Re: [PATCH] userns: security: Inform LSMs of capability check during userns creation

[Bradley Morgan]

On 14 November 2026 14:34:07 GMT, Serge Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>Nov 13, 2026 15:54:37 Bradley Morgan <bradley.morgan@xxxxxxxxx>:
>
>> On 13 November 2026 21:39:33 GMT, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> wrote:
>>> On Wed, Nov 11, 2026 at 08:58:14PM +0000, Bradley Morgan wrote:
>>>> Right now security_capable() gets called in create_user_ns() to
>snapshot
>>>> whether the parent could setfcap, but the LSM gets zero context on
>where
>>>> the check actually came from. It is the same story as setid: without a
>>>> dedicated flag, security modules cannot tell this apart from regular
>>>> capability checks.
>>>>
>>>> Add CAP_OPT_USERNS_CREATE and pass it along from create_user_ns().
>>>
>>> This should be patch 1/N in a set that introduces a user of it
>>> in some lsm.
>>
>> hmm. Did you read Christians suggestion?
>
>I did, when he first sent it. Actually it seems to me that what the lsm
>would really like to know is that this is not for an immediate use of
>setfcap, but possible future use. But that doesn't really matter. I wasn't
>judging the patch. I was just going by what i believe is general lsm
>subsystem policy.

( my word wrapping client did not like that message :( )

hmm, it's pre-reqed over the patch as on the lore link, so Christian may
want to have a look at this obe

>
>> Let's see if Christian or anyone
>> else could suggest a nice little lsm user for this.
>>
>> If nobody responds, in coming days, I'll go and find and do a user for
>it.
>>
>>>
>>>> Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> Link:
>>>
>https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261111-kommt-gischt-ohnedies-469998d2f219@brauner/
>>>> Signed-off-by: Bradley Morgan <bradley.morgan@xxxxxxxxx>
>>>> ---
>>>> Thanks Christian for the suggestion :).
>>>> ---
>>>> include/linux/security.h | 2 ++
>>>> kernel/user_namespace.c  | 3 ++-
>>>> 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
>>>> index 40831fab54709..d24666a0b4833 100644
>>>> --- a/include/linux/security.h
>>>> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
>>>> @@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ struct nsset;
>>>> #define CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT BIT(1)
>>>> /* If capable is being called by a setid function */
>>>> #define CAP_OPT_INSETID BIT(2)
>>>> +/* Is capable being called from the user namespace creation path? */
>>>> +#define CAP_OPT_USERNS_CREATE BIT(3)
>>>>
>>>> /* LSM Agnostic defines for security_sb_set_mnt_opts() flags */
>>>> #define SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS 1
>>>> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
>>>> index 57b7f10be74e1..37480f6d8369f 100644
>>>> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
>>>> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
>>>> @@ -134,7 +134,8 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
>>>>      * audit: the creator may never map uid 0.
>>>>      */
>>>>     ns->parent_could_setfcap =
>>>> -       !security_capable(new, parent_ns, CAP_SETFCAP,
>CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT);
>>>> +       !security_capable(new, parent_ns, CAP_SETFCAP,
>>>> +                 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT | CAP_OPT_USERNS_CREATE);
>>>>
>>>>     ret = ns_common_init(ns);
>>>>     if (ret)
>>>> --
>>>> 2.53.0
>>>
>>
>> --- Thanks!
>
>

--- Thanks!