[PATCH] greybus: verify the received message size covers the message header
From: Shunbo Shi
Date: Thu Nov 12 2026 - 03:20:15 EST
In gb_connection_recv(), the size of the received data is checked
against sizeof(struct gb_operation_msg_hdr) and against the message
size encoded in the header (msg_size), but msg_size itself is never
checked against the header size.
If a peer sends a message whose header claims a size smaller than
the header itself (e.g. header.size == 3), the two existing checks
both pass (size >= sizeof(header) and size >= msg_size), and the
message is dispatched with the undersized msg_size.
In gb_operation_create_incoming(), this leads to an unsigned
integer underflow in:
request_size = size - sizeof(struct gb_operation_msg_hdr);
The underflowed request_size then wraps back around in
gb_operation_message_alloc():
message_size = payload_size + sizeof(*header);
causing kzalloc() to allocate a buffer that is too small to hold
the message header. When the response is later prepared in
gb_operation_response_alloc(), reading
request_header->operation_id reads past the end of the undersized
allocation, triggering a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds report. When
header.size is zero, kzalloc(0) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR and the
same read dereferences an invalid address.
Verify msg_size >= sizeof(header) in gb_connection_recv() so that
the "Caller has made sure we at least have a message header"
assumption in gb_operation_create_incoming() actually holds.
Fixes: d90c25b0a279 ("greybus: let operation layer examine incoming data")
Reported-by: syzbot+0b456664585fa81a47f6@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Closes: https://syzbot.org/bug?extid=0b456664585fa81a47f6
Signed-off-by: Shunbo Shi <shishunbo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/greybus/operation.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/greybus/operation.c b/drivers/greybus/operation.c
index 7e12ffb2dd60..da53c0e026f0 100644
--- a/drivers/greybus/operation.c
+++ b/drivers/greybus/operation.c
@@ -1047,6 +1047,13 @@ void gb_connection_recv(struct gb_connection *connection,
/* Use memcpy as data may be unaligned */
memcpy(&header, data, sizeof(header));
msg_size = le16_to_cpu(header.size);
+ if (msg_size < sizeof(header)) {
+ dev_err_ratelimited(dev,
+ "%s: invalid message header size (%zu < %zu)\n",
+ connection->name, msg_size,
+ sizeof(header));
+ return;
+ }
if (size < msg_size) {
dev_err_ratelimited(dev,
"%s: incomplete message 0x%04x of type 0x%02x received (%zu < %zu)\n",
--
2.53.0