Re: [PATCH 0/2] lockdown: Prevent booting with lockdown enabled but IOMMU disabled

From: Mario Limonciello

Date: Mon Nov 16 2026 - 14:46:51 EST


On 11/16/26 13:44, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
On Mon, Nov 02, 2026 at 08:00:24AM -0600, Mario Limonciello (AMD) wrote:
Lockdown is a kernel LSM that restricts access to sensitive kernel
resources (e.g. /dev/mem, kernel modules, perf, tracing, kprobes,
BPF access to kernel memory). However, without IOMMU, any PCI/PCIe
device can perform DMA to arbitrary physical memory, effectively
bypassing all lockdown protections.

I don't see how this is enough?

You can have an iommu but the commandline can put the whole thing in
DMA passthrough, which is the same functionality as not having an
iommu.

Well that's why I was suggesting that we explicitly blocked manipulating IOMMU from the command line when lockdown is enabled.


It is not like "any" PCI device can do this DMA. Lockdown
systematically prevents any userspace from triggering such an
uncontrolled DMA.

This is more about preventing someone with physical control of the HW
from access all of memory, which IMHO, is not part of the threat model
lockdown should have.

If external attacks through PCIe are part of your threat model then
lockdown is the wrong direction. Leon's driver trust series is how we
are trying to solve this issue comprehensively in a useful way.

Jason