[PATCH 3/6] apparmor: Use security_capable_lsm() for policy capabilities

From: Mickaël Salaün

Date: Tue Nov 10 2026 - 15:43:01 EST


AppArmor checks CAP_MAC_ADMIN for policy management and CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE
for unconfined stacking with cap_capable() instead of capable(), so that
other stacked LSMs do not have to authorize them. This also lets a
process in a Landlock domain that denies CAP_MAC_ADMIN manage AppArmor
policy, and one that denies CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE avoid the stacking
restriction on unconfined profile changes.

Commit 31ec99e13346 ("apparmor: switch to apparmor to internal capable
check for policy management") made this choice for CAP_MAC_ADMIN.

Switch these checks to security_capable_lsm(), which keeps this choice
for LSMs that only implement the capable hook. policy_ns_capable()
still makes its own aa_capable() check. Update the comments that
described these checks.

Cc: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
---
security/apparmor/domain.c | 9 +++++----
security/apparmor/policy.c | 7 ++++---
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index af9e8431e3ea..d2c111783457 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -884,11 +884,12 @@ static bool is_profile_priv_restricted_to_stack(const struct cred *subj_cred,
{
if (profile_unconfined(profile) && profile == profile->ns->unconfined &&
aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted &&
- /* cap_capable returns false (0) if true, hence true here means
- * doesn't have capability and the stack will be restricted
+ /* security_capable_lsm() returns 0 if CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE is granted,
+ * otherwise the stack will be restricted
*/
- cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE,
- CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT))
+ security_capable_lsm(current_cred(), &init_user_ns,
+ CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT,
+ LSM_ID_APPARMOR))
return true;
return false;
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 63f7821b4dff..ba162d921805 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -876,8 +876,8 @@ static int audit_policy(struct aa_label *subj_label, const char *op,
return error;
}

-/* don't call out to other LSMs in the stack for apparmor policy admin
- * permissions
+/* don't ask other LSMs' capable hooks about apparmor policy admin
+ * permissions, only LSMs restricting capability use through capable_lsm
*/
static int policy_ns_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
struct aa_label *label,
@@ -886,7 +886,8 @@ static int policy_ns_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
int err;

/* check for MAC_ADMIN cap in cred */
- err = cap_capable(subj_cred, userns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE);
+ err = security_capable_lsm(subj_cred, userns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE,
+ LSM_ID_APPARMOR);
if (!err)
err = aa_capable(subj_cred, label, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE);

--
2.56.0