Re: [PATCH v2 1/6] landlock: Factor out capability denial checks
From: Günther Noack
Date: Tue Nov 17 2026 - 08:56:27 EST
On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 11:11:51AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> hook_capable() is the only place that checks a capability against a
> Landlock domain. commoncap also makes capability decisions from other
> LSM hooks, and the following commits add Landlock counterparts for them.
> Move the check and its denial logging into check_cap() so that these
> hooks share it.
>
> No functional change.
>
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>
> Changes since v1:
> https://patch.msgid.link/20261110202436.2408244-2-mic@xxxxxxxxxxx
> - Add Serge Hallyn's Acked-by.
> ---
> security/landlock/cap.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
> 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/landlock/cap.c b/security/landlock/cap.c
> index b4f491b09baa..fa59118e3486 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/cap.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/cap.c
> @@ -24,25 +24,21 @@ static const struct access_masks cap_permission = {
> };
>
> /**
> - * hook_capable - Deny capability use for Landlock-sandboxed processes
> + * check_cap - Check a capability use against the domain of @cred
> *
> * @cred: Credentials being checked.
> - * @ns: Target user namespace (intentionally ignored; policy depends on the
> - * acting credentials and @cap, not namespace ownership).
> * @cap: Capability number (CAP_*).
> * @opts: Capability check options. CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT skips the denial record:
> * no audit record, no trace event, and no denial count.
> *
> * Pure bitmask check: denies the capability if it is not in the layer's allowed
> - * set. This hook is purely restrictive: commoncap is registered with
> - * LSM_ORDER_FIRST so cap_capable() always runs first, which means Landlock can
> - * deny capabilities that commoncap would allow, but never grant capabilities
> - * that commoncap denied.
> + * set. It does not check that @cred holds @cap: only call it for a capability
> + * that commoncap already granted.
> *
> * Return: 0 if allowed, -EPERM if capability use is denied.
> */
> -static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> - int cap, unsigned int opts)
> +static int check_cap(const struct cred *const cred, const int cap,
> + const unsigned int opts)
> {
> const struct landlock_cred_security *subject;
> size_t denied_layer;
> @@ -72,6 +68,28 @@ static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> return -EPERM;
> }
>
> +/**
> + * hook_capable - Deny capability use for Landlock-sandboxed processes
> + *
> + * @cred: Credentials being checked.
> + * @ns: Target user namespace (intentionally ignored; policy depends on the
> + * acting credentials and @cap, not namespace ownership).
> + * @cap: Capability number (CAP_*).
> + * @opts: Capability check options, see check_cap().
> + *
> + * This hook is purely restrictive: commoncap is registered with LSM_ORDER_FIRST
> + * so cap_capable() always runs first, which means Landlock can deny
> + * capabilities that commoncap would allow, but never grant capabilities that
> + * commoncap denied.
> + *
> + * Return: 0 if allowed, -EPERM if capability use is denied.
> + */
> +static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> + int cap, unsigned int opts)
> +{
> + return check_cap(cred, cap, opts);
> +}
> +
> static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, hook_capable),
> };
> --
> 2.56.0
>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@xxxxxxxxxx>