[PATCH v2 1/2] smb: client: fail SMB2 responses with a bad signature

From: Suyuan Wang via B4 Relay

Date: Sun Nov 15 2026 - 23:06:31 EST


From: Suyuan Wang <stevewong@xxxxxxxxxxx>

smb2_check_receive() checks the response signature when signing is on,
but a failed check is only logged:

rc = smb2_verify_signature(&rqst, server);
if (rc)
cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "SMB signature verification returned ...",
rc);
...
return map_smb2_to_linux_error(mid->resp_buf, log_error);

The status from the response is returned as usual, and the caller goes
on to use a response whose signature is wrong. This is the path for
synchronous and compound requests and for smb2_writev_callback(). On a
signed but unencrypted connection, anyone who can modify the traffic
can change e.g. a directory listing or file attributes, and the client
accepts it.

Return the verification error instead. That alone is not enough for
compound_send_recv(), which still hands the response buffer to the
caller after check_receive() fails. smb2_compound_op() then maps the
status from that buffer again and copies the payload out, and other
callers look at the buffer on error too, e.g. smb2_open_file() parses
a symlink target out of a STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK response. So also
mark the mid MID_RESPONSE_MALFORMED, and have compound_send_recv() handle
it like a mid in a bad state: mark the earlier mids cancelled, so that a
CREATE which did succeed gets its handle closed, and don't pass any
response on.

Unlike the SMB1 fix in commit dc96f01d54cc ("smb: client: terminate
session upon failed client required signing"), don't reconnect: this
runs in the thread that sent the request, and only cifsd should call
cifs_reconnect(). And fail the request whichever side required signing,
since a response with a bad signature can't be trusted either way.

Found with a static analysis tool and checked by hand.

Reported-by: Daniel Birtwhistle <daniel.birtwhistle@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cifs/SN4PR22MB28883DAF57E0B4D4BFB1C22AEEC42@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
Fixes: 3c1bf7e48e9e ("CIFS: Enable signing in SMB2")
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Co-developed-by: Kaixuan Li <kaixuan.li@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Kaixuan Li <kaixuan.li@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Suyuan Wang <stevewong@xxxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/smb/client/smb2transport.c | 6 +++++-
fs/smb/client/transport.c | 6 ++++++
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2transport.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2transport.c
index 080864b24a0c..5d6871553ee9 100644
--- a/fs/smb/client/smb2transport.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2transport.c
@@ -711,9 +711,13 @@ smb2_check_receive(struct mid_q_entry *mid, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
int rc;

rc = smb2_verify_signature(&rqst, server);
- if (rc)
+ if (rc) {
cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "SMB signature verification returned error = %d\n",
rc);
+ /* compound_send_recv() must not pass this response on */
+ mid->mid_state = MID_RESPONSE_MALFORMED;
+ return rc;
+ }
}

return map_smb2_to_linux_error(mid->resp_buf, log_error);
diff --git a/fs/smb/client/transport.c b/fs/smb/client/transport.c
index d0d0159c1061..f1ba9701b545 100644
--- a/fs/smb/client/transport.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/transport.c
@@ -1110,6 +1110,12 @@ compound_send_recv(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses,

rc = server->ops->check_receive(mid[i], server,
flags & CIFS_LOG_ERROR);
+ if (mid[i]->mid_state != MID_RESPONSE_READY) {
+ /* Bad signature, don't let the caller parse any response */
+ cifs_mark_compound_mids_cancelled(mid, i);
+ num_processed = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
num_processed = i + 1;
}


--
2.34.1