Re: [patch V2 1/8] signal: Prevent exec() race

From: Frederic Weisbecker

Date: Wed Sep 09 2026 - 08:24:42 EST


Le Wed, Sep 09, 2026 at 11:55:18AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra a écrit :
> On Wed, Sep 09, 2026 at 11:08:31AM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 09 2026 at 10:04, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > > On Tue, Sep 08, 2026 at 12:15:21PM +0200, Frederic Weisbecker wrote:
> > > Let me try and have a go :-)
> > >
> > >
> > > do_exit() de_thread() posix_timer_fn()
> > > exit_signal() LOCK siglock posix_timer_send_sigqueue()
> > > LOCK siglock UNLOCK siglock t = posix_timer_get_target()
> > > tsk->flags |= PF_EXITING; LOCK siglock
> > > UNLOCK siglock if (!thread_group_leader) if (!list_empty(sigqueue))
> > > LOCK tasklist_lock
> > > flush_sigqueue_list(); if (leader->exit_state)
> > > break;
> > > ... transfer_pid()
> > > UNLOCK tasklist_lock
> > > exit_notify()
> > > LOCK tasklist_lock
> > > tsk->exit_state = EXIT_ZOMBIE;
> > > UNLOCK tasklist_lock
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Then there is indeed nothing that makes sure posix_timer_fn() sees
> > > sigqueue updates done by do_exit(), because those are ordered by
> > > tasklist_lock, but posix_timer_fn() doesn't care about that.
> >
> > That's irrelevant because in the above scenario posix_timer_fn() 't'
> > points to the exiting old leader (on the left) because the PID store has
> > not happened yet and it therefore observes PF_EXITING on it so it won't
> > touch the sigqueue. Note, that setting and checking PF_EXITING is
> > serialized by sighand lock, so this is fine.
>
> There is nothing that constraints the 3rd column from happening before,
> it could happen after transfer_pid().
>
> > > The easy solution would probably be to do transfer_pid() while holding
> > > siglock?
> >
> > That'd be only relevant for the situation Frederic is concerned about,
> > i.e. the case where the third party observes the TID swap.
>
> That is the case I was aiming at.
>
> > Because with that visible 't' in posix_timer_send_sigqueue() won't be
> > old_leader, which has PF_EXITING set, it will be new_leader which has it
> > not set.
>
> Same as above, there is nothing constraining the 3rd column from sliding
> up or down. If it manages to see the new_leader, I don't see why it
> would see the sigqueue flush.
>
> > So Frederic is concerned that posix_timer_send_sigqueue() can observe
> > the PID store but not observe the sigqueue stores.
> >
> > I argue that's not possible:
> >
> > A: sigqueue stores
> >
> > B: AQUIRE tasklist
> >
> > C: exit_state store
> >
> > D: RELEASE tasklist
> > // sigqueue and exit_state stores become globally visible
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > E ACQUIRE tasklist
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > F if (exit_state)
> > swap_pid()
> > G STORE_PID
> >
> > // The PID store can become visible in the
> > // system right here so F can observe them before
> > // RELEASE tasklist
>
> The STORE_PID is not a STORE_RELEASE.
>
> > H READ PID
>
> And this READ is not LOAD_AQUIRE; although the LOCK siglock is probably
> sufficient here. The READ MUST happen before LOCK siglock by means of
> data dependency, and then the LOCK will constrain later loads.
>
> > ....
> > I ACQUIRE siglock
> >
> > After #A the sigqueue stores are maybe visible
> >
> > After #C the exit_state store is maybe visible
> >
> > After #D both #A and #C are guaranteed to be visible to _ALL_ agents in
> > the system and cannot become magically become invisible after that
> > point.
>
> No, that is not in fact how Power (or ARM) works AFAICT. Memory ordering
> is not global. It is entirely possible some CPUs see a store while
> others do not.
>
> The only guarantee here is that IF you acquire tasklist_lock (you
> observe the store that unlocked it), you will also observe preceding
> stores. But since the posix_timer_fn() column does not in fact observe
> or care about tasklist_lock, there is no ordering.
>
> > The new leader cannot swap PIDs before acquiring task list lock and
> > before it observed exit_state != 0 under it. That's fully serialized
> > against the old leader as both hold task list lock for their operations.
> >
> > #F creates a control dependency, so if the new leader acquires task list
> > lock before the old it will observe 0, drop the lock and wait. No PID
> > store obviously.
>
> A control dependency only ensure *that* CPU will complete the exit_state
> load before the store, it is a local LOAD->STORE ordering.
>
> > #G can be come visible immediately but is only guaranteed to be visible
> > globally at the RELEASE of tasklist lock.
>
> Nope, not at all. Can be randomly visible to random sets of CPUs.
>
> > #H can only observe the PID store after the store actually happened in
> > #G. So it either reads the original PID or the swapped PID.
>
> Sure. But that has no bearing on if it sees the sigqueue stores at A.
>
> > #I is not really relevant for this. It's only relevant for PF_EXITING
> > and other stuff which is directly protected by it. And it does not
> > matter whether it locks the old or the new sighand.
> >
> > Now let's look at the full chain and what can possibly be visible or not
> > and when:
> >
> > #A can trickle into the tasklist held section, but not after #D.
>
> Yup.
>
> > #C cannot be reordered against #B and #D
>
> Agreed.
>
> > #A is therefore guaranteed to be globally visible _before_ new leader
> > observes exit_state != 0 in #F under task list lock
>
> Nope, A is therefore visible if you acquire tasklist_lock, specifically,
> when you observe the store from D. And only if that matching LOAD is a
> LOAD-ACQUIRE, such that subsequent loads are forced to be later.
>
> > #G cannot be reordered against #F and obviously not against #E either.
>
> Indeed.
>
> > It can become visible at any point after the store, but as argued
> > above that visibility can't be reordered before #A (sigqueue stores)
> > became visible.
>
> Let G' be the unnamed RELEASE after G.
>
> Now, I have deleted and rewritten this tail end at least twice now. And
> I *think* I'm agreeing with you. Let me explain:
>
> It all hinges on D-E and H-I.
>
> D-E is a UNLOCK+LOCK hand-over, which is not quite the same as
> RELEASE+ACQUIRE. Specifically, we have:
>
> RELEASE+ACQUIRE: RCpc, only the CPUs involved agree on the ordering
> UNLOCK+LOCK: RCtso, the hand-over is store-ordering
>
> So while earlier I was arguing with RCpc in mind, in which case D-E
> completely goes away and we can consider B-G' to be one big critical
> section from the PoV of a third CPU (our posix_timer_fn() one). In this
> case we can push A down and G up and have them cross.
>
> *However*, since these are locks, we actually have D-E be UNLOCK+LOCK,
> which is RCtso and that *does* impose store order, so A stores must
> happen before G stores
>
> Combine with H-I, which has a data dependency from the LOAD to the LOCK
> and thereby constraints later LOADs, those sigqueue loads that come
> after I must in fact observe the A stores.

