Re: [PATCH v3] RDMA/rxe: Validate inline data range in user WQEs
From: Zhu Yanjun
Date: Sun Oct 04 2026 - 20:30:01 EST
在 2026/10/3 23:44, Jiale Yao 写道:
For a user QP, the send queue is an mmap'd ring which userspace writes
directly. rxe_post_send() only schedules the send task for such a QP,
so userspace can also change WQE fields while rxe_requester() processes
the WQE.
Commit 126c757e4cd46f866ddc283143b58eb4d9bf52cd ("RDMA/rxe:
Validate num_sge/cur_sge before indexing wqe->dma.sge[]") added bounds
checks for two members of the userspace-controlled dma structure, but
left sge_offset unchecked. For an inline WQE, finish_packet() uses that
value directly as an index into inline_data[] and copies dma.resid bytes
from the resulting pointer into the packet payload.
A local user with access to uverbs can therefore put an out-of-range
sge_offset in the mmap'd SQ ring. This can disclose kernel memory in the
outgoing packet or cause a vmalloc out-of-bounds access.
Since sge_offset comes from shared memory, validating it in
rxe_requester() and then reading it again in finish_packet() leaves a
TOCTOU window. Load it exactly once with READ_ONCE() in finish_packet(),
validate that local value, and use the same value for the copy and update.
Check the offset first and use subtraction for the length check to avoid
an integer overflow.
I reproduced this on Linux 7.3-rc4 with an RC user QP, IB_SEND_INLINE,
a 64-byte residual length, and sge_offset set to 0x100000. KASAN
reported:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in rxe_requester+0x1f27/0x4940
Read of size 64 at addr ffffc90000191250 by task kworker/u16:0/12
Workqueue: rxe_wq do_work
Call Trace:
__asan_memcpy
rxe_requester+0x1f27/0x4940
rxe_sender+0xe/0x30
do_work+0x184/0x3d0
process_scheduled_works+0x7c0/0xf10
Conceptually, wqe->dma.sge_offset is runtime state that should be exclusively managed by the kernel, but mapping the SQ into user space via mmap exposes it to untrusted asynchronous writes.
Beyond finish_packet(), every reader of sge_offset across the driver (such as in rxe_sge.c and rxe_resp.c) must treat it as untrusted input.
We should audit all access points to ensure they consistently use a READ_ONCE() local snapshot followed by underflow-safe bounds checks. Longer term, moving kernel-managed progress state into kernel-private memory would eliminate this attack surface entirely.
Yanjun Zhu
Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260708224534.1206-1-security@xxxxxxxxxxxx/
Signed-off-by: Jiale Yao <yaojiale02@xxxxxxx>
---
Notes:
Changes in v3:
- Read sge_offset from the shared WQE with READ_ONCE(), as requested.
Changes in v2:
- Copy sge_offset into a local variable in finish_packet(), validate that
value, and reuse it for the memcpy and update.
drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c | 14 +++++++++++---
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c
index 24f5c044363f..9be753d2e5dd 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c
@@ -503,6 +503,7 @@ static int finish_packet(struct rxe_qp *qp, struct rxe_av *av,
struct sk_buff *skb, u32 payload)
{
int err;
+ u32 sge_offset;
err = rxe_prepare(av, pkt, skb);
if (err)
@@ -510,12 +511,19 @@ static int finish_packet(struct rxe_qp *qp, struct rxe_av *av,
if (pkt->mask & RXE_WRITE_OR_SEND_MASK) {
if (wqe->wr.send_flags & IB_SEND_INLINE) {
- u8 *tmp = &wqe->dma.inline_data[wqe->dma.sge_offset];
+ sge_offset = READ_ONCE(wqe->dma.sge_offset);
+ if (unlikely(sge_offset > qp->sq.max_inline ||
+ payload >
+ qp->sq.max_inline - sge_offset)) {
+ rxe_dbg_qp(qp, "invalid inline data range in send wqe\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
- memcpy(payload_addr(pkt), tmp, payload);
+ memcpy(payload_addr(pkt),
+ &wqe->dma.inline_data[sge_offset], payload);
wqe->dma.resid -= payload;
- wqe->dma.sge_offset += payload;
+ wqe->dma.sge_offset = sge_offset + payload;
} else {
err = copy_data(qp->pd, 0, &wqe->dma,
payload_addr(pkt), payload,