define DESC_RSA_PRIV_F1_LEN (2 * CAAM_CMD_SZ + \
> - SIZEOF_RSA_PRIV_F1_PDB)
> -#define DESC_RSA_PRIV_F2_LEN (2 * CAAM_CMD_SZ + \
> - SIZEOF_RSA_PRIV_F2_PDB)
> -#define DESC_RSA_PRIV_F3_LEN (2 * CAAM_CMD_SZ + \
> - SIZEOF_RSA_PRIV_F3_PDB)
> -#define CAAM_RSA_MAX_INPUT_SIZE 512 /* for a 4096-bit modulus */
> -
> -/* buffer filled with zeros, used for padding */
> -static u8 *zero_buffer;
> -
> -/*
> - * variable used to avoid double free of resources in case
> - * algorithm registration was unsuccessful
> - */
> -static bool init_done;
> -
> -struct caam_akcipher_alg {
> - struct akcipher_engine_alg akcipher;
> - bool registered;
> -};
> -
> -static void rsa_io_unmap(struct device *dev, struct rsa_edesc *edesc,
> - struct akcipher_request *req)
> -{
> - struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
> -
> - dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->dst, edesc->dst_nents, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> - dma_unmap_sg(dev, req_ctx->fixup_src, edesc->src_nents,
> DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> -
> - if (edesc->sec4_sg_bytes)
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, edesc->sec4_sg_dma,
edesc->sec4_sg_bytes,
> - DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> -}
> -
> -static void rsa_pub_unmap(struct device *dev, struct rsa_edesc *edesc,
> - struct akcipher_request *req)
> -{
> - struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> - struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
> - struct rsa_pub_pdb *pdb = &edesc->pdb.pub;
> -
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->n_dma, key->n_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->e_dma, key->e_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> -}
> -
> -static void rsa_priv_f1_unmap(struct device *dev, struct rsa_edesc
*edesc,
> - struct akcipher_request *req)
> -{
> - struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> - struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
> - struct rsa_priv_f1_pdb *pdb = &edesc->pdb.priv_f1;
> -
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->n_dma, key->n_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->d_dma, key->d_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> -}
> -
> -static void rsa_priv_f2_unmap(struct device *dev, struct rsa_edesc
*edesc,
> - struct akcipher_request *req)
> -{
> - struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> - struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
> - struct rsa_priv_f2_pdb *pdb = &edesc->pdb.priv_f2;
> - size_t p_sz = key->p_sz;
> - size_t q_sz = key->q_sz;
> -
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->d_dma, key->d_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->p_dma, p_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->q_dma, q_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->tmp1_dma, p_sz, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->tmp2_dma, q_sz, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
> -}
> -
> -static void rsa_priv_f3_unmap(struct device *dev, struct rsa_edesc
*edesc,
> - struct akcipher_request *req)
> -{
> - struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> - struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
> - struct rsa_priv_f3_pdb *pdb = &edesc->pdb.priv_f3;
> - size_t p_sz = key->p_sz;
> - size_t q_sz = key->q_sz;
> -
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->p_dma, p_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->q_dma, q_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->dp_dma, p_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->dq_dma, q_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->c_dma, p_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->tmp1_dma, p_sz, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->tmp2_dma, q_sz, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
> -}
> -
> -/* RSA Job Completion handler */
> -static void rsa_pub_done(struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 err, void
*context)
> -{
> - struct akcipher_request *req = context;
> - struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
> - struct caam_drv_private_jr *jrp = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> - struct rsa_edesc *edesc;
> - int ecode = 0;
> - bool has_bklog;
> -
> - if (err)
> - ecode = caam_jr_strstatus(dev, err);
> -
> - edesc = req_ctx->edesc;
> - has_bklog = edesc->bklog;
> -
> - rsa_pub_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
> - rsa_io_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
> - kfree(edesc);
> -
> - /*
> - * If no backlog flag, the completion of the request is done
> - * by CAAM, not crypto engine.
> - */
> - if (!has_bklog)
> - akcipher_request_complete(req, ecode);
> - else
> - crypto_finalize_akcipher_request(jrp->engine, req, ecode);
> -}
> -
> -static void rsa_priv_f_done(struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 err,
> - void *context)
> -{
> - struct akcipher_request *req = context;
> - struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> - struct caam_drv_private_jr *jrp = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> - struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
> - struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
> - struct rsa_edesc *edesc;
> - int ecode = 0;
> - bool has_bklog;
> -
> - if (err)
> - ecode = caam_jr_strstatus(dev, err);
> -
> - edesc = req_ctx->edesc;
> - has_bklog = edesc->bklog;
> -
> - switch (key->priv_form) {
> - case FORM1:
> - rsa_priv_f1_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
> - break;
> - case FORM2:
> - rsa_priv_f2_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
> - break;
> - case FORM3:
> - rsa_priv_f3_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
> - }
> -
> - rsa_io_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
> - kfree(edesc);
> -
> - /*
> - * If no backlog flag, the completion of the request is done
> - * by CAAM, not crypto engine.
> - */
> - if (!has_bklog)
> - akcipher_request_complete(req, ecode);
> - else
> - crypto_finalize_akcipher_request(jrp->engine, req, ecode);
> -}
> -
> -/**
> - * caam_rsa_count_leading_zeros - Count leading zeros, need it to strip,
> - * from a given scatterlist
> - *
> - * @sgl : scatterlist to count zeros from
> - * @nbytes: number of zeros, in bytes, to strip
> - * @flags : operation flags
> - */
> -static int caam_rsa_count_leading_zeros(struct scatterlist *sgl,
> - unsigned int nbytes,
> - unsigned int flags)
> -{
> - struct sg_mapping_iter miter;
> - int lzeros, ents;
> - unsigned int len;
> - unsigned int tbytes = nbytes;
> - const u8 *buff;
> -
> - ents = sg_nents_for_len(sgl, nbytes);
> - if (ents < 0)
> - return ents;
> -
> - sg_miter_start(&miter, sgl, ents, SG_MITER_FROM_SG | flags);
> -
> - lzeros = 0;
> - len = 0;
> - while (nbytes > 0) {
> - /* do not strip more than given bytes */
> - while (len && !*buff && lzeros < nbytes) {
> - lzeros++;
> - len--;
> - buff++;
> - }
> -
> - if (len && *buff)
> - break;
> -
> - if (!sg_miter_next(&miter))
> - break;
> -
> - buff = miter.addr;
> - len = miter.length;
> -
> - nbytes -= lzeros;
> - lzeros = 0;
> - }
> -
> - miter.consumed = lzeros;
> - sg_miter_stop(&miter);
> - nbytes -= lzeros;
> -
> - return tbytes - nbytes;
> -}
> -
> -static struct rsa_edesc *rsa_edesc_alloc(struct akcipher_request *req,
> - size_t desclen)
> -{
> - struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> - struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
> - struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
> - struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
> - struct rsa_edesc *edesc;
> - gfp_t flags = (req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) ?
