[PATCH v3] KEYS: Protect pkey method checks against type removal
From: Yuansheng Yang
Date: Wed Nov 04 2026 - 23:38:45 EST
keyctl_pkey_params_get() looks up the key, and keyctl_pkey_query(),
keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() and keyctl_pkey_verify() then dereference
key->type->asym_* outside key->sem. A reference keeps the key alive, but
does not pin the module providing its type.
unregister_key_type() calls key_gc_keytype(), which retypes every
remaining key of the type to key_type_dead under key->sem for writing.
The pkey paths read key->type again after their checks, so a concurrent
module unload can turn the checked callback into the NULL key_type_dead
member and call through a NULL function pointer, e.g.:
KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN task Module unload and key GC
------------------------ ------------------------
keyctl_pkey_e_d_s()
if (!key->type->asym_eds_op) unregister_key_type()
GC: down_write(&key->sem)
GC: retype to key_type_dead
GC: up_write(&key->sem)
free_module()
in = memdup_user(...)
key->type->asym_eds_op(...) -> NULL call
In-tree, turris-signing-key provides such methods.
Hold key->sem for reading around the method check and the matching call,
so that the type cannot be retired in between. Each keyctl handler takes
and releases the lock itself; the semaphore is not passed out through the
parameter block. User buffers are copied outside the critical section.
This is the same type-removal problem recently fixed for the read
(925c84e3cc21) and update (aef3a8a4f988) methods.
Fixes: 00d60fd3b932 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]")
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Yuansheng Yang <0xbeac@xxxxxxxxx>
---
Changes in v3:
- Keep the switch, allocations and existing error handling in place.
- Use one unlock point per method check/call pair.
- Set -EOPNOTSUPP inside the failed checks; add blank lines before labels.
- Use my real name in the author and sign-off fields.
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261104021414.50696-1-0xbeac@xxxxxxxxx/
security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
index 15b6bf6399..40475817dd 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
@@ -100,9 +100,6 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get(key_serial_t id,
return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
params->key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
- if (!params->key->type->asym_query)
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-
return 0;
}
@@ -129,7 +126,16 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
+ down_read(¶ms->key->sem);
+ if (!params->key->type->asym_query) {
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
ret = params->key->type->asym_query(params, &info);
+
+out_unlock:
+ up_read(¶ms->key->sem);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -185,7 +191,16 @@ long keyctl_pkey_query(key_serial_t id,
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
+ down_read(¶ms.key->sem);
+ if (!params.key->type->asym_query) {
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
ret = params.key->type->asym_query(¶ms, &res);
+
+out_unlock:
+ up_read(¶ms.key->sem);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
@@ -230,10 +245,6 @@ long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int op,
if (ret < 0)
goto error_params;
- ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (!params.key->type->asym_eds_op)
- goto error_params;
-
switch (op) {
case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT:
params.op = kernel_pkey_encrypt;
@@ -260,7 +271,16 @@ long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int op,
if (!out)
goto error_in;
+ down_read(¶ms.key->sem);
+ if (!params.key->type->asym_eds_op) {
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
ret = params.key->type->asym_eds_op(¶ms, in, out);
+
+out_unlock:
+ up_read(¶ms.key->sem);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_out;
@@ -307,10 +327,6 @@ long keyctl_pkey_verify(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
if (ret < 0)
goto error_params;
- ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (!params.key->type->asym_verify_signature)
- goto error_params;
-
in = memdup_user(_in, params.in_len);
if (IS_ERR(in)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(in);
@@ -324,8 +340,17 @@ long keyctl_pkey_verify(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
}
params.op = kernel_pkey_verify;
+ down_read(¶ms.key->sem);
+ if (!params.key->type->asym_verify_signature) {
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
ret = params.key->type->asym_verify_signature(¶ms, in, in2);
+out_unlock:
+ up_read(¶ms.key->sem);
+
kfree(in2);
error_in:
kfree(in);
--
2.43.0