I didn't know about all those UNLOCK+LOCK properties. Well,
I know that UNLOCK+LOCK on the same lock, or on different locks
but the same CPU, equals smp_mb() except on powerpc. Which is why
we have smp_mb__after_unlock_lock(). But what you describe is quite
different.

Is this something that we should expect litmus to modelize?

Because the following doesn't verify that:
---
C MP+farfetched

{}

P0(int *next, int *prev, int *exit_state, spinlock_t *tasklist_lock)
{
// list_del_init()
WRITE_ONCE(*next, 1);
WRITE_ONCE(*prev, 1);
// exit_notify()
spin_lock(tasklist_lock);
WRITE_ONCE(*exit_state, 1);
spin_unlock(tasklist_lock);
}

P1(int *exit_state, int *pid, spinlock_t *tasklist_lock)
{
int r0;

// de_thread()
spin_lock(tasklist_lock);
r0 = READ_ONCE(*exit_state);
if (r0 == 1) {
// exchange_tids()
WRITE_ONCE(*pid, 1);
}
spin_unlock(tasklist_lock);
}

P2(int *next, int *prev, int *pid, spinlock_t *sighand)
{
int r0;
int r1;
// get target
r0 = READ_ONCE(*pid);
spin_lock(sighand);
// queue signal
r1 = READ_ONCE(*next);
if (r1 == 0)
WRITE_ONCE(*prev, 2);
spin_unlock(sighand);
}

exists (prev=1 /\ 2:r0=1) (* Bad outcome. *)
---
herd7 -conf linux-kernel.cfg ~/farfetched.litmus
Test MP+farfetched Allowed
States 4
2:r0=0; [prev]=1;
2:r0=0; [prev]=2;
2:r0=1; [prev]=1;
2:r0=1; [prev]=2;
Ok
Witnesses
Positive: 2 Negative: 7
Condition exists ([prev]=1 /\ 2:r0=1)
Observation MP+farfetched Sometimes 2 7
Time MP+farfetched 0.02
Hash=a44733c870613a81ae096a93babe215