Re: [PATCH v6 6/8] dma: swiotlb: Centralize memory-encryption pool sizing
From: Will Deacon
Date: Tue Oct 06 2026 - 17:50:36 EST
On Thu, Sep 24, 2026 at 11:37:54AM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm) wrote:
> Memory-encrypted guests use shared or unencrypted memory for DMA and may
> route all DMA through SWIOTLB. The default pool can therefore be too
> small for I/O-intensive workloads.
>
> Move the existing x86 guest-sizing policy into the SWIOTLB core. For
> SWIOTLB_POOL_CC_GUEST, size the pool to 6% of guest memory, clamped
> between the normal default and 1 GiB. Preserve an explicit swiotlb=
> size.
>
> Host memory encryption still selects a normal-sized shared pool and
> does not use the guest-sizing policy.
>
> A restricted DMA pool already provides shared bounce buffers for its
> devices. Record its presence during reserved-memory initialization and
> do not select the confidential-guest default-pool policy solely because
> guest memory encryption is active.
>
> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: x86@xxxxxxxxxx
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@xxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm) <aneesh.kumar@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 24 ------------------------
> kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index 95bae74fdab2..912f22ca838f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -101,9 +101,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
>
> void __init mem_encrypt_setup_arch(void)
> {
> - phys_addr_t total_mem = memblock_phys_mem_size();
> - unsigned long size;
> -
> /*
> * Do RMP table fixups after the e820 tables have been setup by
> * e820__memory_setup().
> @@ -114,27 +111,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_setup_arch(void)
> if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
> return;
>
> - /*
> - * For SEV and TDX, all DMA has to occur via shared/unencrypted pages.
> - * Kernel uses SWIOTLB to make this happen without changing device
> - * drivers. However, depending on the workload being run, the
> - * default 64MB of SWIOTLB may not be enough and SWIOTLB may
> - * run out of buffers for DMA, resulting in I/O errors and/or
> - * performance degradation especially with high I/O workloads.
> - *
> - * Adjust the default size of SWIOTLB using a percentage of guest
> - * memory for SWIOTLB buffers. Also, as the SWIOTLB bounce buffer
> - * memory is allocated from low memory, ensure that the adjusted size
> - * is within the limits of low available memory.
> - *
> - * The percentage of guest memory used here for SWIOTLB buffers
> - * is more of an approximation of the static adjustment which
> - * 64MB for <1G, and ~128M to 256M for 1G-to-4G, i.e., the 6%
> - */
> - size = total_mem * 6 / 100;
> - size = clamp_val(size, IO_TLB_DEFAULT_SIZE, SZ_1G);
> - swiotlb_adjust_size(size);
> -
> /* Set restricted memory access for virtio. */
> virtio_set_mem_acc_cb(virtio_require_restricted_mem_acc);
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
> index 75ee63cd354e..e626cca63ad1 100644
> --- a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
> +++ b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
> @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
> #include <linux/kmsan-checks.h>
> #include <linux/iommu-helper.h>
> #include <linux/init.h>
> +#include <linux/math64.h>
> #include <linux/memblock.h>
> #include <linux/mm.h>
> #include <linux/pfn.h>
> @@ -80,6 +81,7 @@ struct io_tlb_slot {
>
> static bool swiotlb_force_bounce;
> static bool swiotlb_force_disable;
> +static bool restricted_dma_pool_present __initdata;
>
> enum swiotlb_pool_policy {
> SWIOTLB_POOL_NONE,
> @@ -478,7 +480,25 @@ swiotlb_adjust_pool_size(enum swiotlb_pool_policy policy)
> size = min(swiotlb_default_pool_size(), size);
> break;
> case SWIOTLB_POOL_CC_GUEST:
> - return;
> + /*
> + * For SEV and TDX and CCA, all DMA has to occur via
> + * shared/unencrypted pages. Kernel uses SWIOTLB to make this
> + * happen without changing device drivers. However, depending on
> + * the workload being run, the default 64MB of SWIOTLB may not be
> + * enough and SWIOTLB may run out of buffers for DMA, resulting in
> + * I/O errors and/or performance degradation especially with high
> + * I/O workloads.
> + *
> + * Adjust the default size of SWIOTLB using a percentage of guest
> + * memory for SWIOTLB buffers.
> + *
> + * The percentage of guest memory used here for SWIOTLB buffers is
> + * more of an approximation of the static adjustment which 64MB for
> + * <1G, and ~128M to 256M for 1G-to-4G, i.e., the 6%
> + */
> + size = div_u64((u64)memblock_phys_mem_size() * 6, 100);
> + size = clamp_val(size, IO_TLB_DEFAULT_SIZE, SZ_1G);
> + break;
> case SWIOTLB_POOL_NONE:
> WARN(true, "Cannot adjust SWIOTLB size without a pool\n");
> return;
> @@ -496,7 +516,8 @@ swiotlb_select_pool_policy(unsigned int flags)
> if (swiotlb_force_disable)
> return SWIOTLB_POOL_NONE;
>
> - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
> + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) &&
> + !restricted_dma_pool_present)
> return SWIOTLB_POOL_CC_GUEST;
I think this check on the restricted DMA pool is too general -- the pool
could be tied to a specific DMA-capable peripheral and so treating its
presence as a global property isn't right.
Will