Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] KEYS: Return user session keyring on lookup
From: Jarkko Sakkinen
Date: Mon Nov 09 2026 - 18:55:08 EST
On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 12:00:49AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> A process without a session keyring looking up KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
> without KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE mutates the credentials. This causes struct creds
> instances shared with other subsystems to become stale.
>
> Address this by returning the resolved user session keyring directly
> without installing it into credentials.
>
> Cc: keyrings@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Cc: linux-integrity@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Cc: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Cc: linux-security-module@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx # v5.10+
> Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
> Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/CAG48ez0XjVSR=M--UBauTm8sJuc+ZbhKzaPa3a6wrSVHyoKevw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
These patches have zero Sashiko remarks and are looking pretty good
overall.
Is there any reason not to apply them?
> ---
> v3:
> In keyctl_session_to_parent(), check the resolved cred->session_keyring
> instead of mycred->session_keyring.
> v2:
> - Added mandatory tags.
> - No code changes.
> - Link: https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/20261019145624.309790-1-jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx/
> Documentation/security/keys/core.rst | 6 ++--
> security/keys/keyctl.c | 5 ++--
> security/keys/process_keys.c | 44 +++++++---------------------
> 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
> ---
> Documentation/security/keys/core.rst | 6 ++--
> security/keys/keyctl.c | 5 ++--
> security/keys/process_keys.c | 44 +++++++---------------------
> 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst
> index 37ed42382f16..e3a215e55f81 100644
> --- a/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst
> @@ -165,8 +165,10 @@ The key service provides a number of features besides keys:
> When a process changes its real UID, if it used to have no session key, it
> will be subscribed to the default session key for the new UID.
>
> - If a process attempts to access its session key when it doesn't have one,
> - it will be subscribed to the default for its current UID.
> + If a process attempts to access its session keyring when it doesn't have
> + one, the default user session keyring for its current UID is returned
> + without being installed into its credentials. If creation is requested,
> + an anonymous session keyring is installed.
>
> * Each user has two quotas against which the keys they own are tracked. One
> limits the total number of keys and keyrings, the other limits the total
> diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
> index d6b10fd67627..b11716f88ded 100644
> --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
> +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
> @@ -1682,8 +1682,7 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
> * there's no point */
> mycred = current_cred();
> pcred = __task_cred(parent);
> - if (mycred == pcred ||
> - mycred->session_keyring == pcred->session_keyring) {
> + if (cred->session_keyring == pcred->session_keyring) {
> ret = 0;
> goto unlock;
> }
> @@ -1701,7 +1700,7 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
> /* the keyrings must have the same UID */
> if ((pcred->session_keyring &&
> !uid_eq(pcred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid)) ||
> - !uid_eq(mycred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid))
> + !uid_eq(cred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid))
> goto unlock;
>
> /* cancel an already pending keyring replacement */
> diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
> index 3af71c6322af..cdf03b8124d0 100644
> --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
> +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
> @@ -356,31 +356,6 @@ int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -/*
> - * Install the given keyring as the session keyring of the current task,
> - * replacing the existing one if any. If the given keyring is NULL, then
> - * install a new anonymous session keyring.
> - *
> - * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure.
> - */
> -static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)
> -{
> - struct cred *new;
> - int ret;
> -
> - new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> -
> - ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);
> - if (ret < 0) {
> - abort_creds(new);
> - return ret;
> - }
> -
> - return commit_creds(new);
> -}
> -
> /*
> * Handle the fsuid changing.
> */
> @@ -720,20 +695,21 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
>
> case KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING:
> if (!ctx.cred->session_keyring) {
> - /* always install a session keyring upon access if one
> - * doesn't exist yet */
> ret = look_up_user_keyrings(NULL, &user_session);
> if (ret < 0)
> goto error;
> - if (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE)
> +
> + if (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) {
> + key_put(user_session);
> ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
> - else
> - ret = install_session_keyring(user_session);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + goto error;
> + goto reget_creds;
> + }
>
> - key_put(user_session);
> - if (ret < 0)
> - goto error;
> - goto reget_creds;
> + key = user_session;
> + key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
> + break;
> } else if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING,
> &ctx.cred->session_keyring->flags) &&
> lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) {
> --
> 2.47.3
>
Br, Jarkko