Re: mm/mremap: F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE can be bypassed via mremap() VMA expansion/duplication

From: David Hildenbrand (Arm)

Date: Sat Nov 07 2026 - 08:18:15 EST


On 11/7/26 04:07, Junyoung Jang wrote:
> Hello,

Hi,

>
> I found a reproducible F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal-policy bypass. A process
> holding a one-page shared writable memfd mapping created before the seal can
> use mremap() after the seal to gain writable access to additional file pages.

F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE is not really range-aware. What makes you believe that it
would be?

I'd say it's expected that if someone has write access to the memfd, it has
write access to the whole thing, not just some subset that was obtained through
the initial mmap.

Any documentation that made you believe that it works that way?

--
Cheers,

David