Re: [PATCH RFC 17/20] attestation: Add CTLV operation handling

From: Yeoreum Yun

Date: Sat Nov 07 2026 - 06:25:14 EST


On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 04:19:59PM +0000, Yeoreum Yun wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 05:03:32PM +0100, Jiri Pirko wrote:
> > Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 03:36:50PM +0100, yeoreum.yun@xxxxxxx wrote:
> > >> Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 09:57:25AM +0100, yeoreum.yun@xxxxxxx wrote:
> > >> >On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 09:27:42AM +0100, Jiri Pirko wrote:
> > >> >> Thu, Nov 05, 2026 at 02:52:19PM +0100, yeoreum.yun@xxxxxxx wrote:
> > >> >> >On Thu, Nov 05, 2026 at 01:32:49PM +0100, Jiri Pirko wrote:
> > >> >> >> Wed, Nov 04, 2026 at 08:46:22PM +0100, jgg@xxxxxxxx wrote:
> > >> >> >> >On Wed, Nov 04, 2026 at 07:11:44PM +0000, Yeoreum Yun wrote:
> > >> >> >> >> [..snip..]
> > >> >> >> >>
> > >> >> >> >> > +static int attestation_evidence_request_decode(struct attestation *att, struct ctlv_op_ctx *ctx,
> > >> >> >> >> > + const struct ctlv_cursor *request,
> > >> >> >> >> > + struct attestation_evidence_request *decoded,
> > >> >> >> >> > + struct attestation_evidence_object_request **objects)
> > >> >> >> >> > +{
> > >> >> >> >> > + const struct attestation_evidence_caps *caps = att->provider->evidence_caps;
> > >> >> >> >> > + u32 challenge_length;
> > >> >> >> >> > +
> > >> >> >> >> > + decoded->challenge =
> > >> >> >> >> > + ctlv_attestation_evidence_get_evidence_challenge_get(request, &challenge_length);
> > >> >> >> >> > + decoded->challenge_length = challenge_length;
> > >> >> >> >> > + if (challenge_length < caps->min_challenge_length ||
> > >> >> >> >> > + challenge_length > caps->max_challenge_length)
> > >> >> >> >>
> > >> >> >> >> Hmm, I'm not sure whether this check is required for
> > >> >> >> >> ATTESTATION_EVIDENCE_BLOB_EVENT_LOG blob type.
> > >> >> >> >>
> > >> >> >> >> for example, if the provider provides two evidence:
> > >> >> >> >> - ATTESTATION_EVIDENCE_BLOB_PRIMARY (might attestation token)
> > >> >> >> >> - ATTESTATION_EVIDENCE_BLOB_EVENT_LOG
> > >> >> >> >>
> > >> >> >> >> might challenge is reuiqred for generating the token
> > >> >> >> >> and this would be marked at min/max_challenge_size in evidence_cap.
> > >> >> >> >>
> > >> >> >> >> However, in case of eventlog, it wouldn't require challenge.
> > >> >> >> >> for example, TPM event log or CCEL event log.
> > >> >> >> >
> > >> >> >> >Right
> > >> >> >> >
> > >> >> >> >> Do we need some field on attestation_evidence_supported_object whether
> > >> >> >> >> it requires challenge or not and applies this sanity check per the object?
> > >> >> >> >>
> > >> >> >> >> Otherwise, to get eventlog, it would need to send *dummy* challenge
> > >> >> >> >> always.
> > >> >> >> >
> > >> >> >> >I wonder if we should have two interfaces here for signed and unsigned
> > >> >> >> >evidence? It would be clearer for userspace then when it needs to
> > >> >> >> >provide a challenge or not.
> > >> >> >>
> > >> >> >> Isn't the challenge field provided/not-provided enough?
> > >> >> >>
> > >> >> >> Currently on the introspection side, device-get op would provide
> > >> >> >> challenge-lengths array:
> > >> >> >>
> > >> >> >> evidence?:
> > >> >> >> challenge-lengths[8]:
> > >> >> >> length?: uint(..4096)
> > >> >> >> min-length?: uint(..4096)
> > >> >> >> max-length?: uint(..4096)
> > >> >> >> objects[16]:
> > >> >> >> blob-class: evidence-blob-class
> > >> >> >> max-length: uint
> > >> >> >> blob-instance?: uint(..u32-max)
> > >> >> >>
> > >> >> >> I think it would make sense to have challenge-lengths array per object:
> > >> >> >>
> > >> >> >> objects[16]:
> > >> >> >> blob-class: evidence-blob-class
> > >> >> >> max-length: uint
> > >> >> >> blob-instance?: uint(..u32-max)
> > >> >> >> challenge-lengths[8]:
> > >> >> >> length?: uint(..4096)
> > >> >> >> min-length?: uint(..4096)
> > >> >> >> max-length?: uint(..4096)
> > >> >> >>
> > >> >> >> Then the unsigned object would just simply have challenge-lengths empty?
> > >> >> >
> > >> >> >This looks good to me. :)
> > >> >>
> > >> >> The challenge is one of several open points that all depend on what an
> > >> >> evidence object is: Rick's TDREPORT, legacy versus DICE Quotes,
