Re: [PATCH net] macsec: prevent AES-GCM nonce reuse after packet number wrap

[Sabrina Dubroca]

2026-09-30, 20:33:33 +0000, Jérémy Jean wrote:
> When MACsec uses 32-bit packet numbers, 0xffffffff is the last valid
> packet number

This makes it sound like it's only a problem for 32b packet numbers,
but I think it affects both? Sure it's unlikely with 64b unless we
start from a large offset, but a well-behaved userspace should also
rekey and switch SAs before we ever wrap to avoid losing packets while
the rekey completes (but yes, "losing packets" is not as bad as
"breaking crypto").

> and after allocating it, MACsec deactivates the
> transmit SA and wraps the next packet number to zero. Packets already
> in flight can still be processed after that.

So this is more of a race condition than a full "forever" bug. I think
commit messages should be clear about that (and that doesn't mean it's
not bad or not worth patching, but it's worth mentioning).

Once TX operations hit macsec_encrypt -> macsec_txsa_get and see
!sa->active, packets will be dropped and nonce reuse stops.


> The first late packet gets packet number zero and is dropped, but
> tx_sa_update_pn() has already advanced the stored counter to one before
> macsec_encrypt() drops it. A second late packet can then be sent with
> packet number one again, reusing the AES-GCM nonce from the start of the
> SA.
>
> Keep next_pn at zero after wrap so all late packets are dropped.

"late packet" is defined on the RX side, but it doesn't make sense on
the TX path.

The diff looks good to me.

-- 
Sabrina