Re: [Bug report] x86-64 apply_returns() decodes attacker-controlled addresses from unvalidated .return_sites entries - wild read on module load
From: Borislav Petkov
Date: Sat Nov 14 2026 - 01:21:19 EST
On Sat, Nov 14, 2026 at 04:00:00PM +0800, Guikun Yang wrote:
> From: Guikun Yang <yangguikun19@xxxxxx>
> To: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
> Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>,
> Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@xxxxxxxxxx>, Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@xxxxxxxx>,
> Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>,
> Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, x86@xxxxxxxxxx,
> linux-modules@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: [Bug report] x86-64 apply_returns() decodes attacker-controlled
> addresses from unvalidated .return_sites entries - wild read on module load
>
> Hi Peter, Ingo,
>
> The .return_sites section of a module is consumed by apply_returns()
> without any validation of the computed addresses. Each entry is an s32
> relative offset whose final value is fully attacker-controlled via the
> R_X86_64_PC32 relocation addend (that relocation path has no overflow
If you can load modules on a system, you've already won.
Why would you even do some silly exploit like that?
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette