Re: [PATCH] ocfs2/dlm: Serialize recovery list teardown with debug reads
From: Joseph Qi
Date: Sat Oct 10 2026 - 04:52:29 EST
On 10/9/26 6:01 PM, Cen Zhang wrote:
> Recovery participant records must remain alive while debug_state_print()
> walks reco.node_data and formats their fields. The formatter holds
> dlm->spinlock, but dlm_destroy_recovery_area() detaches the list under
> dlm_reco_state_lock and frees the records without taking dlm->spinlock.
>
> When a recovery master finishes recovering a dead node, a concurrent
> open of the domain's dlm_state file can reach the participant list after
> the master's last dlm->spinlock section. The following ordering is
> possible:
>
> Debugfs open Recovery thread
> debug_state_print()
> lock dlm->spinlock
> select participant
> dlm_destroy_recovery_area()
> lock dlm_reco_state_lock
> detach participant list
> unlock dlm_reco_state_lock
> kfree(participant)
> read node->state/node_num
> unlock dlm->spinlock
>
> The field read or the next list iteration then accesses freed memory.
> Debugfs removal protects the domain lifetime, but session completion
> leaves the file installed, so it does not drain this open callback.
>
> Take dlm->spinlock around the existing locked list detachment. A debug
> reader must now finish before detachment, and later readers see an empty
> list. Keep the frees outside both locks. This also covers cleanup after
> partial allocation failure in dlm_init_recovery_area().
>
> KASAN report as below:
>
> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0
> Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810662ef80 by task dlm-state-stres/896
>
> CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 896 Comm: dlm-state-stres Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-next-20260921-pmb-ocfs2-functional-v1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
> Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
> print_report+0xce/0x630
> ? debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0
> ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> ? __virt_addr_valid+0x20e/0x420
> ? debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0
> kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
> ? debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0
> debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0
> ? __pfx_debug_state_open+0x10/0x10
> full_proxy_open_regular+0x193/0x310
> do_dentry_open+0x595/0x12d0
> ? __pfx_full_proxy_open_regular+0x10/0x10
> vfs_open_consume+0xd1/0x400
> ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> path_openat+0x18d0/0x2020
> ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10
> do_file_open+0x21e/0x470
> ? __pfx_do_file_open+0x10/0x10
> ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x40
> ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> ? alloc_fd+0x3a6/0x6b0
> do_sys_openat2+0xf4/0x1b0
> ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10
> ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> ? __fput+0x5b5/0xa60
> __x64_sys_openat+0x136/0x1e0
> ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10
> do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
> [Register dump omitted.]
> </TASK>
>
> Allocated by task 880:
> kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
> kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
> __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
> __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x28d/0x610
> dlm_remaster_locks+0x147/0x1d90
> dlm_do_recovery+0xde1/0x1580
> dlm_recovery_thread+0x109/0x300
> kthread+0x351/0x460
> ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940
> ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
>
> Freed by task 880:
> kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
> kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
> kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
> __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80
> kfree+0x308/0x580
> dlm_destroy_recovery_area+0x285/0x460
> dlm_remaster_locks+0x17c4/0x1d90
> dlm_do_recovery+0xde1/0x1580
> dlm_recovery_thread+0x109/0x300
> kthread+0x351/0x460
> ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940
> ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
>
> The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810662ef80
> which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32
> The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
> freed 32-byte region [ffff88810662ef80, ffff88810662efa0)
>
> [Page and memory-state dumps omitted.]
>
> Fixes: 007dce53a29c ("ocfs2/dlm: Dump the dlm state in a debugfs file")
> Assisted-by: LLM
> Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>
> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c
> index 9d4a2695b9594d1ad8bd60de9cec8ee701355f09..5719c2b88e4292cff38e26b10b29c8a4a0deccda 100644
> --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c
> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c
> @@ -764,9 +764,12 @@ static void dlm_destroy_recovery_area(struct dlm_ctxt *dlm)
> struct dlm_reco_node_data *ndata, *next;
> LIST_HEAD(tmplist);
>
> + /* Serialize list detachment with debug_state_print(). */
> + spin_lock(&dlm->spinlock);
> spin_lock(&dlm_reco_state_lock);
> list_splice_init(&dlm->reco.node_data, &tmplist);
> spin_unlock(&dlm_reco_state_lock);
> + spin_unlock(&dlm->spinlock);
>
The race looks real.
But I don't want to involve dlm->spinlock for list dlm->reco.node_data.
While dlm_reco_state_lock is the designed lock to protect list
dlm->reco.node_data.
So why not add the dlm_reco_state_lock in debug_state_print()? This
can keep consitent with all other places that access list
dlm->reco.node_data.
Also it seems also fixes the potential list_add_tail() race in
dlm_init_recovery_area().
Thanks,
Joseph