Re: [PATCH net] net: reuseport: avoid duplicate closed socket insertion

[Lin Jiapeng]

On 2026-11-07 1:02 p.m., Jiayuan Chen wrote:
> On 11/6/26 9:58 PM, Lin Jiapeng wrote:
> > Clearing SO_REUSEPORT on a TCP listener clears sk_reuseport but leaves
> > sk_reuseport_cb attached to its reuseport group. 
> > ...
> > Repeated connect(AF_UNSPEC)/listen() cycles therefore insert the same
> > socket until num_closed_socks exceeds max_socks. The next insertion
> > writes before socks[], overlapping prog on x86-64 and leading to type
> > confusion when a reuseport program is attached or detached.
>
>
> Is the issue same as Eric's patch ?
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20261106084300.2029567-1-edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx/

These reports may be related, but analysis suggests that they seem
to have different root causes.

Eric's patch seems to prevent attaching a program to the same unhashed,
shutdown listener from resurrecting it into the listening section. My
patch addresses duplicate closed-section insertion after SO_REUSEPORT
is cleared, which may eventually make socks[-1] overwrite reuse->prog.

Eric's patch does not change reuseport_stop_listen_sock(). Also, my PoC
attaches the program on a separate, still-hashed anchor socket, so his
new check may not apply to this path.

I tested Eric's v2 patch with my unmodified PoC. His positive control
returned EINVAL, so the patch seems to be active. However, my PoC still
triggered the same UBSAN/KASAN failure. Since his patch did not stop my
reproducer, and the root causes appear to be different, I think these
may not be the same issue. The two fixes may therefore be complementary.

The following is the UBSAN/KASAN output with Eric's v2 patch applied:

[trigger] cycle 129/129 (vulnerable: socks[-1] overwrites prog)
[trigger] attaching CBPF after closed-region pump
------------[ cut here ]------------
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in 
/Users/m00nb1rd/WorkSpace/vul-findings/reuseport-closed-region-negative-index-bpfprog-as-sock/repro-upstream/linux-eric-v2/net/core/sock_reuseport.c:153:9
index -1 is out of range for type 'struct sock *[] 
__counted_by(max_socks)' (aka 'struct sock *[]')
CPU: 0 UID: 65534 PID: 22 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.4.0-rc1+ #1 PREEMPTLAZY
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x23/0x30
 ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x30
 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x91/0xa0
 reuseport_stop_listen_sock+0x290/0x310
 ? reuseport_stop_listen_sock+0x43/0x310
 inet_unhash+0xd5/0x400
 tcp_set_state+0x125/0x260
 tcp_disconnect+0x47/0x1950
 __inet_stream_connect+0x2d0/0xab0
 ? do_iter_readv_writev+0x25b/0x350
 ? vfs_writev+0x2e0/0x3c0
 inet_stream_connect+0x57/0x90
 __sys_connect+0x14b/0x1a0
 __x64_sys_connect+0x71/0x80
 do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x205560
...
...
 </TASK>
---[ end trace ]---
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 
0xdffffc000000008e: 0000 [#1] KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000470-0x0000000000000477]
CPU: 0 UID: 65534 PID: 22 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.4.0-rc1+ #1 PREEMPTLAZY
RIP: 0010:call_rcu+0x10d/0x260
...
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? reuseport_attach_prog+0x6c/0x250
 reuseport_attach_prog+0xdd/0x250
 sk_reuseport_attach_filter+0x97/0xf0
 sk_setsockopt+0x973/0x1cc0
 do_sock_setsockopt+0xa9/0x120
 __sys_setsockopt+0xaa/0xe0
 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xac/0xc0
 do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x202f22
...
 </TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---