[PATCH 1/6] landlock: Factor out capability denial checks
From: Mickaël Salaün
Date: Tue Nov 10 2026 - 15:32:19 EST
hook_capable() is the only place that checks a capability against a
Landlock domain. commoncap also makes capability decisions from other
LSM hooks, and the following commits add Landlock counterparts for them.
Move the check and its denial logging into check_cap() so that these
hooks share it.
No functional change.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
---
security/landlock/cap.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/landlock/cap.c b/security/landlock/cap.c
index b4f491b09baa..fa59118e3486 100644
--- a/security/landlock/cap.c
+++ b/security/landlock/cap.c
@@ -24,25 +24,21 @@ static const struct access_masks cap_permission = {
};
/**
- * hook_capable - Deny capability use for Landlock-sandboxed processes
+ * check_cap - Check a capability use against the domain of @cred
*
* @cred: Credentials being checked.
- * @ns: Target user namespace (intentionally ignored; policy depends on the
- * acting credentials and @cap, not namespace ownership).
* @cap: Capability number (CAP_*).
* @opts: Capability check options. CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT skips the denial record:
* no audit record, no trace event, and no denial count.
*
* Pure bitmask check: denies the capability if it is not in the layer's allowed
- * set. This hook is purely restrictive: commoncap is registered with
- * LSM_ORDER_FIRST so cap_capable() always runs first, which means Landlock can
- * deny capabilities that commoncap would allow, but never grant capabilities
- * that commoncap denied.
+ * set. It does not check that @cred holds @cap: only call it for a capability
+ * that commoncap already granted.
*
* Return: 0 if allowed, -EPERM if capability use is denied.
*/
-static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
- int cap, unsigned int opts)
+static int check_cap(const struct cred *const cred, const int cap,
+ const unsigned int opts)
{
const struct landlock_cred_security *subject;
size_t denied_layer;
@@ -72,6 +68,28 @@ static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
return -EPERM;
}
+/**
+ * hook_capable - Deny capability use for Landlock-sandboxed processes
+ *
+ * @cred: Credentials being checked.
+ * @ns: Target user namespace (intentionally ignored; policy depends on the
+ * acting credentials and @cap, not namespace ownership).
+ * @cap: Capability number (CAP_*).
+ * @opts: Capability check options, see check_cap().
+ *
+ * This hook is purely restrictive: commoncap is registered with LSM_ORDER_FIRST
+ * so cap_capable() always runs first, which means Landlock can deny
+ * capabilities that commoncap would allow, but never grant capabilities that
+ * commoncap denied.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if allowed, -EPERM if capability use is denied.
+ */
+static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ int cap, unsigned int opts)
+{
+ return check_cap(cred, cap, opts);
+}
+
static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, hook_capable),
};
--
2.56.0