Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] KEYS: fix signature length passed to KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY

From: Jarkko Sakkinen

Date: Thu Nov 19 2026 - 07:55:31 EST


On Thu, Nov 19, 2026 at 02:50:04AM -0500, Guicai Ma wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 11:19:28PM +0000, Florian Bauckholt wrote:
> > As a result keyctl_pkey_verify() ignores the signature length passed by
> > the caller and always reads max_sig_size bytes from the signature
> > pointer. A shorter signature is extended with whatever follows it in
> > the caller's memory, or the call fails with -EFAULT if that memory is
> > not readable.
>
> Verified the union usage in struct kernel_pkey_params and reproduced both
> failure modes on arm64 with an RSA-2048 PKCS#8 key (enc=pkcs1 hash=sha256):
>
> - A truncated 200-byte signature with the remaining 56 bytes still intact
> in userspace memory was falsely accepted (0) before this patch, and is
> now rejected with -EINVAL.
> - A 16-byte signature placed right before a PROT_NONE guard page (as well
> as a 0-byte signature at the page boundary) returned -EFAULT before this
> patch, and now returns -EINVAL without faulting.
>
> Reviewed-by: Guicai Ma <maguicai@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Tested-by: Guicai Ma <maguicai@xxxxxxxxxx>

Thanks.

Br, Jarkko