> - GFP_KERNEL : GFP_ATOMIC;
> - int sg_flags = (flags == GFP_ATOMIC) ? SG_MITER_ATOMIC : 0;
> - int sec4_sg_index, sec4_sg_len = 0, sec4_sg_bytes;
> - int src_nents, dst_nents;
> - int mapped_src_nents, mapped_dst_nents;
> - unsigned int diff_size = 0;
> - int lzeros;
> -
> - if (req->src_len > key->n_sz) {
> - /*
> - * strip leading zeros and
> - * return the number of zeros to skip
> - */
> - lzeros = caam_rsa_count_leading_zeros(req->src,
req->src_len -
> - key->n_sz,
sg_flags);
> - if (lzeros < 0)
> - return ERR_PTR(lzeros);
> -
> - req_ctx->fixup_src = scatterwalk_ffwd(req_ctx->src,
req->src,
> - lzeros);
> - req_ctx->fixup_src_len = req->src_len - lzeros;
> - } else {
> - /*
> - * input src is less then n key modulus,
> - * so there will be zero padding
> - */
> - diff_size = key->n_sz - req->src_len;
> - req_ctx->fixup_src = req->src;
> - req_ctx->fixup_src_len = req->src_len;
> - }
> -
> - src_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req_ctx->fixup_src,
> - req_ctx->fixup_src_len);
> - dst_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, req->dst_len);
> -
> - mapped_src_nents = dma_map_sg(dev, req_ctx->fixup_src, src_nents,
> - DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - if (unlikely(!mapped_src_nents)) {
> - dev_err(dev, "unable to map source\n");
> - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> - }
> - mapped_dst_nents = dma_map_sg(dev, req->dst, dst_nents,
> - DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> - if (unlikely(!mapped_dst_nents)) {
> - dev_err(dev, "unable to map destination\n");
> - goto src_fail;
> - }
> -
> - if (!diff_size && mapped_src_nents == 1)
> - sec4_sg_len = 0; /* no need for an input hw s/g table */
> - else
> - sec4_sg_len = mapped_src_nents + !!diff_size;
> - sec4_sg_index = sec4_sg_len;
> -
> - if (mapped_dst_nents > 1)
> - sec4_sg_len += pad_sg_nents(mapped_dst_nents);
> - else
> - sec4_sg_len = pad_sg_nents(sec4_sg_len);
> -
> - sec4_sg_bytes = sec4_sg_len * sizeof(struct sec4_sg_entry);
> -
> - /* allocate space for base edesc, hw desc commands and link tables
*/
> - edesc = kzalloc(sizeof(*edesc) + desclen + sec4_sg_bytes, flags);
> - if (!edesc)
> - goto dst_fail;
> -
> - edesc->sec4_sg = (void *)edesc + sizeof(*edesc) + desclen;
> - if (diff_size)
> - dma_to_sec4_sg_one(edesc->sec4_sg, ctx->padding_dma,
diff_size,
> - 0);
> -
> - if (sec4_sg_index)
> - sg_to_sec4_sg_last(req_ctx->fixup_src,
req_ctx->fixup_src_len,
> - edesc->sec4_sg + !!diff_size, 0);
> -
> - if (mapped_dst_nents > 1)
> - sg_to_sec4_sg_last(req->dst, req->dst_len,
> - edesc->sec4_sg + sec4_sg_index, 0);
> -
> - /* Save nents for later use in Job Descriptor */
> - edesc->src_nents = src_nents;
> - edesc->dst_nents = dst_nents;
> -
> - req_ctx->edesc = edesc;
> -
> - if (!sec4_sg_bytes)
> - return edesc;
> -
> - edesc->mapped_src_nents = mapped_src_nents;
> - edesc->mapped_dst_nents = mapped_dst_nents;
> -
> - edesc->sec4_sg_dma = dma_map_single(dev, edesc->sec4_sg,
> - sec4_sg_bytes, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - if (dma_mapping_error(dev, edesc->sec4_sg_dma)) {
> - dev_err(dev, "unable to map S/G table\n");
> - goto sec4_sg_fail;
> - }
> -
> - edesc->sec4_sg_bytes = sec4_sg_bytes;
> -
> - print_hex_dump_debug("caampkc sec4_sg@" __stringify(__LINE__) ":
",
> - DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, edesc->sec4_sg,
> - edesc->sec4_sg_bytes, 1);
> -
> - return edesc;
> -
> -sec4_sg_fail:
> - kfree(edesc);
> -dst_fail:
> - dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->dst, dst_nents, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> -src_fail:
> - dma_unmap_sg(dev, req_ctx->fixup_src, src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> -}
> -
> -static int akcipher_do_one_req(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *areq)
> -{
> - struct akcipher_request *req = container_of(areq,
> - struct
akcipher_request,
> - base);
> - struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> - struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> - struct device *jrdev = ctx->dev;
> - u32 *desc = req_ctx->edesc->hw_desc;
> - int ret;
> -
> - req_ctx->edesc->bklog = true;
> -
> - ret = caam_jr_enqueue(jrdev, desc, req_ctx->akcipher_op_done,
req);
> -
> - if (ret == -ENOSPC && engine->retry_support)
> - return ret;
> -
> - if (ret != -EINPROGRESS) {
> - rsa_pub_unmap(jrdev, req_ctx->edesc, req);
> - rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, req_ctx->edesc, req);
> - kfree(req_ctx->edesc);
> - } else {
> - ret = 0;
> - }
> -
> - return ret;
> -}
> -
> -static int set_rsa_pub_pdb(struct akcipher_request *req,
> - struct rsa_edesc *edesc)
> -{
> - struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> - struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> - struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
> - struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
> - struct rsa_pub_pdb *pdb = &edesc->pdb.pub;
> - int sec4_sg_index = 0;
> -
> - pdb->n_dma = dma_map_single(dev, key->n, key->n_sz,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - if (dma_mapping_error(dev, pdb->n_dma)) {
> - dev_err(dev, "Unable to map RSA modulus memory\n");
> - return -ENOMEM;
> - }
> -
> - pdb->e_dma = dma_map_single(dev, key->e, key->e_sz,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - if (dma_mapping_error(dev, pdb->e_dma)) {
> - dev_err(dev, "Unable to map RSA public exponent
memory\n");
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->n_dma, key->n_sz,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - return -ENOMEM;
> - }
> -
> - if (edesc->mapped_src_nents > 1) {
> - pdb->sgf |= RSA_PDB_SGF_F;
> - pdb->f_dma = edesc->sec4_sg_dma;
> - sec4_sg_index += edesc->mapped_src_nents;
> - } else {
