Re: [PATCH -next -v2 6/8] lockdown: bound the status string with scnprintf
From: Serge E. Hallyn
Date: Tue Nov 10 2026 - 08:54:30 EST
On Tue, Nov 10, 2026 at 09:28:16PM +0800, Cai Xinchen wrote:
> Use scnprintf() instead of sprintf() when composing the lockdown status
> string in lockdown_read(). The current set of levels fits well within the
> 80 byte buffer, but sprintf() provides no protection if more or longer
> labels are added later. scnprintf() makes the buffer bounds explicit.
>
> Store the level label strings in named arrays and point the matching
> lockdown_reasons[] entries at them. Their sizes are compile-time
> constants, so a BUILD_BUG_ON() can verify that the status buffer is large
> enough for all level labels, their trailing spaces, and the brackets
> around the active one.
>
> Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> index 84efd533fe5a..26cac7628a48 100644
> --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> @@ -14,13 +14,17 @@
> #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
> #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
>
> +static const char lockdown_label_none[] = "none";
> +static const char lockdown_label_integrity[] = "integrity";
> +static const char lockdown_label_confidentiality[] = "confidentiality";
> +
> /*
> * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
> * security_locked_down() LSM hook, used for the denial message and the
> * securityfs status file.
> */
> static const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX + 1] = {
> - [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none",
> + [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = lockdown_label_none,
> [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",
> [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
> [LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access",
> @@ -41,7 +45,7 @@ static const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX + 1] = {
> [LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM",
> [LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION] = "RTAS error injection",
> [LOCKDOWN_XEN_USER_ACTIONS] = "Xen guest user action",
> - [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
> + [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = lockdown_label_integrity,
> [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
> [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
> [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
> @@ -50,7 +54,7 @@ static const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX + 1] = {
> [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
> [LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",
> [LOCKDOWN_XFRM_SECRET] = "xfrm SA secret",
> - [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
> + [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = lockdown_label_confidentiality,
> };
>
> static enum lockdown_reason kernel_locked_down;
> @@ -137,6 +141,16 @@ static ssize_t lockdown_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count,
> char temp[80] = "";
> int i, offset = 0;
>
> + /*
> + * Size the buffer for the worst case: the active level is
> + * confidentiality, with brackets and trailing spaces, plus the
> + * terminating NUL. The label sizeof() values include their own
> + * NULs, so only three more bytes are needed.
> + */
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(temp) < sizeof(lockdown_label_none) +
> + sizeof(lockdown_label_integrity) +
> + sizeof(lockdown_label_confidentiality) + 3);
Awesome, thanks. It also might be worth it to replace the 80 in temp[80]
with the calculated size, but this is safe enough.
> +
> for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_levels); i++) {
> enum lockdown_reason level = lockdown_levels[i];
>
> @@ -144,9 +158,13 @@ static ssize_t lockdown_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count,
> const char *label = lockdown_reasons[level];
>
> if (kernel_locked_down == level)
> - offset += sprintf(temp+offset, "[%s] ", label);
> + offset += scnprintf(temp + offset,
> + sizeof(temp) - offset,
> + "[%s] ", label);
> else
> - offset += sprintf(temp+offset, "%s ", label);
> + offset += scnprintf(temp + offset,
> + sizeof(temp) - offset,
> + "%s ", label);
> }
> }
>
> --
> 2.18.0.huawei.25
>