[PATCH 1/2] crypto: ecc - Keep the random initial Z below 2^521 on P-521
From: Arun Iyengar via B4 Relay
Date: Sat Nov 14 2026 - 03:44:28 EST
From: Arun Iyengar <aiyengar1990@xxxxxxxxx>
Erwin Pawliczek's commit cd65eaf17841 ("crypto: ecc - Randomize the
initial Z in ecc_make_pub_key()") takes the initial Z from ndigits * 8
random bytes, as crypto_ecdh_shared_secret() already did. On P-521 that
is a 576-bit number, but vli_mmod_fast_521() only reduces products of
numbers below 2^521. With a 576-bit Z, every P-521 ecc_make_pub_key()
call returns -EAGAIN. There is no in-tree P-521 caller yet.
Get Z from one helper at both sites that keeps the random bits to the
curve's bit length. The other curves are unchanged.
Tested in UML: P-521 ecc_make_pub_key() now matches a Python reference
for the tested keys from 2^522 - 2n up to n - 3. Smaller keys are fixed
by the next patch. The ecdsa-nist-p521 self-tests still pass.
Fixes: cd65eaf17841 ("crypto: ecc - Randomize the initial Z in ecc_make_pub_key()")
Cc: Erwin Pawliczek <pawliczekerwin@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Arun Iyengar <aiyengar1990@xxxxxxxxx>
---
crypto/ecc.c | 20 ++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/ecc.c b/crypto/ecc.c
index 6696bf0d90a6..a56a33e4eccb 100644
--- a/crypto/ecc.c
+++ b/crypto/ecc.c
@@ -1609,13 +1609,22 @@ int ecc_gen_privkey(unsigned int curve_id, unsigned int ndigits,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ecc_gen_privkey);
+/* Random initial Z for ecc_point_mult(), below 2^nbits */
+static void ecc_rand_z(const struct ecc_curve *curve, u64 *z,
+ unsigned int ndigits)
+{
+ get_random_bytes(z, ndigits << ECC_DIGITS_TO_BYTES_SHIFT);
+ /* P-521: the fast reduction only takes products of 521-bit numbers */
+ if (curve->nbits % 64)
+ z[ndigits - 1] &= GENMASK_ULL(curve->nbits % 64 - 1, 0);
+}
+
int ecc_make_pub_key(unsigned int curve_id, unsigned int ndigits,
const u64 *private_key, u64 *public_key)
{
int ret = 0;
struct ecc_point *pk;
u64 rand_z[ECC_MAX_DIGITS];
- unsigned int nbytes;
const struct ecc_curve *curve = ecc_get_curve(curve_id);
if (!private_key || ndigits > ARRAY_SIZE(rand_z)) {
@@ -1623,9 +1632,7 @@ int ecc_make_pub_key(unsigned int curve_id, unsigned int ndigits,
goto out;
}
- nbytes = ndigits << ECC_DIGITS_TO_BYTES_SHIFT;
-
- get_random_bytes(rand_z, nbytes);
+ ecc_rand_z(curve, rand_z, ndigits);
pk = ecc_alloc_point(ndigits);
if (!pk) {
@@ -1719,7 +1726,6 @@ int crypto_ecdh_shared_secret(unsigned int curve_id, unsigned int ndigits,
int ret = 0;
struct ecc_point *product, *pk;
u64 rand_z[ECC_MAX_DIGITS];
- unsigned int nbytes;
const struct ecc_curve *curve = ecc_get_curve(curve_id);
if (!private_key || !public_key || ndigits > ARRAY_SIZE(rand_z)) {
@@ -1727,9 +1733,7 @@ int crypto_ecdh_shared_secret(unsigned int curve_id, unsigned int ndigits,
goto out;
}
- nbytes = ndigits << ECC_DIGITS_TO_BYTES_SHIFT;
-
- get_random_bytes(rand_z, nbytes);
+ ecc_rand_z(curve, rand_z, ndigits);
pk = ecc_alloc_point(ndigits);
if (!pk) {
--
2.55.0