> - pdb->f_dma = sg_dma_address(req_ctx->fixup_src);
> - }
> -
> - if (edesc->mapped_dst_nents > 1) {
> - pdb->sgf |= RSA_PDB_SGF_G;
> - pdb->g_dma = edesc->sec4_sg_dma +
> - sec4_sg_index * sizeof(struct sec4_sg_entry);
> - } else {
> - pdb->g_dma = sg_dma_address(req->dst);
> - }
> -
> - pdb->sgf |= (key->e_sz << RSA_PDB_E_SHIFT) | key->n_sz;
> - pdb->f_len = req_ctx->fixup_src_len;
> -
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static int set_rsa_priv_f1_pdb(struct akcipher_request *req,
> - struct rsa_edesc *edesc)
> -{
> - struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> - struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
> - struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
> - struct rsa_priv_f1_pdb *pdb = &edesc->pdb.priv_f1;
> - int sec4_sg_index = 0;
> -
> - pdb->n_dma = dma_map_single(dev, key->n, key->n_sz,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - if (dma_mapping_error(dev, pdb->n_dma)) {
> - dev_err(dev, "Unable to map modulus memory\n");
> - return -ENOMEM;
> - }
> -
> - pdb->d_dma = dma_map_single(dev, key->d, key->d_sz,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - if (dma_mapping_error(dev, pdb->d_dma)) {
> - dev_err(dev, "Unable to map RSA private exponent
memory\n");
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->n_dma, key->n_sz,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - return -ENOMEM;
> - }
> -
> - if (edesc->mapped_src_nents > 1) {
> - pdb->sgf |= RSA_PRIV_PDB_SGF_G;
> - pdb->g_dma = edesc->sec4_sg_dma;
> - sec4_sg_index += edesc->mapped_src_nents;
> -
> - } else {
> - struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx =
akcipher_request_ctx(req);
> -
> - pdb->g_dma = sg_dma_address(req_ctx->fixup_src);
> - }
> -
> - if (edesc->mapped_dst_nents > 1) {
> - pdb->sgf |= RSA_PRIV_PDB_SGF_F;
> - pdb->f_dma = edesc->sec4_sg_dma +
> - sec4_sg_index * sizeof(struct sec4_sg_entry);
> - } else {
> - pdb->f_dma = sg_dma_address(req->dst);
> - }
> -
> - pdb->sgf |= (key->d_sz << RSA_PDB_D_SHIFT) | key->n_sz;
> -
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static int set_rsa_priv_f2_pdb(struct akcipher_request *req,
> - struct rsa_edesc *edesc)
> -{
> - struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> - struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
> - struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
> - struct rsa_priv_f2_pdb *pdb = &edesc->pdb.priv_f2;
> - int sec4_sg_index = 0;
> - size_t p_sz = key->p_sz;
> - size_t q_sz = key->q_sz;
> -
> - pdb->d_dma = dma_map_single(dev, key->d, key->d_sz,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - if (dma_mapping_error(dev, pdb->d_dma)) {
> - dev_err(dev, "Unable to map RSA private exponent
memory\n");
> - return -ENOMEM;
> - }
> -
> - pdb->p_dma = dma_map_single(dev, key->p, p_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - if (dma_mapping_error(dev, pdb->p_dma)) {
> - dev_err(dev, "Unable to map RSA prime factor p memory\n");
> - goto unmap_d;
> - }
> -
> - pdb->q_dma = dma_map_single(dev, key->q, q_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - if (dma_mapping_error(dev, pdb->q_dma)) {
> - dev_err(dev, "Unable to map RSA prime factor q memory\n");
> - goto unmap_p;
> - }
> -
> - pdb->tmp1_dma = dma_map_single(dev, key->tmp1, p_sz,
> DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
> - if (dma_mapping_error(dev, pdb->tmp1_dma)) {
> - dev_err(dev, "Unable to map RSA tmp1 memory\n");
> - goto unmap_q;
> - }
> -
> - pdb->tmp2_dma = dma_map_single(dev, key->tmp2, q_sz,
> DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
> - if (dma_mapping_error(dev, pdb->tmp2_dma)) {
> - dev_err(dev, "Unable to map RSA tmp2 memory\n");
> - goto unmap_tmp1;
> - }
> -
> - if (edesc->mapped_src_nents > 1) {
> - pdb->sgf |= RSA_PRIV_PDB_SGF_G;
> - pdb->g_dma = edesc->sec4_sg_dma;
> - sec4_sg_index += edesc->mapped_src_nents;
> - } else {
> - struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx =
akcipher_request_ctx(req);
> -
> - pdb->g_dma = sg_dma_address(req_ctx->fixup_src);
> - }
> -
> - if (edesc->mapped_dst_nents > 1) {
> - pdb->sgf |= RSA_PRIV_PDB_SGF_F;
> - pdb->f_dma = edesc->sec4_sg_dma +
> - sec4_sg_index * sizeof(struct sec4_sg_entry);
> - } else {
> - pdb->f_dma = sg_dma_address(req->dst);
> - }
> -
> - pdb->sgf |= (key->d_sz << RSA_PDB_D_SHIFT) | key->n_sz;
> - pdb->p_q_len = (q_sz << RSA_PDB_Q_SHIFT) | p_sz;
> -
> - return 0;
> -
> -unmap_tmp1:
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->tmp1_dma, p_sz, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
> -unmap_q:
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->q_dma, q_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> -unmap_p:
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->p_dma, p_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> -unmap_d:
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->d_dma, key->d_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> -
> - return -ENOMEM;
> -}
> -
> -static int set_rsa_priv_f3_pdb(struct akcipher_request *req,
> - struct rsa_edesc *edesc)
> -{
> - struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> - struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
> - struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
> - struct rsa_priv_f3_pdb *pdb = &edesc->pdb.priv_f3;
> - int sec4_sg_index = 0;
> - size_t p_sz = key->p_sz;
> - size_t q_sz = key->q_sz;
> -
> - pdb->p_dma = dma_map_single(dev, key->p, p_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - if (dma_mapping_error(dev, pdb->p_dma)) {
> - dev_err(dev, "Unable to map RSA prime factor p memory\n");
> - return -ENOMEM;
> - }
> -
> - pdb->q_dma = dma_map_single(dev, key->q, q_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - if (dma_mapping_error(dev, pdb->q_dma)) {
> - dev_err(dev, "Unable to map RSA prime factor q memory\n");
> - goto unmap_p;
> - }
> -
> - pdb->dp_dma = dma_map_single(dev, key->dp, p_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - if (dma_mapping_error(dev, pdb->dp_dma)) {
> - dev_err(dev, "Unable to map RSA exponent dp memory\n");
> - goto unmap_q;
> - }
> -
> - pdb->dq_dma = dma_map_single(dev, key->dq, q_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - if (dma_mapping_error(dev, pdb->dq_dma)) {
> - dev_err(dev, "Unable to map RSA exponent dq memory\n");
> - goto unmap_dp;
> - }
> -
> - pdb->c_dma = dma_map_single(dev, key->qinv, p_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - if (dma_mapping_error(dev, pdb->c_dma)) {
> - dev_err(dev, "Unable to map RSA CRT coefficient qinv
memory\n");
> - goto unmap_dq;
> - }
> -
> - pdb->tmp1_dma = dma_map_single(dev, key->tmp1, p_sz,
> DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
> - if (dma_mapping_error(dev, pdb->tmp1_dma)) {
> - dev_err(dev, "Unable to map RSA tmp1 memory\n");
> - goto unmap_qinv;
> - }
> -
> - pdb->tmp2_dma = dma_map_single(dev, key->tmp2, q_sz,
> DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
> - if (dma_mapping_error(dev, pdb->tmp2_dma)) {
> - dev_err(dev, "Unable to map RSA tmp2 memory\n");
> - goto unmap_tmp1;
> - }
> -
> - if (edesc->mapped_src_nents > 1) {
> - pdb->sgf |= RSA_PRIV_PDB_SGF_G;
> - pdb->g_dma = edesc->sec4_sg_dma;
> - sec4_sg_index += edesc->mapped_src_nents;
> - } else {
> - struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx =
akcipher_request_ctx(req);
> -
> - pdb->g_dma = sg_dma_address(req_ctx->fixup_src);
> - }
> -
> - if (edesc->mapped_dst_nents > 1) {
> - pdb->sgf |= RSA_PRIV_PDB_SGF_F;
> - pdb->f_dma = edesc->sec4_sg_dma +
> - sec4_sg_index * sizeof(struct sec4_sg_entry);
> - } else {
> - pdb->f_dma = sg_dma_address(req->dst);
> - }
> -
> - pdb->sgf |= key->n_sz;
> - pdb->p_q_len = (q_sz << RSA_PDB_Q_SHIFT) | p_sz;
> -
> - return 0;
> -
> -unmap_tmp1:
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->tmp1_dma, p_sz, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
> -unmap_qinv:
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->c_dma, p_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> -unmap_dq:
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->dq_dma, q_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> -unmap_dp:
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->dp_dma, p_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> -unmap_q:
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->q_dma, q_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> -unmap_p:
> - dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->p_dma, p_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> -
> - return -ENOMEM;
> -}
> -
> -static int akcipher_enqueue_req(struct device *jrdev,
> - void (*cbk)(struct device *jrdev, u32
*desc,
> - u32 err, void *context),
> - struct akcipher_request *req)
> -{
> - struct caam_drv_private_jr *jrpriv = dev_get_drvdata(jrdev);
> - struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> - struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
> - struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
> - struct rsa_edesc *edesc = req_ctx->edesc;
> - u32 *desc = edesc->hw_desc;
> - int ret;
> -
> - req_ctx->akcipher_op_done = cbk;
> - /*
> - * Only the backlog request are sent to crypto-engine since the
others
> - * can be handled by CAAM, if free, especially since JR has up to
1024
> - * entries (more than the 10 entries from crypto-engine).
> - */
> - if (req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG)
> - ret =
crypto_transfer_akcipher_request_to_engine(jrpriv->engine,
> - req);
> - else
> - ret = caam_jr_enqueue(jrdev, desc, cbk, req);
> -
> - if ((ret != -EINPROGRESS) && (ret != -EBUSY)) {
> - switch (key->priv_form) {
> - case FORM1:
> - rsa_priv_f1_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
> - break;
> - case FORM2:
> - rsa_priv_f2_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
> - break;
> - case FORM3:
> - rsa_priv_f3_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
> - break;
> - default:
> - rsa_pub_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
> - }
> - rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
> - kfree(edesc);
> - }
> -
> - return ret;
> -}
> -
> -static int caam_rsa_enc(struct akcipher_request *req)
> -{
> - struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> - struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
> - struct device *jrdev = ctx->dev;
> - struct rsa_edesc *edesc;
> - int ret;
> -
> - if (unlikely(!key->n || !key->e))
> - return -EINVAL;
> -
> - if (req->dst_len < key->n_sz) {
> - req->dst_len = key->n_sz;
> - dev_err(jrdev, "Output buffer length less than parameter
n\n");
> - return -EOVERFLOW;
> - }
> -
> - /* Allocate extended descriptor */
> - edesc = rsa_edesc_alloc(req, DESC_RSA_PUB_LEN);
> - if (IS_ERR(edesc))
> - return PTR_ERR(edesc);
> -
> - /* Set RSA Encrypt Protocol Data Block */
> - ret = set_rsa_pub_pdb(req, edesc);
> - if (ret)
> - goto init_fail;
> -
> - /* Initialize Job Descriptor */
> - init_rsa_pub_desc(edesc->hw_desc, &edesc->pdb.pub);
> -
> - return akcipher_enqueue_req(jrdev, rsa_pub_done, req);
> -
> -init_fail:
> - rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
> - kfree(edesc);
> - return ret;
> -}
> -
> -static int caam_rsa_dec_priv_f1(struct akcipher_request *req)
> -{
> - struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> - struct device *jrdev = ctx->dev;
> - struct rsa_edesc *edesc;
> - int ret;
> -
> - /* Allocate extended descriptor */
> - edesc = rsa_edesc_alloc(req, DESC_RSA_PRIV_F1_LEN);
> - if (IS_ERR(edesc))
