[PATCH v4 3/5] mm/memory-failure: efi: record hardware-poisoned frames into the poisoned-memory table

[Breno Leitao]

action_result() is where memory_failure() reports the outcome of a hard
offline, so hook it to set the frame's bit in the
LINUX_EFI_POISONED_MEMORY bitmap.

Soft-offlined pages reach num_poisoned_pages_inc() through
page_handle_poison() and are deliberately left out: they are still
functional and were offlined predictively, so recording them would turn
a prediction into a permanent loss for every kernel further down the
kexec chain.

A bit is only ever set, never cleared, given that multiple pages can set
the same bit, and it is not trivial to decide if the bit should be unset
when a page is unrecorded.

Unpoisoning a frame therefore does not hand its unit back to the next
kernel. That is a known limitation.

The table is EFI ACPI reclaim memory, which becomes E820_TYPE_ACPI and so
reaches neither memblock nor the direct map; touching it then faults.
Hand its pages to memblock from efi_config_parse_tables() the way the
unaccepted memory table already does, and vet the inherited header in the
same pass, so everything afterwards can reach a table it can trust with
phys_to_virt().

memory_failure() has already taken the frame out of this kernel's
allocator, so only the cross-kexec record happens here.

Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile |   1 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c    |   2 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/poison.c | 115 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/efi.h           |   8 +++
 mm/memory-failure.c           |   3 ++
 5 files changed, 129 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
index 8efbcf699e4ff..05d0a490923e5 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
@@ -43,4 +43,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_EARLYCON)		+= earlycon.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_UEFI_CPER_ARM)		+= cper-arm.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_UEFI_CPER_X86)		+= cper-x86.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_UNACCEPTED_MEMORY)		+= unaccepted_memory.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_POISONED_MEMORY)	+= poison.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TEE_STMM_EFI)		+= stmm/tee_stmm_efi.o
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
index af1fa443839c4..55b2ee53fc268 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
@@ -883,6 +883,8 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(const efi_config_table_t *config_tables,
 		}
 	}
 
+	efi_poisoned_memory_reserve();
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/poison.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/poison.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..c18edf111c710
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/poison.c
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Runtime side of the LINUX_EFI_POISONED_MEMORY table: one bit per
+ * EFI_POISON_UNIT_SIZE, set here as frames go bad, honored by the next kernel.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2026 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+ * Copyright (c) 2026 Breno Leitao <leitao@xxxxxxxxxx>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "efi: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/bitmap.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/log2.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/overflow.h>
+
+static bool __init
+efi_poison_geometry_valid(const struct linux_efi_poisoned_memory *pm)
+{
+	u64 nbits;
+
+	/* Whole words, and a bit count that can be taken without wrapping. */
+	if (!pm->size || !IS_ALIGNED(pm->size, sizeof(unsigned long)) ||
+	    check_mul_overflow(pm->size, (u64)BITS_PER_BYTE, &nbits))
+		return false;
+
+	if (pm->unit_size < PAGE_SIZE || !is_power_of_2(pm->unit_size))
+		return false;
+
+	return IS_ALIGNED(pm->phys_base, pm->unit_size);
+}
+
+/* The table may come from an earlier kernel, so vet it before using it. */
+static bool __init
+efi_poison_table_valid(const struct linux_efi_poisoned_memory *pm)
+{
+	if (pm->version != 1) {
+		pr_warn("Ignoring poisoned-memory table with version %u\n",
+			pm->version);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (!efi_poison_geometry_valid(pm)) {
+		pr_warn("Ignoring malformed poisoned-memory table\n");
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Vet the inherited table and hand its pages to memblock, the way the
+ * unaccepted memory table is handled. It is EFI ACPI reclaim memory, which
+ * becomes E820_TYPE_ACPI and would otherwise stay out of the direct map, and
+ * touching it then faults. Called from efi_config_parse_tables(), so
+ * everything later can reach it with efi_poisoned_memory().
+ */
+void __init efi_poisoned_memory_reserve(void)
+{
+	struct linux_efi_poisoned_memory *pm;
+	phys_addr_t start, end;
+
+	if (efi.poisoned_memory == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
+		return;
+
+	pm = early_memremap(efi.poisoned_memory, sizeof(*pm));
+	if (!pm) {
+		pr_warn("Could not map poisoned-memory table\n");
+		efi.poisoned_memory = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (!efi_poison_table_valid(pm)) {
+		efi.poisoned_memory = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR;
+		early_memunmap(pm, sizeof(*pm));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	start = PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN(efi.poisoned_memory);
+	end = PAGE_ALIGN(efi.poisoned_memory + sizeof(*pm) + pm->size);
+	early_memunmap(pm, sizeof(*pm));
+
+	memblock_add(start, end - start);
+	memblock_reserve(start, end - start);
+}
+
+/* The table, vetted at parse time, or NULL if this boot has none. */
+static struct linux_efi_poisoned_memory *efi_poisoned_memory(void)
+{
+	if (efi.poisoned_memory == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return phys_to_virt(efi.poisoned_memory);
+}
+
+/*
+ * A bit is never cleared: it stands for a whole EFI_POISON_UNIT_SIZE, so an
+ * unpoison cannot tell whether the unit as a whole is good again.
+ */
+void efi_hwpoison_record_pfn(unsigned long pfn)
+{
+	struct linux_efi_poisoned_memory *pm = efi_poisoned_memory();
+	phys_addr_t addr = PFN_PHYS(pfn);
+	u64 unit;
+
+	if (!pm || addr < pm->phys_base)
+		return;
+
+	unit = (addr - pm->phys_base) / pm->unit_size;
+	if (unit < pm->size * BITS_PER_BYTE)
+		set_bit(unit, pm->bitmap);
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index efaf63f9a54ed..56402fdccd114 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -1286,6 +1286,14 @@ struct linux_efi_poisoned_memory {
 
 #define EFI_POISON_UNIT_SIZE	SZ_2M
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_POISONED_MEMORY
+void __init efi_poisoned_memory_reserve(void);
+void efi_hwpoison_record_pfn(unsigned long pfn);
+#else
+static inline void efi_poisoned_memory_reserve(void) { }
+static inline void efi_hwpoison_record_pfn(unsigned long pfn) { }
+#endif
+
 void __init efi_arch_mem_reserve(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size);
 
 /*
diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c
index a2ca8df501cae..d9b8be696aac3 100644
--- a/mm/memory-failure.c
+++ b/mm/memory-failure.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
 #include <linux/dax.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
 #include <linux/ksm.h>
 #include <linux/rmap.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
@@ -1326,6 +1327,8 @@ static int action_result(unsigned long pfn, enum mf_action_page_type type,
 	if (type != MF_MSG_ALREADY_POISONED && type != MF_MSG_PFN_MAP) {
 		num_poisoned_pages_inc(pfn);
 		update_per_node_mf_stats(pfn, result);
+		/* Only hard offlines are carried over to the next kernel. */
+		efi_hwpoison_record_pfn(pfn);
 	}
 
 	pr_err("%#lx: recovery action for %s: %s\n",

-- 
2.53.0-Meta