[PATCH RFC v3 66/90] capabilities: let a cell shrink its bounding sets

From: Josef Bacik

Date: Thu Nov 05 2026 - 10:32:09 EST


PR_CAPBSET_DROP requires CAP_SETPCAP. Without that requirement, a user
could run a set-uid root program with a capability removed that the
program relies on. A program that does not notice that it failed to drop
its privileges would then carry on with them.

In a cell no program gains anything from its file, so there is no such
program to trick. A task that wants to give less to the programs it starts
should not need a capability for that.

This matters in practice. systemd removes every capability from the
bounding set of a service that the unit does not list, and fails the
service if it cannot. In a cell that has CAP_KILL but not CAP_SETPCAP,
journald does not start.

Let a task of a cell drop capabilities from its bounding set without
CAP_SETPCAP.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
security/commoncap.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 02e25ab18f56..1e0ef7465766 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1281,7 +1281,12 @@ static int cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
{
struct cred *new;

- if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
+ /*
+ * It takes a capability lest a program that gains from its file runs with
+ * less than it counts on. In a cell no program gains anything from a file.
+ */
+ if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP) &&
+ !userns_is_cell(current_user_ns()))
return -EPERM;
if (!cap_valid(cap))
return -EINVAL;

--
2.55.0