> - return PTR_ERR(edesc);
> -
> - /* Set RSA Decrypt Protocol Data Block - Private Key Form #1 */
> - ret = set_rsa_priv_f1_pdb(req, edesc);
> - if (ret)
> - goto init_fail;
> -
> - /* Initialize Job Descriptor */
> - init_rsa_priv_f1_desc(edesc->hw_desc, &edesc->pdb.priv_f1);
> -
> - return akcipher_enqueue_req(jrdev, rsa_priv_f_done, req);
> -
> -init_fail:
> - rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
> - kfree(edesc);
> - return ret;
> -}
> -
> -static int caam_rsa_dec_priv_f2(struct akcipher_request *req)
> -{
> - struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> - struct device *jrdev = ctx->dev;
> - struct rsa_edesc *edesc;
> - int ret;
> -
> - /* Allocate extended descriptor */
> - edesc = rsa_edesc_alloc(req, DESC_RSA_PRIV_F2_LEN);
> - if (IS_ERR(edesc))
> - return PTR_ERR(edesc);
> -
> - /* Set RSA Decrypt Protocol Data Block - Private Key Form #2 */
> - ret = set_rsa_priv_f2_pdb(req, edesc);
> - if (ret)
> - goto init_fail;
> -
> - /* Initialize Job Descriptor */
> - init_rsa_priv_f2_desc(edesc->hw_desc, &edesc->pdb.priv_f2);
> -
> - return akcipher_enqueue_req(jrdev, rsa_priv_f_done, req);
> -
> -init_fail:
> - rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
> - kfree(edesc);
> - return ret;
> -}
> -
> -static int caam_rsa_dec_priv_f3(struct akcipher_request *req)
> -{
> - struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> - struct device *jrdev = ctx->dev;
> - struct rsa_edesc *edesc;
> - int ret;
> -
> - /* Allocate extended descriptor */
> - edesc = rsa_edesc_alloc(req, DESC_RSA_PRIV_F3_LEN);
> - if (IS_ERR(edesc))
> - return PTR_ERR(edesc);
> -
> - /* Set RSA Decrypt Protocol Data Block - Private Key Form #3 */
> - ret = set_rsa_priv_f3_pdb(req, edesc);
> - if (ret)
> - goto init_fail;
> -
> - /* Initialize Job Descriptor */
> - init_rsa_priv_f3_desc(edesc->hw_desc, &edesc->pdb.priv_f3);
> -
> - return akcipher_enqueue_req(jrdev, rsa_priv_f_done, req);
> -
> -init_fail:
> - rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
> - kfree(edesc);
> - return ret;
> -}
> -
> -static int caam_rsa_dec(struct akcipher_request *req)
> -{
> - struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> - struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
> - int ret;
> -
> - if (unlikely(!key->n || !key->d))
> - return -EINVAL;
> -
> - if (req->dst_len < key->n_sz) {
> - req->dst_len = key->n_sz;
> - dev_err(ctx->dev, "Output buffer length less than
parameter n\n");
> - return -EOVERFLOW;
> - }
> -
> - if (key->priv_form == FORM3)
> - ret = caam_rsa_dec_priv_f3(req);
> - else if (key->priv_form == FORM2)
> - ret = caam_rsa_dec_priv_f2(req);
> - else
> - ret = caam_rsa_dec_priv_f1(req);
> -
> - return ret;
> -}
> -
> -static void caam_rsa_free_key(struct caam_rsa_key *key)
> -{
> - kfree_sensitive(key->d);
> - kfree_sensitive(key->p);
> - kfree_sensitive(key->q);
> - kfree_sensitive(key->dp);
> - kfree_sensitive(key->dq);
> - kfree_sensitive(key->qinv);
> - kfree_sensitive(key->tmp1);
> - kfree_sensitive(key->tmp2);
> - kfree(key->e);
> - kfree(key->n);
> - memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key));
> -}
> -
> -static void caam_rsa_drop_leading_zeros(const u8 **ptr, size_t *nbytes)
> -{
> - while (!**ptr && *nbytes) {
> - (*ptr)++;
> - (*nbytes)--;
> - }
> -}
> -
> -/**
> - * caam_read_rsa_crt - Used for reading dP, dQ, qInv CRT members.
> - * dP, dQ and qInv could decode to less than corresponding p, q length,
as the
> - * BER-encoding requires that the minimum number of bytes be used to
encode
> the
> - * integer. dP, dQ, qInv decoded values have to be zero-padded to
appropriate
> - * length.
> - *
> - * @ptr : pointer to {dP, dQ, qInv} CRT member
> - * @nbytes: length in bytes of {dP, dQ, qInv} CRT member
> - * @dstlen: length in bytes of corresponding p or q prime factor
> - */
> -static u8 *caam_read_rsa_crt(const u8 *ptr, size_t nbytes, size_t dstlen)
> -{
> - u8 *dst;
> -
> - caam_rsa_drop_leading_zeros(&ptr, &nbytes);
> - if (!nbytes)
> - return NULL;
> -
> - dst = kzalloc(dstlen, GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!dst)
> - return NULL;
> -
> - memcpy(dst + (dstlen - nbytes), ptr, nbytes);
> -
> - return dst;
> -}
> -
> -/**
> - * caam_read_raw_data - Read a raw byte stream as a positive integer.
> - * The function skips buffer's leading zeros, copies the remained data
> - * to a buffer allocated in the GFP_KERNEL zone and returns
> - * the address of the new buffer.
> - *
> - * @buf : The data to read
> - * @nbytes: The amount of data to read
> - */
> -static inline u8 *caam_read_raw_data(const u8 *buf, size_t *nbytes)
> -{
> -
> - caam_rsa_drop_leading_zeros(&buf, nbytes);
> - if (!*nbytes)
> - return NULL;
> -
> - return kmemdup(buf, *nbytes, GFP_KERNEL);
> -}
> -
> -static int caam_rsa_check_key_length(unsigned int len)
> -{
> - if (len > 4096)
> - return -EINVAL;
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static int caam_rsa_set_pub_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const void
*key,
> - unsigned int keylen)
> -{
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> - struct rsa_key raw_key = {NULL};
> - struct caam_rsa_key *rsa_key = &ctx->key;
> - int ret;
> -
> - /* Free the old RSA key if any */
> - caam_rsa_free_key(rsa_key);
> -
> - ret = rsa_parse_pub_key(&raw_key, key, keylen);
> - if (ret)
> - return ret;
> -
> - /* Copy key in DMA zone */
> - rsa_key->e = kmemdup(raw_key.e, raw_key.e_sz, GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!rsa_key->e)
> - goto err;
> -
> - /*
> - * Skip leading zeros and copy the positive integer to a buffer
> - * allocated in the GFP_KERNEL zone. The decryption descriptor
> - * expects a positive integer for the RSA modulus and uses its
length as
> - * decryption output length.
