Re: [PATCH] userns: security: Inform LSMs of capability check during userns creation
From: Bradley Morgan
Date: Fri Nov 13 2026 - 16:58:59 EST
On 13 November 2026 21:39:33 GMT, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
>On Wed, Nov 11, 2026 at 08:58:14PM +0000, Bradley Morgan wrote:
>> Right now security_capable() gets called in create_user_ns() to snapshot
>> whether the parent could setfcap, but the LSM gets zero context on where
>> the check actually came from. It is the same story as setid: without a
>> dedicated flag, security modules cannot tell this apart from regular
>> capability checks.
>>
>> Add CAP_OPT_USERNS_CREATE and pass it along from create_user_ns().
>
>This should be patch 1/N in a set that introduces a user of it
>in some lsm.
hmm. Did you read Christians suggestion? Let's see if Christian or anyone
else could suggest a nice little lsm user for this.
If nobody responds, in coming days, I'll go and find and do a user for it.
>
>> Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> Link:
>https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261111-kommt-gischt-ohnedies-469998d2f219@brauner/
>> Signed-off-by: Bradley Morgan <bradley.morgan@xxxxxxxxx>
>> ---
>> Thanks Christian for the suggestion :).
>> ---
>> include/linux/security.h | 2 ++
>> kernel/user_namespace.c | 3 ++-
>> 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
>> index 40831fab54709..d24666a0b4833 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/security.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
>> @@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ struct nsset;
>> #define CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT BIT(1)
>> /* If capable is being called by a setid function */
>> #define CAP_OPT_INSETID BIT(2)
>> +/* Is capable being called from the user namespace creation path? */
>> +#define CAP_OPT_USERNS_CREATE BIT(3)
>>
>> /* LSM Agnostic defines for security_sb_set_mnt_opts() flags */
>> #define SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS 1
>> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
>> index 57b7f10be74e1..37480f6d8369f 100644
>> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
>> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
>> @@ -134,7 +134,8 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
>> * audit: the creator may never map uid 0.
>> */
>> ns->parent_could_setfcap =
>> - !security_capable(new, parent_ns, CAP_SETFCAP, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT);
>> + !security_capable(new, parent_ns, CAP_SETFCAP,
>> + CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT | CAP_OPT_USERNS_CREATE);
>>
>> ret = ns_common_init(ns);
>> if (ret)
>> --
>> 2.53.0
>
--- Thanks!