Re: [PATCH] userns: Let LSMs deny the CAP_SETFCAP snapshot for mapping uid 0

From: Paul Moore

Date: Tue Nov 10 2026 - 10:15:03 EST


On Tue, Nov 10, 2026 at 9:42 AM Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Commit db2e718a4798 ("capabilities: require CAP_SETFCAP to map uid 0")
> records in parent_could_setfcap whether the creator of a user namespace
> had CAP_SETFCAP, because a creator writing its own uid_map only has
> capabilities in the new namespace. The snapshot uses cap_raised(), so a
> task whose LSM policy denies CAP_SETFCAP can still map uid 0 in a
> namespace it creates.
>
> Use security_capable() against the parent namespace instead: the
> creator's credentials still belong to it at this point, so commoncap
> returns the same result, and only LSM denials are added.
>
> Do not audit this check: creating a user namespace does not use
> CAP_SETFCAP, and most namespaces never map uid 0. The uid_map write
> that later fails has no LSM audit record.
>
> Checking CAP_SETFCAP when the map is written would not work: the
> writer's credentials then belong to the new namespace, where commoncap
> grants the creator all capabilities.
>
> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Fixes: db2e718a4798 ("capabilities: require CAP_SETFCAP to map uid 0")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>
> This is independent from Josef Bacik's series, which reworks this code
> to close other ways around the CAP_SETFCAP rule:
> https://patch.msgid.link/20261027-b4-setfcap-userns-v8-0-2674adc63f3c@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
> That series still computes the creator's CAP_SETFCAP with cap_capable()
> and cap_raised() in cap_setfcap_level(), so it would need the same
> change.
> ---
> include/linux/user_namespace.h | 5 +++--
> kernel/user_namespace.c | 8 +++++++-
> 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

Looks reasonable to me.

Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> (LSM)

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