> - */
> - rsa_key->n = caam_read_raw_data(raw_key.n, &raw_key.n_sz);
> - if (!rsa_key->n)
> - goto err;
> -
> - if (caam_rsa_check_key_length(raw_key.n_sz << 3)) {
> - caam_rsa_free_key(rsa_key);
> - return -EINVAL;
> - }
> -
> - rsa_key->e_sz = raw_key.e_sz;
> - rsa_key->n_sz = raw_key.n_sz;
> -
> - return 0;
> -err:
> - caam_rsa_free_key(rsa_key);
> - return -ENOMEM;
> -}
> -
> -static int caam_rsa_set_priv_key_form(struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx,
> - struct rsa_key *raw_key)
> -{
> - struct caam_rsa_key *rsa_key = &ctx->key;
> - size_t p_sz = raw_key->p_sz;
> - size_t q_sz = raw_key->q_sz;
> - unsigned aligned_size;
> -
> - rsa_key->p = caam_read_raw_data(raw_key->p, &p_sz);
> - if (!rsa_key->p)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> - rsa_key->p_sz = p_sz;
> -
> - rsa_key->q = caam_read_raw_data(raw_key->q, &q_sz);
> - if (!rsa_key->q)
> - goto free_p;
> - rsa_key->q_sz = q_sz;
> -
> - aligned_size = ALIGN(raw_key->p_sz, dma_get_cache_alignment());
> - rsa_key->tmp1 = kzalloc(aligned_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!rsa_key->tmp1)
> - goto free_q;
> -
> - aligned_size = ALIGN(raw_key->q_sz, dma_get_cache_alignment());
> - rsa_key->tmp2 = kzalloc(aligned_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!rsa_key->tmp2)
> - goto free_tmp1;
> -
> - rsa_key->priv_form = FORM2;
> -
> - rsa_key->dp = caam_read_rsa_crt(raw_key->dp, raw_key->dp_sz,
p_sz);
> - if (!rsa_key->dp)
> - goto free_tmp2;
> -
> - rsa_key->dq = caam_read_rsa_crt(raw_key->dq, raw_key->dq_sz,
q_sz);
> - if (!rsa_key->dq)
> - goto free_dp;
> -
> - rsa_key->qinv = caam_read_rsa_crt(raw_key->qinv, raw_key->qinv_sz,
> - q_sz);
> - if (!rsa_key->qinv)
> - goto free_dq;
> -
> - rsa_key->priv_form = FORM3;
> -
> - return 0;
> -
> -free_dq:
> - kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->dq);
> -free_dp:
> - kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->dp);
> -free_tmp2:
> - kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->tmp2);
> -free_tmp1:
> - kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->tmp1);
> -free_q:
> - kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->q);
> -free_p:
> - kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->p);
> - return -ENOMEM;
> -}
> -
> -static int caam_rsa_set_priv_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const void
*key,
> - unsigned int keylen)
> -{
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> - struct rsa_key raw_key = {NULL};
> - struct caam_rsa_key *rsa_key = &ctx->key;
> - int ret;
> -
> - /* Free the old RSA key if any */
> - caam_rsa_free_key(rsa_key);
> -
> - ret = rsa_parse_priv_key(&raw_key, key, keylen);
> - if (ret)
> - return ret;
> -
> - /* Copy key in DMA zone */
> - rsa_key->d = kmemdup(raw_key.d, raw_key.d_sz, GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!rsa_key->d)
> - goto err;
> -
> - rsa_key->e = kmemdup(raw_key.e, raw_key.e_sz, GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!rsa_key->e)
> - goto err;
> -
> - /*
> - * Skip leading zeros and copy the positive integer to a buffer
> - * allocated in the GFP_KERNEL zone. The decryption descriptor
> - * expects a positive integer for the RSA modulus and uses its
length as
> - * decryption output length.
> - */
> - rsa_key->n = caam_read_raw_data(raw_key.n, &raw_key.n_sz);
> - if (!rsa_key->n)
> - goto err;
> -
> - if (caam_rsa_check_key_length(raw_key.n_sz << 3)) {
> - caam_rsa_free_key(rsa_key);
> - return -EINVAL;
> - }
> -
> - rsa_key->d_sz = raw_key.d_sz;
> - rsa_key->e_sz = raw_key.e_sz;
> - rsa_key->n_sz = raw_key.n_sz;
> -
> - ret = caam_rsa_set_priv_key_form(ctx, &raw_key);
> - if (ret)
> - goto err;
> -
> - return 0;
> -
> -err:
> - caam_rsa_free_key(rsa_key);
> - return -ENOMEM;
> -}
> -
> -static unsigned int caam_rsa_max_size(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
> -{
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> -
> - return ctx->key.n_sz;
> -}
> -
> -/* Per session pkc's driver context creation function */
> -static int caam_rsa_init_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
> -{
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> -
> - akcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct caam_rsa_req_ctx));
> -
> - ctx->dev = caam_jr_alloc();
> -
> - if (IS_ERR(ctx->dev)) {
> - pr_err("Job Ring Device allocation for transform
failed\n");
> - return PTR_ERR(ctx->dev);
> - }
> -
> - ctx->padding_dma = dma_map_single(ctx->dev, zero_buffer,
> - CAAM_RSA_MAX_INPUT_SIZE - 1,
> - DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - if (dma_mapping_error(ctx->dev, ctx->padding_dma)) {
> - dev_err(ctx->dev, "unable to map padding\n");
> - caam_jr_free(ctx->dev);
> - return -ENOMEM;
> - }
> -
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -/* Per session pkc's driver context cleanup function */
> -static void caam_rsa_exit_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
> -{
> - struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
> - struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
> -
> - dma_unmap_single(ctx->dev, ctx->padding_dma,
> CAAM_RSA_MAX_INPUT_SIZE -
> - 1, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> - caam_rsa_free_key(key);
> - caam_jr_free(ctx->dev);
> -}
> -
> -static struct caam_akcipher_alg caam_rsa = {
> - .akcipher.base = {
> - .encrypt = caam_rsa_enc,
> - .decrypt = caam_rsa_dec,
> - .set_pub_key = caam_rsa_set_pub_key,
> - .set_priv_key = caam_rsa_set_priv_key,
> - .max_size = caam_rsa_max_size,
> - .init = caam_rsa_init_tfm,
> - .exit = caam_rsa_exit_tfm,
> - .base = {
> - .cra_name = "rsa",
> - .cra_driver_name = "rsa-caam",
> - .cra_priority = 3000,
> - .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
> - .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct caam_rsa_ctx) +
> - CRYPTO_DMA_PADDING,
> - },
> - },
> - .akcipher.op = {
> - .do_one_request = akcipher_do_one_req,
> - },
> -};
> -
> -/* Public Key Cryptography module initialization handler */
> -int caam_pkc_init(struct device *ctrldev)
> -{
> - struct caam_drv_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(ctrldev);
> - u32 pk_inst, pkha;
> - int err;
> - init_done = false;
> -
> - /* Determine public key hardware accelerator presence. */
> - if (priv->era < 10) {
> - pk_inst = (rd_reg32(&priv->jr[0]->perfmon.cha_num_ls) &
> - CHA_ID_LS_PK_MASK) >> CHA_ID_LS_PK_SHIFT;
> - } else {
> - pkha = rd_reg32(&priv->jr[0]->vreg.pkha);
> - pk_inst = pkha & CHA_VER_NUM_MASK;
> -
> - /*
> - * Newer CAAMs support partially disabled functionality.
