[PATCH v2 2/2] tpm: sessions: bound the parameter decryption by the response size
From: Guo Zihao
Date: Sun Nov 08 2026 - 20:50:29 EST
tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() decrypts the parameter area of a
response for sessions with TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT set:
len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_p);
aes_prepareenckey(&auth->aes_key, auth->scratch, AES_KEY_BYTES);
aescfb_decrypt(&auth->aes_key, &buf->data[offset_p],
&buf->data[offset_p], len,
auth->scratch + AES_KEY_BYTES);
The length is read from the response itself and never checked
against the buffer: every other size taken from a session response
is compared to tpm_buf_length(), but not this one. A TPM that
reports an oversized parameter area makes aescfb_decrypt() walk
past the end of the buffer, and since the decryption is done in
place, this both reads and writes whatever follows the received
data.
Check that the encrypted parameters fit in the response before
decrypting them.
Signed-off-by: Guo Zihao <guozh23@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
v2: Drop the Fixes and Cc: stable tags, as suggested by Jarkko
Sakkinen: a TPM reporting an oversized parameter area is not known
to violate the TCG specification, so this is hardening rather
than a bug fix. No code changes.
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index e140079dbc13..59c7fdc0c88e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -872,6 +872,10 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
auth->scratch);
len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_p);
+ if (offset_p + len > tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
aes_prepareenckey(&auth->aes_key, auth->scratch, AES_KEY_BYTES);
aescfb_decrypt(&auth->aes_key, &buf->data[offset_p],
&buf->data[offset_p], len,
--
2.50.1