> > >> >> "primary", "raw" and the format strings. Here is my proposal to settle
> > >> >> these together:
> > >> >>
> > >> >> The model:
> > >> >>
> > >> >> 1. device-get lists each object with an id, a class (signed, event-log,
> > >> >> cert-chain or auxiliary), the formats it may come in, its max-length
> > >> >> and, for signed objects only, challenge-lengths.
> > >> >> 2. evidence-get names objects by id, as MR ops name MRs, each with its
> > >> >> output blob. It carries a challenge exactly when it names a signed
> > >> >> object, and the challenge has to fit each of them.
> > >> >> 3. The reply gives each object's format, length and, where the TCB
> > >> >> vouches for it, the TCB's digest. The output is always {label, data}.
> > >> >> 4. A signed object is made by the call, over the challenge, and never
> > >> >> reused. The rest are read as they stand.
> > >> >>
> > >> >> This settles following issues discussed during this patchset review:
> > >> >>
> > >> >> 1. One op, not two. Per-object challenge-lengths tell userspace when to
> > >> >> pass a challenge, and one call returns the signed object with the log
> > >> >> and certificates needed to check it.
> > >> >> 2. TDX's TDREPORT goes: it is MAC'd for the platform, not signed.
> > >> >> /dev/tdx_guest keeps TDX_CMD_GET_REPORT0.
> > >> >> 3. TDX's Quote object lists the legacy and the DICE format. The provider
> > >> >> labels what the host returned and fails on a Quote it cannot label.
> > >> >> 4. "primary" becomes "signed", manifest joins auxiliary, spdm-vca,
> > >> >> spdm-measurements and tdisp-report become formats, and signature
> > >> >> goes, as a signed object carries its own.
> > >> >> 5. "raw" goes with the representation attr. The TCB digest is a reply
> > >> >> field, so a blob always holds the object's own bytes.
> > >> >>
> > >> >> Formats become an enum each provider family defines, instead of free
> > >> >> strings. I'm still unsure if format should be entirely provider-specific
> > >> >> and defined as "extension", or it should be somehow mixture of common
> > >> >> and provider-specific. Looks there is not really much common
> > >> >> anyway, so I lean towards provider-specific only. So far I have:
> > >> >
> > >> >Overall, This is plausible for me with some small question.
> > >> >
> > >> >>
> > >> >> ====== ============ ========== ========= ===========================
> > >> >> Family Format Class Challenge Bytes
> > >> >> ====== ============ ========== ========= ===========================
> > >> >[...]
> > >> >> tpm ek-cert cert-chain none EK certificate from NV
> > >> >
> > >> >Just a thought, but how are we planning to retrieve
> > >> >the NV index for EK certificate?
> > >> >
> > >> >As far as I know, TPM NV storage doesn't support labeling.
> > >> >
> > >> >Should I assume that the NV index would be specified as part of the
> > >> >challenge to retrieve the certificate from TPM NV storage?
> > >>
> > >> evidence-get allows to accept mr-selection as part of the request
> > >> alongside the challenge.
> > >
> > >Sorry. Could you explain a little bit detail for this?.
> > >AFAIU, this is to get the EK certificate from TPM non-volatile storage.
> > >But, I don't know why *EK* certificate get would be relevant for
> > >*mr selection*. AFAIK, the TPM_Quote will be used AK not a EK.
> >
> > You are right, my mistake. I misunderstood the question.
> >
> > mr-selection selects PCRs for Quote, or an extend-NV measurement
> > register for NV Certify.
> >
> > An NV-resident EK certificate is retrieved using NV_Read. I think
> > blob-instance is a good fit. For TPM certificate objects, it could
> > identify the certificate's NV index.
>
> Ah. I missed the TCG_EK_Credential_Profile specification which defines
> the NV index value for EK certificate:
>
> 2.2.1.4 Low Range
> The Low Range is at NV Indices 0x01c00002 - 0x01c0000c.
> 0x01c00002 RSA 2048 EK Certificate
> 0x01c00003 RSA 2048 EK Nonce
> 0x01c00004 RSA 2048 EK Template
> 0x01c0000a ECC NIST P256 EK Certificate
> 0x01c0000b ECC NIST P256 EK Nonce
> 0x01c0000c ECC NIST P256 EK Template
>
> But, do we need some argument to get which EK certificate to get?
> (RSA or ECC NIST P256)?
>
> Otherwise, Is this interface going to print all EK certificate
> regardless of alg?

Might be with a format, it seems to be provided with my humble
thought...

--
Sincerely,
Yeoreum Yun