If this is the
> - * case, the number is non-zero, but this bit is set to
indicate that
> - * no encryption or decryption is supported. Only signing
and
> verifying
> - * is supported.
> - */
> - if (pkha & CHA_VER_MISC_PKHA_NO_CRYPT)
> - pk_inst = 0;
> - }
> -
> - /* Do not register algorithms if PKHA is not present. */
> - if (!pk_inst)
> - return 0;
> -
> - /* allocate zero buffer, used for padding input */
> - zero_buffer = kzalloc(CAAM_RSA_MAX_INPUT_SIZE - 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!zero_buffer)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> -
> - err = crypto_engine_register_akcipher(&caam_rsa.akcipher);
> -
> - if (err) {
> - kfree(zero_buffer);
> - dev_warn(ctrldev, "%s alg registration failed\n",
> - caam_rsa.akcipher.base.base.cra_driver_name);
> - } else {
> - init_done = true;
> - caam_rsa.registered = true;
> - dev_info(ctrldev, "caam pkc algorithms registered in
/proc/crypto\n");
> - }
> -
> - return err;
> -}
> -
> -void caam_pkc_exit(void)
> -{
> - if (!init_done)
> - return;
> -
> - if (caam_rsa.registered)
> - crypto_engine_unregister_akcipher(&caam_rsa.akcipher);
> -
> - kfree(zero_buffer);
> -}
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 96d03704c9be..000000000000
> --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
> -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> -/*
> - * caam - Freescale FSL CAAM support for Public Key Cryptography
descriptors
> - *
> - * Copyright 2016 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
> - *
> - * There is no Shared Descriptor for PKC so that the Job Descriptor must
carry
> - * all the desired key parameters, input and output pointers.
> - */
> -
> -#ifndef _PKC_DESC_H_
> -#define _PKC_DESC_H_
> -#include "compat.h"
> -#include "pdb.h"
> -
> -/**
> - * caam_priv_key_form - CAAM RSA private key representation
> - * CAAM RSA private key may have either of three forms.
> - *
> - * 1. The first representation consists of the pair (n, d), where the
> - * components have the following meanings:
> - * n the RSA modulus
> - * d the RSA private exponent
> - *
> - * 2. The second representation consists of the triplet (p, q, d), where
the
> - * components have the following meanings:
> - * p the first prime factor of the RSA modulus n
> - * q the second prime factor of the RSA modulus n
> - * d the RSA private exponent
> - *
> - * 3. The third representation consists of the quintuple (p, q, dP, dQ,
qInv),
> - * where the components have the following meanings:
> - * p the first prime factor of the RSA modulus n
> - * q the second prime factor of the RSA modulus n
> - * dP the first factors's CRT exponent
> - * dQ the second factors's CRT exponent
> - * qInv the (first) CRT coefficient
> - *
> - * The benefit of using the third or the second key form is lower
computational
> - * cost for the decryption and signature operations.
> - */
> -enum caam_priv_key_form {
> - FORM1,
> - FORM2,
> - FORM3
> -};
> -
> -/**
> - * caam_rsa_key - CAAM RSA key structure. Keys are allocated in DMA zone.
> - * @n : RSA modulus raw byte stream
> - * @e : RSA public exponent raw byte stream
> - * @d : RSA private exponent raw byte stream
> - * @p : RSA prime factor p of RSA modulus n
> - * @q : RSA prime factor q of RSA modulus n
> - * @dp : RSA CRT exponent of p
> - * @dp : RSA CRT exponent of q
> - * @qinv : RSA CRT coefficient
> - * @tmp1 : CAAM uses this temporary buffer as internal state
buffer.
> - * It is assumed to be as long as p.
> - * @tmp2 : CAAM uses this temporary buffer as internal state
buffer.
> - * It is assumed to be as long as q.
> - * @n_sz : length in bytes of RSA modulus n
> - * @e_sz : length in bytes of RSA public exponent
> - * @d_sz : length in bytes of RSA private exponent
> - * @p_sz : length in bytes of RSA prime factor p of RSA modulus n
> - * @q_sz : length in bytes of RSA prime factor q of RSA modulus n
> - * @priv_form : CAAM RSA private key representation
> - */
> -struct caam_rsa_key {
> - u8 *n;
> - u8 *e;
> - u8 *d;
> - u8 *p;
> - u8 *q;
> - u8 *dp;
> - u8 *dq;
> - u8 *qinv;
> - u8 *tmp1;
> - u8 *tmp2;
> - size_t n_sz;
> - size_t e_sz;
> - size_t d_sz;
> - size_t p_sz;
> - size_t q_sz;
> - enum caam_priv_key_form priv_form;
> -};
> -
> -/**
> - * caam_rsa_ctx - per session context.
> - * @key : RSA key in DMA zone
> - * @dev : device structure
> - * @padding_dma : dma address of padding, for adding it to the input
> - */
> -struct caam_rsa_ctx {
> - struct caam_rsa_key key;
> - struct device *dev;
> - dma_addr_t padding_dma;
> -
> -};
> -
> -/**
> - * caam_rsa_req_ctx - per request context.
> - * @src : input scatterlist (stripped of leading zeros)
> - * @fixup_src : input scatterlist (that might be stripped of leading
zeros)
> - * @fixup_src_len : length of the fixup_src input scatterlist
> - * @edesc : s/w-extended rsa descriptor
> - * @akcipher_op_done : callback used when operation is done
> - */
> -struct caam_rsa_req_ctx {
> - struct scatterlist src[2];
> - struct scatterlist *fixup_src;
> - unsigned int fixup_src_len;
> - struct rsa_edesc *edesc;
> - void (*akcipher_op_done)(struct device *jrdev, u32 *desc, u32 err,
> - void *context);
> -};
> -
> -/**
> - * rsa_edesc - s/w-extended rsa descriptor
> - * @src_nents : number of segments in input s/w scatterlist
> - * @dst_nents : number of segments in output s/w scatterlist
> - * @mapped_src_nents: number of segments in input h/w link table
> - * @mapped_dst_nents: number of segments in output h/w link table
> - * @sec4_sg_bytes : length of h/w link table
> - * @bklog : stored to determine if the request needs backlog
> - * @sec4_sg_dma : dma address of h/w link table
> - * @sec4_sg : pointer to h/w link table
> - * @pdb : specific RSA Protocol Data Block (PDB)
> - * @hw_desc : descriptor followed by link tables if any
> - */
> -struct rsa_edesc {
> - int src_nents;
> - int dst_nents;
> - int mapped_src_nents;
> - int mapped_dst_nents;
> - int sec4_sg_bytes;
> - bool bklog;
> - dma_addr_t sec4_sg_dma;
> - struct sec4_sg_entry *sec4_sg;
> - union {
> - struct rsa_pub_pdb pub;
> - struct rsa_priv_f1_pdb priv_f1;
> - struct rsa_priv_f2_pdb priv_f2;
> - struct rsa_priv_f3_pdb priv_f3;
> - } pdb;
> - u32 hw_desc[];
> -};
> -
> -/* Descriptor construction primitives. */
> -void init_rsa_pub_desc(u32 *desc, struct rsa_pub_pdb *pdb);
> -void init_rsa_priv_f1_desc(u32 *desc, struct rsa_priv_f1_pdb *pdb);
> -void init_rsa_priv_f2_desc(u32 *desc, struct rsa_priv_f2_pdb *pdb);
> -void init_rsa_priv_f3_desc(u32 *desc, struct rsa_priv_f3_pdb *pdb);
> -
> -#endif
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/pkc_desc.c
b/drivers/crypto/caam/pkc_desc.c
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 0d5ee762e036..000000000000
> --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/pkc_desc.c
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
> -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> -/*
> - * caam - Freescale FSL CAAM support for Public Key Cryptography
descriptors
> - *
> - * Copyright 2016 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
> - *
> - * There is no Shared Descriptor for PKC so that the Job Descriptor must
carry
> - * all the desired key parameters, input and output pointers.
