Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 0/8] bpf, sockmap: Restrict iter-context sockmap updates to sockmap iterators

From: Michal Luczaj

Date: Sun Nov 15 2026 - 18:10:59 EST


On 11/14/26 19:45, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Sat Nov 7, 2026 at 5:58 PM UTC, Michal Luczaj wrote:
>> Follow-up to Sashiko's report [1] and the decision to restrict which
>> iterator may perform sockmap updates [2]. Series started short: remove
>> about-to-be-stale test, restrict updates, add a negative test. Then it
>> expanded: mark bpf_iter__sockmap::sk as PTR_TRUSTED, restrict
>> bpf_sock_destroy() callers to iter/{tcp,udp}, few little tweaks.
>>
>> [1]: https://msgid.link/20260626205814.BAC3C1F000E9@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> [2]: https://msgid.link/87echn2fhd.fsf@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@xxxxxxx>
>> ---
>> Changes in v3:
>> - Drop RFC prefix
>> - Update bpf_iter_reg::feature docs
>> - Fix tcp_request_sock BTF build error
>> - Restrict allowed callers of bpf_sock_destroy() to iter/{tcp,udp} (Alexei)
>> - Link to v2: https://patch.msgid.link/20261102-sockmap-update-limit-iter-v2-0-e96a63c43b39@xxxxxxx
>
> Sorry for the delay. Applied.

No problem, thanks.

To follow up on bpf_iter__unix::unix_sk, looks like there's a single helper
that will become unusable from iter/unix (once plain-PTR_TO_BTF_ID is
gone): bpf_get_socket_cookie(). PTR_TRUSTED then?

Michal