[PATCH] KEYS: Fix signature input size for KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY

From: Stefan Berger

Date: Fri Nov 13 2026 - 11:06:14 EST


Revert the changes made for signature verification in cb481e59ea6c back
to the old behavior where effectively the params->in2_len was set to the
length of the user provided buffer uparams.in2_len (out_len is an alias
for in2_len due to the union). We cannot use the max_sig_size in the
case of signature verification since this is neither the true size of the
input buffer nor would it pass tests of size indicators found in the ASN.1
in the buffer comparing against the input buffer size.

Fixes: cb481e59ea6c ("KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()")
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Florian Bauckholt <florian.bauckholt@xxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
index 15b6bf6399b5..794fa3d01911 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par
uparams.in2_len > info.max_sig_size)
return -EINVAL;

- params->out_len = info.max_sig_size;
+ params->in2_len = uparams.in2_len;
break;
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
--
2.56.0