Re: [PATCH net 2/2] Revert "net: advertise TCP MSS from the configured MTU, not the learned PMTU"

[David Laight]

On Mon, 26 Oct 2026 15:23:09 +0800
Esko Mobius via B4 Relay <devnull+echoowall.gmail.com@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> From: Esko Mobius <echoowall@xxxxxxxxx>
> 
> This reverts commit 2640e6419594 ("net: advertise TCP MSS from the
> configured MTU, not the learned PMTU").
> 
> That commit stopped the learned PMTU from lowering the MSS we advertise
> in SYN and SYN-ACK. For symmetric paths it argued that "the peer runs
> its own PMTU discovery and usually already knows the real path MTU".
> That only holds if ICMP "fragmentation needed" can reach the peer. When
> the peer sits behind a firewall that drops inbound ICMP, its PMTU
> discovery is a black hole (RFC 2923, section 2.1), and the smaller MSS
> we advertised was the only thing keeping its full-size segments off the
> narrow hop.
> 
> Inbound ICMP filtering is very common in enterprise and carrier
> networks, and it is pervasive in mainland China. We hit this in
> production after the commit was backported to 6.12.111: TCP connections
> that reach a server through a relay with a smaller-MTU hop complete the
> handshake, then stall as soon as the client sends full-size segments.
> Clients on networks that let ICMP through, and connections that bypass
> the relay, are unaffected, which made it hard to trace back to the
> kernel.

If it isn't a silly question, how to connections in the other direction
work?

I'd have thought they'd need that ICMP message to get through.

David