> - */
> -#include "caampkc.h"
> -#include "desc_constr.h"
> -
> -/* Descriptor for RSA Public operation */
> -void init_rsa_pub_desc(u32 *desc, struct rsa_pub_pdb *pdb)
> -{
> - init_job_desc_pdb(desc, 0, SIZEOF_RSA_PUB_PDB);
> - append_cmd(desc, pdb->sgf);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->f_dma);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->g_dma);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->n_dma);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->e_dma);
> - append_cmd(desc, pdb->f_len);
> - append_operation(desc, OP_TYPE_UNI_PROTOCOL |
> OP_PCLID_RSAENC_PUBKEY);
> -}
> -
> -/* Descriptor for RSA Private operation - Private Key Form #1 */
> -void init_rsa_priv_f1_desc(u32 *desc, struct rsa_priv_f1_pdb *pdb)
> -{
> - init_job_desc_pdb(desc, 0, SIZEOF_RSA_PRIV_F1_PDB);
> - append_cmd(desc, pdb->sgf);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->g_dma);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->f_dma);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->n_dma);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->d_dma);
> - append_operation(desc, OP_TYPE_UNI_PROTOCOL |
> OP_PCLID_RSADEC_PRVKEY |
> - RSA_PRIV_KEY_FRM_1);
> -}
> -
> -/* Descriptor for RSA Private operation - Private Key Form #2 */
> -void init_rsa_priv_f2_desc(u32 *desc, struct rsa_priv_f2_pdb *pdb)
> -{
> - init_job_desc_pdb(desc, 0, SIZEOF_RSA_PRIV_F2_PDB);
> - append_cmd(desc, pdb->sgf);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->g_dma);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->f_dma);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->d_dma);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->p_dma);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->q_dma);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->tmp1_dma);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->tmp2_dma);
> - append_cmd(desc, pdb->p_q_len);
> - append_operation(desc, OP_TYPE_UNI_PROTOCOL |
> OP_PCLID_RSADEC_PRVKEY |
> - RSA_PRIV_KEY_FRM_2);
> -}
> -
> -/* Descriptor for RSA Private operation - Private Key Form #3 */
> -void init_rsa_priv_f3_desc(u32 *desc, struct rsa_priv_f3_pdb *pdb)
> -{
> - init_job_desc_pdb(desc, 0, SIZEOF_RSA_PRIV_F3_PDB);
> - append_cmd(desc, pdb->sgf);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->g_dma);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->f_dma);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->c_dma);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->p_dma);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->q_dma);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->dp_dma);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->dq_dma);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->tmp1_dma);
> - append_ptr(desc, pdb->tmp2_dma);
> - append_cmd(desc, pdb->p_q_len);
> - append_operation(desc, OP_TYPE_UNI_PROTOCOL |
> OP_PCLID_RSADEC_PRVKEY |
> - RSA_PRIV_KEY_FRM_3);
> -}
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig
> index ec57bf6aaf6c..94f19126f61b 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig
> @@ -133,15 +133,6 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_AHASH_API
> Selecting this will offload ahash for users of the
> scatterlist crypto API to the SEC4 via job ring.
>
> -config CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_PKC_API
> - bool "Register public key cryptography implementations with Crypto
API"
> - default y
> - select CRYPTO_RSA
> - help
> - Selecting this will allow SEC Public key support for RSA.
> - Supported cryptographic primitives: encryption, decryption,
> - signature and verification.
> -
> config CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API
> bool "Register caam device for hwrng API"
> default y
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile b/drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile
> index a17e3cf14c61..87a82474b841 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile
> @@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ caam_jr-
> $(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_CRYPTO_API) += caamalg.o
> caam_jr-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_CRYPTO_API_QI) += caamalg_qi.o
> caam_jr-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_AHASH_API) += caamhash.o
> caam_jr-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API) += caamrng.o
> -caam_jr-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_PKC_API) += caampkc.o
> pkc_desc.o
> caam_jr-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN) += blob_gen.o
>
> caam-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_CRYPTO_API_QI) += qi.o
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
> index 6e48bf7d6054..744b6586171c 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
> @@ -178,24 +178,6 @@ static inline void caam_algapi_hash_exit(void)
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_AHASH_API */
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_PKC_API
> -
> -int caam_pkc_init(struct device *dev);
> -void caam_pkc_exit(void);
> -
> -#else
> -
> -static inline int caam_pkc_init(struct device *dev)
> -{
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline void caam_pkc_exit(void)
> -{
> -}
> -
> -#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_PKC_API */
> -
> #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API
>
> int caam_rng_init(struct device *dev);
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/jr.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/jr.c
> index 239469f6882e..2c1e8275ddaf 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/jr.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/jr.c
> @@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ static void register_algs(struct caam_drv_private_jr
> *jrpriv,
>
> caam_algapi_init(dev);
> caam_algapi_hash_init(dev);
> - caam_pkc_init(dev);
> jrpriv->hwrng = !caam_rng_init(dev);
> caam_qi_algapi_init(dev);
>
> @@ -54,7 +53,6 @@ static void unregister_algs(void)
> goto algs_unlock;
>
> caam_qi_algapi_exit();
> - caam_pkc_exit();
> caam_algapi_hash_exit();
> caam_algapi_exit();
>
> --
> Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
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