Re: [PATCH] KVM: arm64: Pend host SErrors for protected vCPUs through HCR_EL2.VSE

[Marc Zyngier]

On Mon, 05 Oct 2026 06:03:52 +0100,
Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> kvm_inject_serror_esr() reads PSTATE.A and SCTLR2_EL1.NMEA to decide
> whether to emulate the SError's exception entry or pend it through
> HCR_EL2.VSE. For a protected vCPU, the host's copy of those is stale,
> and when it reads as unmasked KVM emulates the entry on that copy. EL2
> never delivers it as an SError: its entry handler turns the pending
> exception into an external abort on the trapped access, and an MMIO
> completion still pending trips WARN_ON(INCREMENT_PC).
> 
> Always pend through HCR_EL2.VSE for a protected vCPU. EL2 forwards it,
> and the guest's own masking decides when the SError is taken.
> 
> Fixes: 872383bd12e11 ("KVM: arm64: Add per-EC entry/exit state marshalling for protected guests")
> Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261001142109.794CA1F000FF@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> Applies on kvmarm/next. A follow-up to "KVM: arm64: Confine protected VM
> vCPU state to EL2" [1], from Sashiko's review of its v4 patch 12.
> 
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261001135711.1640520-1-fuad.tabba@xxxxxxxxx/
> 
>  arch/arm64/kvm/inject_fault.c | 5 ++++-
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/inject_fault.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/inject_fault.c
> index d6c4fc16f8795..49a342b078365 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/inject_fault.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/inject_fault.c
> @@ -378,8 +378,11 @@ int kvm_inject_serror_esr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 esr)
>  	 *
>  	 * As we're emulating the SError injection we need to explicitly populate
>  	 * ESR_ELx.EC because hardware will not do it on our behalf.
> +	 *
> +	 * A protected vCPU's PSTATE and SCTLR2_EL1 live at EL2, so pend through
> +	 * HCR_EL2.VSE and let the guest's own masking apply.
>  	 */
> -	if (!serror_is_masked(vcpu)) {
> +	if (!vcpu_is_protected(vcpu) && !serror_is_masked(vcpu)) {
>  		pend_serror_exception(vcpu);
>  		esr |= FIELD_PREP(ESR_ELx_EC_MASK, ESR_ELx_EC_SERROR) | ESR_ELx_IL;
>  		vcpu_write_sys_reg(vcpu, esr, exception_esr_elx(vcpu));
> 

I thought we had discussed that one before (or am I making things
up?). Why can't the host always evaluate serror_is_masked() as true?
Given that PSTATE is never synced back to the host, it would only be a
matter of set PSTATE.A==1 at vcpu creation time.

It'd be more palatable than this sprinkling of vcpu_is_protected(),
which really do not scale.

Thanks,

	M.

-- 
Jazz isn't dead. It just smells funny.